United States v. Lonnie Cartrette , 502 F. App'x 311 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4186
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LONNIE LEROY CARTRETTE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:11-cr-00400-RBH-1)
Argued: December 5, 2012 Decided: December 31, 2012
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Davis wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Duncan and Judge Agee joined.
ARGUED: James P. Rogers, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas Ernest Booth,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: William N. Nettles, United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, Alfred W. Bethea, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence,
South Carolina; Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General,
John D. Buretta, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Lonnie Cartrette appeals his conviction of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
and a two-level obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement
imposed under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1 after
the district court found he committed perjury on the witness
stand. Cartrette principally argues that the police did not
properly impound his vehicle after he was arrested for
shoplifting, and that the subsequent inventory search (which
revealed the weapon) was thus invalid. He also contends the
district court improperly excluded certain photographic evidence
and improperly applied the obstruction of justice enhancement.
For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
I.
A.
Conway, South Carolina, Police Department (“CPD”) officers
Joshua Hardee and Chevis Ridgeway responded to a shoplifting
report at a local Wal-Mart around 8:30 p.m. on February 4, 2011.
Wal-Mart loss prevention employees had detained Cartrette after
he had attempted to shoplift a bottle of perfume. The officers
arrested Cartrette for shoplifting and took him out of the Wal-
Mart to their patrol car. They asked Cartrette where his car was
3
in the parking lot, and he indicated the aisle in which his car
was located. 1 The officers determined that Cartrette’s license
was suspended and decided to have his car towed from the lot,
even though Cartrette told them that both his wife and brother
were not far away and could pick up the car. Indeed, Cartrette
told the officers his brother was at a restaurant next to the
Wal-Mart parking lot.
Nonetheless, the officers opted to impound the vehicle and
conduct an inventory search. While the CPD has no written policy
addressing when vehicles should be impounded (as opposed to when
they should be searched after impoundment), Officers Ridgeway
and Hardee testified that the standard procedure is to impound a
vehicle when the driver is arrested and no other driver is
present to take custody of the vehicle. Thus, while Cartrette
remained in the police cruiser with Hardee, Officer Ridgeway
walked to Cartrette’s vehicle and began an inventory search.
The CPD policy for inventory searches states:
G. Automobile Inventories
1
Apparently, the Wal-Mart employees had questioned
Cartrette before the officers’ arrival and the officers quickly
learned that Cartrette had a vehicle nearby. Cartrette confirmed
at oral argument that he makes no contention that the officers
learned of the car’s presence through custodial questioning by
the officers. Indeed, Cartrette apparently requested that the
officers place in his vehicle a container of dog food (which,
unlike the purloined perfume) he had paid for at the register in
the Wal-Mart. We are told they did as he requested.
4
1. Officers will routinely conduct a warrantless
inventory of any lawfully impounded vehicle.
2. Warrantless inventories are done to:
a. Protect the owner’s property
b. Protect the Department against claims of lost
or stolen property
c. Make sure that no weapons or other dangerous
instruments fall into the hands of vandals or
thieves.
3. Officers will complete a Vehicle Impound Form on
every impounded vehicle.
J.A. 82. Ridgeway found a machete and a BB gun in the vehicle’s
passenger compartment. He then opened the trunk and found,
wrapped in shirts or sweatshirts, a short-barrel, pump action
shotgun. Cartrette stipulated at trial that he had previously
been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, and thus was ineligible to possess firearms.
B.
Cartrette was indicted in the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina on March 22, 2011, on one
count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e). Cartrette filed a motion to
suppress the shotgun, arguing that the search of his car’s trunk
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. In a pre-trial
motions hearing and at trial, the arresting officers testified
to the CPD impoundment procedure. Officer Hardee testified that
the standard procedure is to impound a vehicle when no other
driver is present:
5
Q: And is that standard operating procedure with
Conway Police Department, that if you arrest a suspect
and there is no other driver present, that you would
call a wrecker and impound the car?
A: Yes, sir. We do that to cover ourselves. That way
nothing happens to the gentleman’s vehicle.
J.A. 32.
Officer Ridgeway testified that “[o]nce we place somebody
under arrest, any of their property that’s not able to go with
them to the jail becomes our responsibility, to include
vehicles.” J.A. 117. Officer Ridgeway also testified:
Q: Now, the defense asked a question as to whether or
not you have any discretion as to wait for another
driver to come and get the vehicle.
A: My understanding is that there is not – I mean I’ve
never personally practiced it, and I don’t know that
it is practiced in the department.
Q: Standard procedure is you would impound the vehicle
--
A: Correct.
Q: -- when someone’s arrested unless there is another
driver present?
A: Yes, sir.
J.A. 45-46. The court denied the motion to suppress, reasoning
that the search of the trunk was a proper inventory search after
police had reasonably impounded the vehicle because there was no
6
known individual immediately available to take custody of the
vehicle. See J.A. 80-85. 2
At trial, Cartrette testified that he, his brother, Richard
“Ricky” Loggins, and Loggins’ girlfriend had driven to the Wal-
Mart to get dog food, and that the brother and his girlfriend
went to a nearby restaurant while Cartrette went into Wal-Mart.
He paid for the dog food but admitted to shoplifting a bottle of
perfume, valued at $6, for his stepdaugther. 3 When Wal-Mart loss
prevention employees stopped him for shoplifting, they took him
to the loss prevention office in the back of the store. When the
police officers arrived, he said, they laid out his possessions
on a counter, noticed the keys, and asked him where the car was.
He allegedly responded, “the car’s setting in the parking lot,
but it’s not mine.” J.A. 62. Cartrette, denying any knowledge
that the shotgun was in the car, testified that the shotgun
belonged to another brother, Jason Mishoe, and that he had seen
it only once before.
2
The district court did, however, suppress Cartrette’s
statements to the officers regarding the shotgun after they
discovered it, finding that, contrary to the officers’
testimony, Cartrette had not been advised of his right to remain
silent.
3
The value of the perfume is not in the record, but
Cartrette’s counsel indicated at oral argument it was worth $6.
7
Mishoe, however, testified that while the gun had
previously belonged to him, he had given up possession of it
before the night of Cartrette’s arrest. Specifically, he
testified that the shotgun found in Cartrette’s trunk first
belonged to Lisa Pate, a former girlfriend of Mishoe’s who had
once lived with him. Mishoe said he had other guns in his house,
but after he was convicted for assault and battery and child
neglect, he was no longer allowed to possess firearms. He
testified that his father therefore took the guns, and that
Cartrette then took the guns from the father.
On cross examination, defense counsel introduced a photo,
uploaded to Facebook in 2010, of Mishoe holding two shotguns –
one of them the shotgun later found in Cartrette’s trunk. Mishoe
said the photo was taken in 2009, before he was barred from
possessing firearms. When the prosecutor objected on relevancy
grounds to the introduction of additional photos showing Mishoe
with guns, the court excluded the other photos under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, which allows a court to exclude relevant
evidence for reasons including undue delay, waste of time, and
the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The court
ultimately admitted the photo of Mishoe holding two shotguns,
and a Facebook printout of the same, but excluded the other
photos.
8
A jury found Cartrette guilty of one count of unlawfully
possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the court
applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice,
finding that Cartrette perjured himself at trial in that he “was
not credible in the opinion of The Court” and “g[a]ve false
testimony on a material matter with the willful intent to
deceive.” J.A. 353. With a criminal history category of III and
an offense level of 22, including the two-level obstruction of
justice enhancement, the Guidelines range was 51 to 63 months.
Without the enhancement, the range would have been 41 to 51
months. The court sentenced Cartrette to 54 months’ imprisonment
and three years of supervised release.
Cartrette filed a timely notice of appeal. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
Cartrette argues on appeal that (1) the impoundment of his
vehicle was unlawful, and thus the shotgun found in the
subsequent inventory search should have been suppressed; (2) the
district court erred in excluding certain photos of his brother
holding firearms; and (3) the court erred in applying a two-
level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. We
address each issue in turn.
9
A.
1.
Cartrette first argues the district court erred in its
denial of his motion to suppress the shotgun found in the trunk
of his car. We review a district court’s factual findings on a
suppression motion for clear error and its legal conclusions de
novo. United States v. Hernandez–Mendez, 626 F.3d 203, 206 (4th
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1833 (2011).
2.
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. As a
general rule, the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a
warrant before conducting a search. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527
U.S. 465, 466 (1999). “Any evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.”
United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 738 (4th Cir. 2007). The
Supreme Court, however, has held warrantless searches to be
valid if the search “‘falls within one of the narrow and well-
delineated exceptions’ to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.” United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 556 (4th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13
(1999)).
10
An inventory search is a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
369-72 (1976). Opperman held that when vehicles are lawfully
impounded, it is reasonable for the police to secure and
inventory the vehicle’s contents so long as there exists a
“standard police procedure” for doing so. Id. at 372. The Court
gave three reasons for allowing inventory searches: (1) to
protect the vehicle owner’s property while it remains in police
custody; (2) to protect the police against claims or disputes
over lost or stolen property; and (3) to protect the police from
potential danger. Id. at 369.
We have stated: “A proper inventory search is merely an
incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding
incarceration, conducted to protect the arrestee from theft of
his possessions, to protect the police from false accusations of
theft, and to remove dangerous items from the arrestee prior to
his jailing.” United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 412 (4th
Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 739
(4th Cir. 2007)). The vehicle must be in the lawful custody of
the police at the time of the search, United States v. Brown,
787 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986), and the search must be
conducted pursuant to standard criteria, Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 374 n.6 (1987). For an inventory search policy to
be valid, “it must curtail the discretion of the searching
11
officer so as to prevent searches from becoming a ‘ruse for a
general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.’”
Banks, 482 F.3d at 739 (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4
(1990)). Officers must administer the search in good faith.
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374.
For the police to lawfully impound a vehicle after an
arrest, the officer must reasonably believe that “there was no
known individual immediately available to take custody of the
car, or [that] the car could have constituted a nuisance in the
area in which it was parked.” Brown, 787 F.2d at 932. The
Supreme Court has stated that the impoundment of a vehicle is a
valid “community caretaking” function of police. Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-43 (1973). And while the Court has
been consistent in holding that inventory searches must be
conducted according to standardized criteria, see Bertine, 479
U.S. at 374 n.6, the Court has afforded police more discretion
when it comes to the decision to impound vehicles. The Bertine
Court stated that “[n]othing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits
the exercise of police discretion [in the impoundment of
vehicles] so long as that discretion is exercised according to
standard criteria and on the basis of something other than
suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Id. at 375.
In Cabbler v. Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary,
528 F.2d 1142 (4th Cir. 1975), we upheld the impoundment and
12
inventory search of a vehicle left in the driveway of a hospital
emergency department. The police followed Cabbler’s car to a
Roanoke, Virginia, hospital, where Cabbler parked the car in the
driveway and went into the hospital. Id. at 1144. Police entered
the hospital and arrested Cabbler on an outstanding warrant. Id.
While being placed in the police car, Cabbler gave the officers
the keys to his car and asked them to roll up the windows. Id.
In so doing, the officers found a pistol in the back seat. Id.
Cabbler was taken away, and the officers impounded his car and
conducted an inventory search. Id. We upheld the search, noting
the “overwhelming” evidence that the purpose of the impoundment
was to protect the car and its contents. Id. at 1145. We also
observed that the car was a “nuisance” where it was parked – a
hospital driveway. Id. at 1145-46. We thus held that “the police
do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they impound a vehicle
to protect it or to remove a nuisance after arresting the driver
away from his home, and he has no means immediately at hand for
the safekeeping of the vehicle.” Id. at 1146.
We reaffirmed our Cabbler holding in Brown, 787 F.2d 929.
In Brown, a police officer noticed Brown’s car weaving down the
highway and striking a parked car. Id. at 930. The officer
stopped Brown and administered a field breath test, confirming
that Brown was intoxicated. Id. The officer then determined that
the passengers in the car had also been drinking, making them
13
unavailable to take custody of the vehicle. Id. at 931. The
officer impounded the car, drove it to a police station, and
conducted an inventory search, finding a short-barreled rifle
under the driver’s seat. Id. Brown challenged the impoundment
and search, arguing that the car should have been left in the
custody of his girlfriend, who lived above the business in whose
parking lot the car was located. Id. at 932. We upheld the
impoundment and subsequent search, stating that the question was
not whether there was a need for police to impound the vehicle,
but whether the officer’s decision to impound the vehicle “was
reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. We observed that while
the officer could have tried to reach the girlfriend and leave
the vehicle with her, the decision to not do so did not render
the impoundment unreasonable. Id. We noted that the parking lot
where the vehicle was located was for both apartment dwellers
and business patrons, and so the officers could have reasonably
concluded that the car would have been a nuisance if left in the
lot. Id. Therefore, we held, the police “could reasonably have
impounded Brown’s vehicle either because there was no known
individual immediately available to take custody of the car, or
because the car could have constituted a nuisance in the area in
which it was parked.” Id.
14
3.
In the instant case, no one was immediately available to
take custody of Cartrette’s vehicle, and a reasonable officer
could have concluded that it constituted a nuisance where it was
parked, in a Wal-Mart parking lot. Even if we credit Cartrette’s
testimony that his brother was nearby – testimony the district
court did not find credible, see J.A. 353 – the police were not
required to stay on the scene and wait for the brother to
return. See Brown, 787 F.2d at 932 (impoundment reasonable when
no known individual is “immediately available to take custody of
the car”).
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Cartrette’s argument
that the Conway Police Department’s lack of a written
impoundment policy renders the impoundment unlawful. Bertine
requires standard criteria for impounding vehicles, 479 U.S. at
375, but it does not require the criteria to be in writing.
Here, the testimony of Officers Ridgeway and Hardee indicates
there was a standard procedure to impound vehicles when no one
is immediately available to take custody of the vehicle, and
that they understood and followed that procedure. The district
court was entitled to credit that testimony. 4
4
Even apart from its non-precedential status, our
unpublished opinion in United States v. Johnson, Nos. 11-5049,
11-5050, 2012 WL 3538876 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2012) (per curiam),
(Continued)
15
We also find that the inventory search conducted subsequent
to the impoundment was a lawful search that followed the CPD’s
inventory search policy. We therefore hold that Cartrette’s
vehicle was lawfully impounded pursuant to standard CPD
procedure, and the inventory search was lawfully conducted
pursuant to a written policy.
B.
1.
Cartrette next argues that the district court erred in
declining to admit certain photos of his brother, Mishoe,
holding various firearms. “We review rulings on the
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion and will only
overturn an evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and
cited by Cartrette at oral argument, is of no help to him. In
Johnson, we upheld a vehicle impoundment and inventory search
where the driver was not properly licensed, the owner of the
vehicle was not present, and the vehicle presented a road
hazard. Id. at *1. We held the impoundment properly followed the
procedure spelled out in the Prince George’s County, Maryland,
Police Department General Order Manual, which provides for the
immediate impoundment of vehicles that are “impeding the
movement of traffic” or parked “in a manner constituting a
threat to public safety.” Id. at *3. The Prince George’s County
Police Department’s commendable decision to commit to writing
its impoundment policy does not require other departments to do
the same, nor are other departments required to follow its
standards. Here, it is sufficient that the CPD had a standard
procedure that comported with our holdings in Brown and Cabbler,
and that the district court found that the officers followed
this procedure.
16
irrational.” United States v. DeLeon, 678 F.3d 317, 326 (4th
Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th
Cir. 2011)).
2.
The district court admitted a photo of Mishoe holding two
guns, one of them the shotgun found in Cartrette’s trunk. J.A.
244(a). The court also admitted a printout of Mishoe’s Facebook
page showing that photo. J.A. 244(b). But the court declined to
admit six photos of Mishoe with guns, and eight pages of
Facebook printouts showing those photos, citing the marginal
relevance of the photos and principles underlying Federal Rule
of Evidence 403. Cartrette argues that the court’s refusal to
admit these additional photos prejudiced him in that he was not
able to show that Mishoe had a penchant for weapons. Cartrette
also argues that the other pictures “would have buttressed the
defendant’s contention that it was Mishoe who placed the sawed-
off shotgun in the trunk.” Cartrette Br. 11. These excluded
photos indeed show Mishoe with weapons, but they do not show him
with the vehicle in which the shotgun was found. The photos are
duplicative of the photo that was admitted: All are undated
photos, uploaded to Facebook in 2010, that show Mishoe with
various firearms. (One excluded photo depicts Mishoe making an
obscene gesture, but does not show a firearm.)
17
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, “All relevant evidence
is admissible,” and evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible. However, Rule 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 403. The six additional photos excluded by the
district court were cumulative. The court admitted a photo
showing Mishoe with the shotgun found in Cartrette’s trunk, and
Cartrette cross-examined Mishoe about the photo. Cartrette has
not shown how the additional, undated photos would have aided
his defense.
Nor has Cartrette shown the district court abused the broad
discretion it is afforded on questions of evidence
admissibility. In explaining the high bar for successfully
challenging a Rule 403 decision by a district court, the
District of Columbia Circuit stated, “Rule 403 contemplates the
thoughtful consideration of the trial court and leaves the
admission of evidence to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.” United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 631 (D.C. Cir.
1992). The Third Circuit further observed, “If judicial self-
restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a
trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal.” United States
18
v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978). The Seventh Circuit
added, “Special deference also is due the district court’s
assessment of the probative value of evidence because that court
is in the best position to balance probative value against the
danger of unfair prejudice.” United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648,
651 (7th Cir. 1993).
We think these observations have significant salience here.
Because the additional photographs Cartrette sought to admit
were cumulative of an already admitted photo and would have done
little to bolster Cartrette’s theory of defense, we decline to
find that the court abused its discretion in excluding them.
C.
1.
Lastly, Cartrette argues that the district court erred in
adding a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for
obstruction of justice. In assessing whether a district court
has properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines, we review legal
conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United
States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010).
2.
Cartrette argues that we should vacate the obstruction of
justice enhancement because he did not perjure himself. Under
the Sentencing Guidelines, a two level upward adjustment under §
3C1.1 is warranted
19
[i]f (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice with respect to the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the
instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive
conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of
conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely
related offense.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 The covered conduct includes “committing,
suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
cmt. n.4(b). When a defendant objects to an obstruction of
justice enhancement stemming from his testimony at trial, the
sentencing court “must review the evidence and make independent
findings necessary to establish [perjury].” United States v.
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993). Otherwise, imposition of the
enhancement would “be automatic whenever the convicted defendant
had exercised her constitutional right to testify in her own
behalf at trial.” United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 647–48
n.3 (4th Cir. 1995).
For a sentencing court to apply the obstruction of justice
enhancement based on perjury, it must find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant when testifying under oath (1)
gave false testimony, (2) concerning a material matter, (3) with
the willful intent to deceive, rather than as a result of
confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. United States v. Jones,
308 F.3d 425, 428 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Dunnigan, 507 U.S.
at 92-98). We recently clarified how district courts are to
20
apply U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1: “If a district court does not make a
specific finding as to each element of perjury, it must provide
a finding that clearly establishes each of the three elements.”
United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 189, 193 (4th Cir. 2011). We
added, “With respect to willfulness, for example, it would, in
the usual case, be enough for the court to say, ‘The defendant
knew that his testimony was false when he gave it,’ but it could
not simply assert, ‘The third element is satisfied.’” Id. In
Perez, we held the district court improperly applied the
obstruction of justice enhancement because it did not indicate
that the false testimony concerned a material matter or that it
was willfully given. Id.
In the instant case, the district court properly found all
three elements of the obstruction of justice enhancement had
been satisfied. As to the first element – that the defendant
gave false testimony – the court stated: “I listened to the
testimony in the evidence that was presented. He was not
credible in the opinion of The Court. I didn’t believe him when
he testified. I don’t think the jury believed him when he
testified. I’m convinced that he did perjure himself.” J.A. 353.
As to the second and third elements – that the false testimony
concerned a material matter and was given with a willful intent
to deceive – the court stated, “I think he did give false
testimony on a material matter with the willful intent to
21
deceive.” J.A. 353. The court repeated that statement later in
the sentencing hearing. See J.A. 354. The court also repeated
that it did not believe Cartrette’s testimony, and stated, “I
find that this enhancement applies not just by a preponderance
of the evidence but also beyond a reasonable doubt.” J.A. 354.
Having made such a finding, the court imposed the two-level
enhancement, giving Cartrette a total offense level of 22 with a
criminal history category of III, resulting in a Guidelines
range of 51 to 63 months. The court sentenced Cartrette to 54
months’ imprisonment.
We hold that the court properly made a specific finding as
to each element of perjury, and we therefore affirm the
obstruction of justice enhancement.
III.
For the reasons stated, we hold that (1) the impoundment
and inventory search of Cartrette’s vehicle were lawfully
conducted pursuant to standard police procedures, and therefore
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; (2) the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding cumulative
photos of Cartrette’s brother holding firearms; and (3) the
district court properly applied a two-level obstruction of
justice sentencing enhancement after it made specific findings
22
that Cartrette had committed perjury. Accordingly, the judgment
of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
23