Stratton v. Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services , 521 F. App'x 278 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2131
SOLOMON STRATTON,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
MECKLENBURG COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; US
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES; UNITED WAY OF
CENTRAL CAROLINAS; FOUNDATION FOR THE CAROLINAS; COUNCIL
FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS; BRETT LOFTIS; MARTHA CURREN; DAVID
CAYER; YVONNE MIMS-EVANS; ELIZABETH MILLER-KILLEGREW;
MARGARET SHARPE; SIDNEY EAGLES; JOHN MARTIN; MARTHA GEER;
PATRICIA TIMMONS-GOODSEN; MECKLENBURG COUNTY; RICHARD
JACOBSEN; TYRONE WADE; TWYLA HOLLINGSWORTH; DONNA FAYKO;
GRETCHEN CALDWELL; SHERRI GLENN; DAVID FEE; LISA LOOBY;
SUSAN MILLER; KATHERINE DORMINEY; ROBERT ADDEN; RICHARD
LUCY; MICHAEL SCHMIDT; CAROLINAS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM,
Defendants – Appellees.
-------------------------------------
PETER BOWMAN RUTLEDGE,
Court-Assigned Amicus Counsel.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. David C. Norton,
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00137-DCN-KM)
Argued: March 22, 2013 Decided: May 31, 2013
Before KING, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge Gregory wrote
a separate concurring opinion.
ARGUED: Lucas D. Bradley, UGA APPELLATE LITIGATION CLINIC,
Athens, Georgia, for Court-Assigned Amicus Counsel. Robert
Evans Harrington, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, PA, Charlotte,
North Carolina; Robert S. Adden, Jr., Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Peter B. Rutledge, Matthew V.H.
Noller, UGA APPELLATE LITIGATION CLINIC, Athens, Georgia, for
Court-Assigned Amicus Counsel. Sinead Noelle O’Doherty, Adam K.
Doerr, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, PA, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellees Council for Children's Rights and Brett
Loftis; Michael Gray Gibson, DEAN & GIBSON, LLP, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee United Way of Central Carolinas.
Grady L. Balentine, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees Martha Curren, David Cayer, Yvonne Mims-Evans,
Elizabeth Miller-Killegrew, Margaret Sharpe, Sidney Eagles, John
Martin, Martha Geer, and Patricia Timmons-Goodsen. Charles
Evans Johnson, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, PA, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee Carolinas Healthcare System. Kelly
Suzanne Hughes, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, PC,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee Foundation for the
Carolinas; Cynthia L. Van Horne, POYNER SPRUILL LLP, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee Michael Schmidt; Richard Lucey,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee Richard Lucey.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Solomon Stratton appeals from the district court’s Order of
September 16, 2011, which adopted the report and recommendations
of a magistrate judge and dismissed the operative complaint in
this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cnty.
Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 3:10-cv-00137 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2011),
ECF No. 115 (the “Order”). 1 The complaint alleges that a
centuries-old international child trafficking enterprise had
orchestrated and caused the termination, by the state courts of
North Carolina, of the parental rights of Jack and Kathy
Stratton (sometimes referred to as the “Strattons”) with respect
to nine of their children. The complaint alleges eight claims
involving a total of thirty defendants, including governmental
entities, charitable organizations, and various judges and other
individuals. As explained below, we are satisfied to affirm the
dismissal by the district court, relying on the Rooker-Feldman
and substantiality doctrines.
1
The district court’s unpublished Order is found at J.A.
475-76. (Citations herein to “J.A. ____” refer to the contents
of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.)
3
I.
A.
On March 22, 2010, Solomon Stratton and his father, Jack
Stratton, filed their pro se complaint in the Western District
of North Carolina. Six months later, on September 24, 2010,
they filed an amended pro se complaint, which constitutes the
operative complaint in this appeal (the “Complaint”). 2 Although
the plaintiffs initially sued only one defendant, the
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services (the “County
DSS”), the Complaint names twenty-nine additional defendants,
including three governmental entities, 3 several charitable
organizations, 4 and more than twenty individuals, eight of them
North Carolina judges. 5
2
The Complaint is found at J.A. 96-159.
3
The governmental defendants include the United States
Department of Health and Human Resources, North Carolina’s
Mecklenburg County, and the County DSS (named only in the
initial pro se complaint). Although the County DSS was not
specifically named as a defendant in the Complaint, it has been
treated as a party defendant in the district court and
throughout these proceedings.
4
The charitable defendants are the United Way of Central
Carolinas, the Foundation for the Carolinas, the Council for
Children’s Rights, and the Carolinas Healthcare System.
5
The individual defendants include Brett Loftis, Director
of the Council for Children’s Rights; Martha Curran, a court
clerk in Mecklenburg County; David Cayer, formerly a state judge
and now a federal magistrate judge; Yvonne Mims-Evans, a state
judge; Elizabeth Miller-Kelligrew, a former state judge;
Margaret Sharpe, a former state judge; Sidney Eagles, a former
(Continued)
4
The various claims generally stem from the state courts’
termination of the parental rights of Jack and Kathy Stratton
with regard to nine of their ten children, including plaintiff
Solomon Stratton. The Complaint consists of sixty-four pages
and more than 400 paragraphs. Its extensive allegations relate,
inter alia, to the seizure in 2001 of the Stratton children by
the County DSS, the termination of the Strattons’ parental
rights by the North Carolina courts, and the court-ordered
placement of their children into foster care. For example, the
Complaint alleges that the “[p]laintiffs and their family are
victims of an Enterprise engaged in international child
trafficking [that] seizes children for purposes of pedophilia
and human child sacrifice.” Complaint ¶ 443. It further
alleges that these occurrences were part of what it denominates
an “International Luciferian Child Trafficking Criminal
Enterprise.” Id. at 5. This enterprise is part of a
“Rothschild-Rockefeller-Illuminati-Federal Reserve-New World
state judge; John Martin, a state judge; Martha Geer, a state
judge; Patricia Timmons-Goodsen, a former state judge; Richard
Jacobsen, former County DSS director; Tyrone Wade, deputy
Mecklenburg County attorney; Twyla Hollingsworth, County DSS
attorney; County DSS supervisors Donna Fayko, Gretchen Caldwell,
Sherri Glenn, David Fee, and Lisa Looby; County DSS social
worker Susan Miller; former County DSS supervisor Katherine
Dorminey; County DSS attorney Robert Adden; attorney Richard
Lucey; and attorney Michael Schmidt.
5
Order conspiracy” that began with the establishment of the
Rothschild banking empire in 1744 in Frankfurt, Germany. Id.
¶ 359. Through the “Rothschild control of the issuance of
money,” the Rothschilds and the Illuminati were able to
“systematically take over and control the governments of
Europe.” Id. ¶ 51. These conspirators thereafter successfully
obtained control of the government of the United States, through
the establishment of the Federal Reserve system, and they now
control “every major business corporation,” as well as “[e]very
government on earth.” Id. ¶¶ 73, 74.
As a result of the foregoing, the Complaint explains, our
entire planet is “now operating under a Luciferian (Satanic)
shadow world government.” Complaint ¶ 74. In addition, the
Complaint contends that “an international Satanic child
trafficking conspiracy operates within ‘child protective
services’ and the CIA,” with “a CIA covert child trafficking
operation” providing children “used by Satan worshippers for
human sacrifices.” Id. ¶¶ 101, 107. The Complaint continues in
that same vein, alleging that “there are approximately four
million practicing Satan worshippers across the United States,
many of them operating at the highest levels of the United
States government.” Id. ¶ 102. In addition, “pedophile sex
orgies with high ranking federal officials” occur at the White
House and at the “Bohemian Grove,” where, for more than 120
6
years, “world leaders have . . . participate[d] in bizarre
Satanic rituals.” Id. ¶¶ 104, 109-10.
The Luciferian conspiracy allegations of the Complaint are
interwoven into various descriptions of the state court
proceedings concerning the Strattons that occurred more than ten
years ago in North Carolina. According to the Complaint, the
conspiracy procured the seizure of the Stratton children through
the fabrication of various court documents, in order to obtain
jurisdiction over the Stratton family and its members outside of
their county of residence. It is alleged that, following the
removal and detention of their children, the Strattons were not
afforded the notices and hearings mandated under North Carolina
law. 6 The Complaint also alleges that the defendants’ actions
were motivated in part by the Strattons being Christians and
their children biracial. It then alleges that, while in the
custody of the County DSS, plaintiff Solomon Stratton was forced
to attend public school against his will, and that he was
6
The Juvenile Code of North Carolina is codified at Chapter
7B of the North Carolina General Statutes. Subchapter I thereof
establishes procedures for the processing in the state courts of
juvenile cases involving abuse, neglect, and dependency. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-100 to 1414. Those procedures include,
inter alia, the appointment of counsel for indigent parents, the
appointment of guardians ad litem to represent juveniles, and
the conduct of various judicial proceedings to assess and
determine the need for custody by the state. See id. §§ 7B-506,
601, 602.
7
subjected to medical procedures to which neither he nor his
parents consented.
On the basis of its extensive factual allegations, the
Complaint identifies eight causes of action:
Claim I (42 U.S.C. § 1983): The defendants conspired
to violate the plaintiffs’ rights under multiple
amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
Claim II (42 U.S.C. § 1985): The defendants,
motivated by race, religion, and sex, conspired to
violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
Claim III (18 U.S.C. § 1964): The defendants
conspired, in furtherance of the international
criminal enterprise, to commit, inter alia, child
kidnapping, child torture, ritualistic child sexual
molestation, drugging of children, and human child
Satanic sacrifices.
Claim IV (18 U.S.C. § 1595): The defendants violated
the Thirteenth Amendment by forcing Solomon and his
siblings into slavery and involuntary servitude.
Claim V (42 U.S.C. § 2000d): The defendants violated
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Claim VI (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1): The Department of
Health and Human Services of the United States (the
“DHHS”) violated the plaintiffs’ rights under
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Claim VII (assault and battery): The defendants,
except defendant Schmidt, committed the state law tort
of assault and battery by kidnapping Solomon and
subjecting him to medical examinations without his
consent or the consent of his parents.
Claim VIII (legal malpractice): Defendant Schmidt, an
attorney, committed legal malpractice against Jack
Stratton by refusing to turn over his Stratton case
file.
8
For relief, the Complaint seeks a declaration from the federal
district court that “all orders and judgments used to kidnap and
hold [the Stratton children] are void and vacated,” plus damages
in excess of two and one-half billion dollars. Complaint 63.
B.
1.
On December 18, 2000, the County DSS received a report that
the children of Jack and Kathy Stratton, one of whom was
plaintiff Solomon Stratton, were living in a home in Charlotte,
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, with inadequate heat and
food. 7 The following day, several County DSS employees
approached the Stratton home, where they observed the children.
Later on December 19, 2000, the Strattons and their children
moved from Mecklenburg County to neighboring Gaston County.
When the County DSS employees returned to the Stratton home in
Charlotte on December 20, 2000, they found it empty, and they
inquired about the family’s absence from Jack Stratton’s mother,
Joan Stratton, who lived next door. Joan, however, “refus[ed]
to provide the . . . whereabouts of the father and family or
where she believe[d] they might be.” J.A. 200. As a result,
7
Our recitation of the pertinent facts is drawn primarily
from the pleadings, the exhibits thereto, and various state and
federal court records. The North Carolina court records
referred to herein are judicially noticed and accepted as
accurate and factual.
9
the County DSS filed a petition in the state district court in
Mecklenburg County on December 21, 2000, alleging that Joan
Stratton was “interfering with [the County DSS’s] ability to
investigate to determine the juveniles’ condition,” and seeking
an order prohibiting further interference by her. Id. 8
A summons was promptly issued by the state district court
directing Joan Stratton to appear the following day, December
22, 2000, in Charlotte, where a hearing was conducted by
defendant Cayer (then a North Carolina judge) on the petition. 9
Defendants Wade, Caldwell, Dorminey, and Fayko, as officials of
the County DSS, were present on its behalf, and defendant
Caldwell presented evidence in support of the petition. On
January 26, 2001, the state court entered an order (the
“Juvenile Order”) containing findings regarding the conditions
of the Stratton home, the welfare of the Stratton children, and
the obstructive conduct of Joan Stratton. 10 More specifically,
the state court found that “none of the nine children had coats
and [they] appeared very dirty and unkempt.” Juvenile Order 2.
8
The Mecklenburg County District Court is comprised of
various divisions, including a Juvenile Court Division. For
ease of reference, we use the term “state district court” when
referring to proceedings therein.
9
Judge Cayer served several years as a North Carolina
judge, and in 2009 was appointed as a United States magistrate
judge.
10
The Juvenile Order is found at J.A. 206-10.
10
One of the children “appeared to be blind or visually impaired,
[and] was leaning on his mother and appeared to need assistance
with walking due to some physical limitation or disability.”
Id.
In the kitchen of the Strattons’ Charlotte home, according
to the Juvenile Order, the County DSS employees observed “a
large hole in the center of the ceiling with a large plastic
barrel collecting water that was dripping from the ceiling.”
Juvenile Order 2. There was no food in the home other than a
small amount “of ground beef and Kool-Aid.” Id. In addition,
“[t]he bedroom had no furniture at all other than some form of
foam mat on the floor.” Id. at 3. Although Kathy Stratton told
the County DSS officials that “the children were being home-
schooled,” the officials observed “no books, pens, tablets, or
anything that would suggest any form of education was being
provided in the home.” Id. Furthermore, “at least one child
appeared to have some sort of speech impediment.” Id. After
finding that the Stratton home had been vacated, and that Joan
Stratton “ha[d] obstructed and interfered with the
investigation,” the Juvenile Order concluded that the Stratton
family was “fleeing from [the County DSS],” ordered Joan
Stratton to fully cooperate with its investigation, and
authorized the County DSS “to take whatever measures [are]
11
necessary to locate the whereabouts of [the] family in order to
ensure the needs of the juveniles are met.” Id. at 3-4.
2.
On January 30, 2001, the County DSS filed a petition in the
state district court alleging that the ten Stratton children
were neglected and dependent. The neglect petition alleged
that, when observed by the County DSS on December 19, 2000,
“[t]he children were noticed to be extremely dirty, unkempt,
[and] inappropriately dressed for the conditions.” J.A. 220.
In addition, “[o]ne child appeared to be blind or otherwise
physically handicapped,” and another child had diabetes. Id.
Regarding the Stratton home, the neglect petition recited that
[t]he family was living in squalid conditions. The
home had three small rooms and a bathroom. There were
holes in the ceiling in the kitchen and bathroom.
There was no running water or working plumbing
facilities, no bedding and only sparse furnishings in
the other room. There was little to no food observed
in the home; however, there was a large tub in the
kitchen, containing floating debris, collecting
dripping water which appeared stagnated.
Id. As for the children’s education, the neglect petition
alleged that “the children have not attended school at all,” and
that “[t]here are no records to support [that] the mother has
been licensed to home school the children. In addition, there
was nothing in the home to indicate the children were being
educated at home.” Id. The neglect petition explained that the
Stratton family had “relocated to Gaston County, but have gone
12
underground,” and it expressed “concerns regarding the quality
of care the children might be receiving and the environment in
which they might be living.” Id. at 221.
Based on the conditions previously observed at the Stratton
home in Charlotte, as spelled out in the Juvenile Order, and on
the family’s move from Mecklenburg County to Gaston County, the
neglect petition requested a determination by the state district
court of whether the children were “in need of the care,
protection, or discipline of the State.” J.A. 221. That very
day, the state court entered a custody order placing the
Stratton children in foster care, with a hearing on the neglect
petition to be held within seven days. 11 Also that day,
employees of the County DSS travelled to neighboring Gaston
County and took custody of the Stratton children.
On February 2, 2001, the state district court conducted a
hearing on the matter, and the custody order was superseded by
an order placing the children in foster care pending final
adjudication of the neglect petition. The foster care order
11
Judge Mims-Evans, a judge in Mecklenburg County, entered
the custody order of January 30, 2001, finding that the Stratton
children’s continuing presence in the family home was contrary
to their welfare and best interests, explaining that “the
juvenile[s] [are] exposed to a substantial risk of physical
injury . . . because the parent, guardian, or custodian has
inflicted the injury or abuse; created the conditions causing
the injury, abuse, or exposure; failed to provide, or is unable
to provide, adequate supervision of protection.” J.A. 212.
13
adopted the allegations of the neglect petition as its findings
of fact, confirmed that Jack and Kathy Stratton were represented
by counsel, and noted that they had consented to the continuing
custody of their children by the State of North Carolina. The
foster care order also authorized parental visitations with the
children, directed the Strattons to cooperate with the County
DSS, and instructed the County DSS to assist the Strattons with
efforts to procure adequate housing.
A family services case plan, prepared by a County DSS
social worker on February 16, 2001, and filed in the federal
district court proceedings, identifies the Stratton children and
reflects that the County DSS’s permanent plan was the Stratton
family reunification. Not long after the Stratton children were
placed in foster care, however, the County DSS ascertained that
none of them had been properly immunized. Their parents
objected to any such immunizations on religious grounds. On
July 3, 2001, the state district court ruled that it was in the
best interests of the Stratton children to receive the necessary
immunizations. See In re Stratton, 571 S.E.2d 234 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002) (“Stratton I”).
The Strattons thereafter appealed the state district
court’s immunization order and its denial of their religious
objections with respect to immunizations. In its decision
rejecting that appeal, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
14
characterized the Stratton home, prior to the children’s removal
therefrom, as being in “severe disrepair,” with the family
“living in squalid conditions.” Stratton I, 571 S.E.2d at 235. 12
More specifically, the court related that
[i]n the kitchen, a large tub caught water dripping
from the ceiling. The tub of water had debris
floating in it. The plumbing facilities were in
disrepair. No beds or mattresses were found
throughout the home. Only two working kerosene
heaters were seen in the home, despite the cold
outside temperature as evidenced by the sleet and
freezing rain earlier that day. The [County DSS]
workers found almost no food in the home. Although
the father-appellant told the workers that mother-
appellant had been home schooling the children, the
workers found no records or educational materials to
support that claim. Appellants stated that none of
the children had ever attended public school.
Id. The Strattons thereafter sought further judicial review in
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, but were again
unsuccessful. See In re Stratton, 573 S.E.2d 512 (N.C. 2002)
(finding no right of appeal and denying discretionary review).
3.
On January 31, 2002, a year after the Stratton children had
been placed in the custody of the County DSS, the state district
court adjudicated the children as neglected and dependent. Jack
Stratton then appealed that order to the court of appeals. On
12
The court of appeals panel that rejected the Stratton I
appeal was comprised of Judges Sidney Eagles, John Martin, and
Patricia Timmons-Goodson, who are named as defendants in these
proceedings.
15
October 14, 2002, while the appeal was pending, the County DSS
filed petitions in the state district court, seeking permanent
termination of the Strattons’ parental rights to nine of their
children. 13 According to these petitions, the Strattons were
unwilling to take the necessary steps to regain custody of their
children. 14 The termination petitions alleged that the Strattons
had repeatedly failed to comply with the court-ordered family
reunification plan by, inter alia, failing to obtain adequate
housing, failing to supply evidence of their employment, and
refusing to cooperate with a court-ordered parenting capacity
evaluation. On June 10, 2003, the state district court granted
each of the petitions and terminated the parental rights of Jack
and Kathy Stratton to all their children save one. As explained
by the court of appeals in August 2003,
[o]n 10 June 2003 . . . [defendant Sharpe] entered an
order, following several months of hearings,
terminating the parental rights of Mr. and Mrs.
Stratton. Based on the evidence presented at the
hearings, [Judge Sharpe] concluded that the Stratton
children were neglected . . . and that [the County
DSS] had proven by clear, cogent, and convincing
13
By late 2002, the eldest of the Stratton children was
more than eighteen years old and no longer involved in the
proceedings.
14
Defendants Hollingsworth and Adden are the attorney-
signatories to the termination petitions. Defendant Fee is a
County DSS official who reviewed the terminations of parental
rights petitions and verified their accuracy.
16
evidence that grounds existed to terminate the
parental rights of the Strattons.
In re Stratton, 583 S.E.2d 323, 324 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)
(“Stratton II”). On the basis of the terminations, the court of
appeals dismissed as moot Jack Stratton’s appeal of the state
district court’s neglect and dependency rulings. See id. 15
At least two additional orders were thereafter entered by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina that are pertinent to the
termination of the Strattons’ parental rights by the state
courts. First, on March 4, 2005, North Carolina’s high court
reversed the denial by the court of appeals of the Strattons’
request for an extension of time to prepare a record on appeal,
and it remanded for entry of an order granting the extension.
See In re I.S., 612 S.E.2d 128 (N.C. 2005). 16 Second, on May 24,
2005, the Supreme Court of North Carolina entered an order
denying Jack Stratton’s petition for extraordinary relief, by
15
The Stratton II opinion reflects that Jack Stratton was
then represented by defendant Schmidt, and that the court of
appeals panel was comprised of defendants Geer, Eagles, and
Martin.
16
The March 4, 2005 Order of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina reflects that Jack Stratton was proceeding pro se,
defendant Wade represented the County DSS, defendant Lucey
represented the guardian ad litem, and defendant Loftis
represented the Council for Children. In sum, it appears that
the named defendants include the judges who have so far ruled
against the Strattons, as well as most of the lawyers who
represented parties adverse to them.
17
which he unsuccessfully sought various writs, including
mandamus, prohibition, supersedeas, and a stay of judgment. See
In re I.S., 615 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 2005). Since 2005, there have
been no judicial proceedings conducted in the state courts of
North Carolina with respect to the Strattons and their children.
And there were no efforts made by the Strattons to secure relief
in the Supreme Court of the United States. The proceedings at
bar were not commenced until 2010. 17
C.
On October 4, 2010, ten days after the Strattons filed the
Complaint, the case was assigned to a judge in the District of
South Carolina, with the related motions referred to a
magistrate judge of that district. Jack and Solomon Stratton
thereafter unsuccessfully sought recusal of the magistrate
17
This litigation is not Jack Stratton’s first venture into
federal court. On October 2, 2002, he filed a federal complaint
seeking injunctive relief from an order entered in the child
custody proceedings in state district court. That complaint was
dismissed on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Stratton v.
Miller, 3:02-cv-00420 (W.D.N.C. 2002). Additionally, on
December 6, 2002, two weeks after the Supreme Court of North
Carolina rejected the Strattons’ challenge to the court-ordered
immunizations of their children, Jack Stratton filed a pro se
complaint in the Western District of North Carolina seeking
relief against the immunizations. It was dismissed for failure
to prosecute. See Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Svcs., 3:02-cv-00510 (W.D.N.C. 2002).
18
judge. For reasons of judicial efficiency, however, a second
magistrate judge was thereafter assigned to the case.
On August 5, 2011, the magistrate judge filed his report in
the matter, recommending dismissal of the Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, and further recommending that all other pending
motions be denied as moot (the “Report”). 18 In explaining its
recommendation concerning the various Claims in the Complaint,
the Report concluded that
[t]he plaintiffs’ allegations of conspiracy, criminal
RICO child trafficking, religious and racial genocide,
assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, malice, constitutional violations, and
statutory violations are all allegations that could
and should have been raised in the state court
proceedings, which were concluded over six years prior
to the filing of this action.
Report 5.
Jack and Solomon Stratton responded to the Report with
timely objections. Their objections, however, did not dispute
the merits of the Report’s recommendation that the Complaint
should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) and the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, but instead asserted that the Report was “a complete
fraud,” and was “VOID, criminally fraudulent, and generated for
18
The Report is found at J.A. 367-74.
19
the express purpose of obstructing justice.” J.A. 278. Their
objections to the Report further asserted that
Jack and Kathy Stratton and their ten children were
never parties in any North Carolina juvenile court
proceedings and Jack and Kathy Stratton’s parental
rights were never terminated. Jack and Kathy
Stratton’s minor children were never placed in foster
care. [The magistrate judge’s] action constitute[s] an
abuse of discretion and judicial conspiracy.
Id. at 381. Jack Stratton, for himself only, then filed various
motions in the federal district court seeking, inter alia, the
magistrate judge’s “Immediate Removal From the Bench,” and
requesting “Judicial Notice re Void ‘Juvenile Proceedings’ and
‘Appellate Decisions.’” J.A. 14.
The objections to the Report were rejected by Order of
September 16, 2011, when the district court adopted the Report
and dismissed the Complaint. 19 The other pending motions were
19
The Report and Order relied on, inter alia, the following
authorities: Berry v. South Carolina Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 121
F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (affirming
dismissal of parent’s complaint challenging actions against him
for child abuse); Salvetti v. Georgia Bar Ass’n, 2007 WL 433390,
at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2007) (dismissing complaint challenging
“various custody actions throughout the past ten years in the
state courts of Georgia” on the basis of, inter alia, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Burdick v. Pritchett & Burch, PLLC,
2008 WL 7542377 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 16, 2008) (dismissing, based on
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, complaint alleging that plaintiff’s
former spouse’s lawyers and state court judges had manipulated
the legal system); Barbeau v. Gen. Ct. of Justice, 2010 WL
2812695 (E.D.N.C. June 15, 2010) (recommending dismissal, based
on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, of complaint asserting “that
parental custody of [plaintiff’s] son and his visitation rights
were determined by the state courts in a manner that resulted in
(Continued)
20
not resolved by the district court, but were rendered moot by
the Order’s dismissal of the Complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Following entry of the Order of September 16, 2011, Jack
and Solomon Stratton filed a document purporting to make further
objections to the Report. Therein, the plaintiffs asserted that
the federal court proceedings were “void,” accused the presiding
district judge of “crimes of false imprisonment, rape, and
sodomy of little children and the disabled,” and asserted yet
again that “it has already been proven that Jack and Kathy
Stratton and their ten children were never parties and [the
defendants] never had any jurisdiction over them.” J.A. 479,
483. Those objections were not further addressed, and Jack and
Solomon Stratton filed a timely pro se notice of appeal from the
Order. We have assigned amicus counsel to assist our handling
violations of his federal civil and Constitutional rights”).
Because the district court ruled that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it did not
address the defendants’ other alleged grounds for dismissal,
which included, inter alia, the substantiality doctrine,
insufficient service of process, statutes of limitations, and
absolute immunity. For example, the Report relates that five
defendants were never served with process, including the DHHS,
which was the only defendant in Claim VI.
21
and resolution of the appeal, and we possess jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 20
II.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d
508, 511 (4th Cir. 2005). Our evaluation of an appeal is not
limited to the grounds relied upon by the district court,
however, and we are entitled to affirm on any basis apparent
from the record. See United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516, 519
(4th Cir. 2005). Although we accept the well-pleaded factual
allegations of a complaint as true, and we draw reasonable
inferences therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor, we do not blindly
accept “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted
deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences,” nor do we
accept “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to
judicial notice.” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir.
2002). And although we are obliged to construe liberally the
allegations of a pro se complaint, we are not required to credit
outlandish conspiracy theories simply because a plaintiff does
20
Plaintiff Jack Stratton died during the pendency of this
appeal. There has been no motion for substitution, and he is
therefore no longer a party. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(a)(1).
22
not have a lawyer. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 901 F.2d
387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
III.
A.
As explained further below, we are satisfied to affirm the
district court’s dismissal of the Complaint in this case. In
doing so, we employ jurisdictional doctrines that are rarely
relied upon in the federal courts, that is, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and the substantiality doctrine.
1.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits the lower
federal courts from reviewing or rejecting state court
judgments, serves as a jurisdictional bar to federal court
review of each of the federal claims alleged in the Complaint.
We agree with the federal district court and the Report in that
respect. The doctrine takes its name from two decisions of the
Supreme Court — Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413(1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983). Simply stated, those precedents bar the
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction in “cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
23
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). More recently, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the propriety of applying the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to a situation where “[t]he losing party in state court
filed suit in a U.S. District Court after the state proceedings
ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court
judgment and seeking federal-court review and rejection of that
judgment.” Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011). 21
Except in limited circumstances not applicable here, the
only federal court with the authority to reverse or modify the
judgments of state courts is the Supreme Court itself. Exxon
Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257). In this
appeal, the submissions of the amicus counsel agree that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is largely applicable to the various
claims. He argues, however, that the pro se allegations of the
Complaint also allege an independent Fourteenth Amendment due
process challenge, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to the procedures
used by Mecklenburg County and the state courts of North
21
In Skinner, the Supreme Court concluded that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine would not, in the proper circumstances, bar a
plaintiff from asserting a claim under § 1983, cautioning that
when “a federal plaintiff presents an independent claim, it is
not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction that
the same or a related question was earlier aired between the
parties in state court.” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1297 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
24
Carolina for removing the Stratton children from the family home
and terminating the Strattons’ parental rights. To the extent
that any such due process claim may be derived from Claim I,
however, it fails to pass muster for a sound legal reason also
asserted on appeal by the defendants — the substantiality
doctrine.
2.
As explained by the Supreme Court, the substantiality
doctrine forbids the federal district courts from exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over claims that are attenuated and
insubstantial, absolutely devoid of merit, obviously frivolous,
or no longer open to discussion. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528, 536-37 (1974). The substantiality doctrine has also been
equated by the Court with a federal court’s dismissal of claims
that are “essentially fictitious.” Id. at 537.
As we have heretofore explained, application of the
substantiality doctrine “is especially important where a wholly
frivolous federal claim serves as a pretext to allow a state-law
issue, the real focus of the claim, to be litigated in the
federal system.” Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir.
1999). And, when faced with clearly fictitious factual claims,
other federal courts have dismissed them under the
substantiality doctrine. See, e.g., Newby v. Obama, 681 F.
Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing “bizarre conspiracy
25
theory” related to “alleged government surveillance and
harassment,” based on substantiality doctrine); Richards v. Duke
Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 232 (D.D.C. 2007) (“Claims that are
essentially fictitious . . . such as those that allege bizarre
conspiracy theories . . . warrant a dismissal under [the
substantiality doctrine].”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 927 F. Supp. 382, 385 (D.
Ariz. 1995) (“On their face, Plaintiff’s allegations are so
bizarre and delusional that they are wholly insubstantial and
cannot invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.”)
B.
As the lower court properly determined in its Order
disposing of the case, the “plaintiffs’ allegations against the
defendants — to the extent they can be deciphered — relate
directly to and are inextricably intertwined with the North
Carolina courts’ judicial termination of Jack and Kathy
Stratton’s parental rights.” See Report 7. In their federal
court filings, Jack and Solomon Stratton were unrelenting in
their demand that the court take “judicial notice” of facts and
law that contradicted the state courts’ custodial orders. See,
e.g., J.A. 177 (requesting judicial notice that “the underlying
alleged Mecklenburg County Juvenile Court Orders are void ab
initio and legal nullities,” and that the Strattons’ “parental
rights have never been terminated according to law and their
26
minor children continue to be held illegally” (emphasis
omitted)). Indeed, the plaintiffs recognize in the Complaint
that the actions taken by the County DSS were directly
authorized and, in some cases, ordered, by the state courts of
North Carolina. 22
As the amicus counsel acknowledges, to the extent Solomon
Stratton seeks to vacate and enjoin the state court judgments
relating to the juvenile proceedings, the termination of the
Strattons’ parental rights, and the custody issues respecting
their children, those claims have been irrevocably resolved by
the North Carolina courts and are barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. 23 See Br. of Amicus Curiae 22 n.2 (conceding
applicability of Rooker-Feldman doctrine insofar as Complaint
seeks “to vacate and enjoin” state court judgments).
Nevertheless, the amicus counsel has, to his credit, mined the
22
Insofar as Solomon Stratton disputes the legal
consequences of the various state court proceedings — for
example, the termination of the parental rights of his parents —
the records of those proceedings constitute pertinent facts in
this litigation, properly subject to judicial notice. See Veney
v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R.
Evid. 201.
23
As part of its Claim III, the Complaint reflects some
familiarity by the plaintiffs with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
alleging that “[d]efendants conspire, pre-plan, and
execute . . . the fraudulent use of legal doctrines such as
‘Rooker-Feldman’ . . . to protect and conceal the enterprise
from being exposed in the federal courts.” Complaint ¶ 452
(emphasis omitted).
27
Complaint and sought to identify and marshal allegations which,
taken together, permit a good faith assertion that Claim I
raises a § 1983 due process challenge to the adequacy of North
Carolina’s procedures for removing the Stratton children from
their parents’ custody, as well as the state’s procedures for
the termination of the Strattons’ parental rights.
For example, the amicus emphasizes the Complaint’s
allegation that “the post-deprivation hearings required by
[North Carolina law] do not exist in Mecklenburg County. They
have been eliminated through the extrinsic fraud scheme set
forth [in the Complaint].” Complaint ¶ 161. The amicus also
argues that, as part of the conspiracy described in the
Complaint, the paperwork utilized by the County DSS and the
state courts deceives parents into waiving their due process
protections, and “[t]he Stratton parents and children have been
denied all pre-deprivation and post-deprivation due process.”
Id. ¶¶ 171-75, 301. Thus, even the amicus counsel is
constrained to rely on the bizarre conspiracy allegations to
seek a viable contention. Even if the due process claim
proposed by the amicus counsel is acknowledged, however, it is
necessarily circumscribed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. And
any such claim utterly fails to pass muster under the
substantiality doctrine.
28
C.
The liberal construction which we are obliged to afford to
a pro se complaint is not without bounds. Admittedly, pro se
complaints “represent the work of an untutored hand requiring
special judicial solicitude.” Nevertheless, they “may present
obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts
to unravel them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274,
1277 (4th Cir. 1985). As we have acknowledged, “[d]istrict
judges are not mind readers,” and the principle of liberal
construction does not require them to “conjure up questions
never presented to them . . . [or to] construct full-blown
claims from sentence fragments.” Id. at 1278.
For multiple reasons, each of the plaintiffs’ claims,
including the amicus counsel’s asserted due process claim, is
frivolous, wholly without merit, and thus insubstantial. Those
reasons include the following: First, not having been properly
pursued in the district court, any due process claim propounded
by the amicus counsel has been waived. We would review such a
claim for plain error only. Second, it is clear that the
primary focus of the Complaint is to seek the summary
invalidation of the state court orders that underlie the
termination of the Strattons’ parental rights. Third, it is
apparent that the Strattons were represented by counsel
throughout the state court proceedings, and that their
29
constitutional rights were protected. Fourth, any claim against
the judicial defendants would certainly be subject to dismissal
based on the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. See
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (explaining that “it is a
general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising
the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself”); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1976)
(affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim on basis of judicial
immunity). 24 Fifth, the due process allegations relied upon by
the amicus counsel must be viewed in context, that is, they are
scattered within a bizarre sixty-page Complaint that features a
fictitious centuries-old international child trafficking
conspiracy. And finally, it is clear that any due process claim
is a mere pretext for the real focus of the Complaint, which
challenges the validity of records and proceedings of the North
Carolina courts that resulted in the termination of the
Strattons’ parental rights. As the district court explained,
those claims were resolved in the North Carolina courts and are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
24
Each of the eight judicial defendants asserted absolute
judicial immunity.
30
In these circumstances, we agree with the defendants that
all of the plaintiffs’ claims are “so attenuated and
unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.” Hagans, 415
U.S. at 536. And we readily conclude that the due process
argument asserted by amicus counsel is “a pretextual federal
issue [asserted] solely for the purpose of having [] state-law
claim[s] [i.e., parental rights issues] adjudicated in the
federal system.” Lovern, 190 F.3d at 655. As we explained
years ago, “Article III of the Constitution forbids this
practice.” Id. 25
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Complaint is barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the due process claim argued by the
amicus counsel fails to pass muster under Rooker-Feldman and the
25
The two purported state law claims of the Complaint —
assault and battery (Claim VII) and legal malpractice (Claim
VIII) — must also be dismissed. The sole basis for federal
jurisdiction over them would be the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367 only
extends the jurisdiction of a district court to claims which do
not themselves fall within any independent basis for federal
jurisdiction, but which are closely related to another claim
over which the court possesses original jurisdiction. When a
district court dismisses federal claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, there was never a valid claim to which the
state claims could be considered supplemental, and dismissal of
the state claims is also required. Crosby v. City of Gastonia,
635 F.3d 634, 644 (4th Cir. 2011).
31
substantiality doctrine. Because the federal district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged federal
claims, its dismissal of those claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
was proper, and its concurrent dismissal of the state law claims
was mandated. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court.
AFFIRMED
32
GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Stratton’s complaint. I concur with the
rationale with one exception--I would find that the due process
claim is substantial and not barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, but fails to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. I would thus affirm the dismissal of the due process
claim on that ground. See Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392
F.3d 650, 660 (4th Cir. 2004).
I.
Admittedly, in the complaint, Solomon Stratton claims that
he and his family are victims of an international Luciferian
child trafficking conspiracy whose reach plausibly extends from
the United Nations to child protection authorities in
Mecklenburg County. Beyond these incredulous allegations
however, Solomon Stratton asserts that he was deprived due
process of law in the initial seizure of the Stratton children
and in the termination of the Stratton parents’ rights.
The majority recognizes that “Claim I raises a § 1983 due
process challenge to the adequacy of North Carolina’s procedures
for removing the Stratton children from their parents’ custody,
as well as the state’s procedures for the termination of the
Strattons’ parental rights.” Ante, at 28. Yet, it concludes
33
that the due process claim articulated in the complaint is so
attenuated that it is insubstantial, and is merely a pretext for
having a state-law claim adjudicated in federal court thus
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. I am of a different
view.
II.
A.
First, I would find that the due process claim is
substantial and thus jurisdiction exists to hear the merits.
The substantiality doctrine states that “federal courts are
without power to entertain claims otherwise within their
jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and insubstantial as to
be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, obviously
frivolous, plainly insubstantial, or no longer open to
discussion.’” Davis v. Pak, 856 F.2d 648, 650-51 (4th Cir.
1988) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)).
The “insubstantiality threshold is a difficult one to
meet,” as “dismissal for insubstantiality is appropriate only
where the proffered claim is truly frivolous,” or is merely a
“pretext[] for the purpose of having a state law claim
adjudicated in the federal system.” Davis, 856 F.2d at 651(emphasis added). Thus, a dismissal for insubstantiality is
“appropriate in only the rarest of circumstances where . . . the
34
complaint is deemed totally implausible.” Apple v. Glenn, 183
F.3d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 1999); see Ricketts v. Midwest Nat.
Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1182 (7th Cir. 1989) (“insubstantiality
dismissals should be applied only in extraordinary
circumstances”).
If the “complaint raises an arguable question of law which
the court may ultimately resolve against the plaintiff,” the
more appropriate mechanism for dismissal is Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Ricketts, 874 F.2d at 1182 n.6; see
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 & n.6 (1989) (holding
that Rule 12(b)(1) insubstantiality dismissal is appropriate if
based on the judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual
allegations, whereas, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate
where while operating under the assumption that all or a set of
facts in the complaint are true, “without regard to whether it
is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but
ultimately unavailing one,” it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent
with the allegations).
Applying these principles, it seems to me that we could
disregard the bizarre conspiracy alleged by Solomon Stratton and
consider whether his due process claim fails to state a claim.
The due process claim asserted here is not dependent on the
Luciferian conspiracy; whether the Strattons were denied due
35
process of law in the initial seizure of the children and in the
permanent termination of parental rights is a sufficiently
substantial legal question that has not been addressed by any
court in the 12 years since this matter arose. Given the
liberal construction due to pro se litigants, and our duty to
apply the substantiality doctrine only in rare or extraordinary
circumstances, the more appropriate approach would be to proceed
to analyze whether the claim passes muster under Rule 12(b)(6).
Before turning to that question, I first address the separate
question whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the claim.
B.
The majority concludes that to the extent the due process
claim is acknowledged, it is “necessarily circumscribed” by
Rooker-Feldman. Ante, at 28. I disagree. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine essentially holds that lower federal courts lack
authority to “sit in direct review of state court decisions.”
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16 (citation omitted). This
doctrine applies specifically to cases where “the loser in state
court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for
an injury allegedly caused by the state court’s decision
itself.” Davani, 434 F.3d at 713. Thus, in applying the
doctrine, (1) there must be a prior state court decision; and
(2) the loser in the state court must be challenging or seeking
to undo the prior state court’s decision by alleging an injury
36
caused by the state court judgment itself. The doctrine has
narrow applicability, and should not be confused or conflated
with preclusion doctrines. Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
The Third Circuit recently considered whether a due process
claim based on custodial termination proceedings was barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In B.S. v. Somerset County, the
plaintiff “challenge[d] the process she received with respect to
state court orders.” 704 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2013). The
state court orders terminated the mother’s custodial rights,
transferring them to the father, and denied the mother’s habeas
petition in which she argued the county violated state law by
removing her daughter from her custody without a hearing. The
Third Circuit held that because “the injury Mother claims is
. . . traceable to the [a]ppellee’s actions, as opposed to the
state court orders those actions allegedly caused, . . . the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine [does not] preclude[] federal subject
matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 260.
Here, the due process claim asserts, as amicus counsel
frames it, “an unjustified seizure of [Solomon] and his siblings
by Mecklenburg County,” “an improper exercise of jurisdiction
over [Solomon] and his family,” and a lack of “fundamental due
process in the County’s termination procedures.” (Amicus
Counsel’s Br. 10, 23.) These allegations are independent of,
37
and do not seek to overturn, any prior state-court judgment. 1
Stratton’s relief does not depend on whether the prior state
court judgments are overturned or vacated. Even if the order
terminating parental rights was valid, the actions taken by the
County to seize and retain custody over the children may have
been improper. Because Stratton alleges an independent
constitutional tort claim which is not dependent on the validity
of the orders terminating parental rights, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not bar the due process claim asserted here.
C.
Because I believe the due process claim survives both the
insubstantiality bar and the Rooker-Feldman bar, I next consider
whether the due process claim fails to state a claim. Stripping
away the incredulous conspiracy theory, succinctly stated,
Stratton asserts that the removal of the children and
termination of parental rights deprived them of their right to
live together as a family without due process of law, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits States from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or
1
As the majority notes, amicus counsel properly concedes
that to the extent that the prayer for relief asks the court “to
vacate and enjoin” various state-court judgments, (see J.A.
158), the request is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
38
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Due Process consists of both substantive and procedural due
process components, both of which are asserted here. Sunrise
Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 328
(4th Cir. 2005). To state a due process claim, either
substantive or procedural, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that
they have been deprived of “interests encompassed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property,” Bd.
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); and (2) the
deprivation did not comport with process that is
constitutionally due, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484
(1972). For a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must
also show that the state’s action is so arbitrary and egregious
that it “shocks the conscience.” 2 Cnty of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
The Supreme Court has recognized a “fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
As such, there is no doubt that now-deceased Jack Stratton had a
2
The Ninth Circuit has held that the proper test for the
deprivation of familial companionship in violation of
substantive due process is whether the state action amounts to
“unwarranted interference” as opposed to whether it “shocks the
conscience.” Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 441 &
n.23 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
39
liberty interest in retaining custody over, caring for, and
rearing his children as he deemed appropriate. See Jordan by
Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 342 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The
state’s removal of a child from his parents indisputably
constitutes an interference with a liberty interest of the
parents and thus triggers the procedural protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”). However, because Jack is no longer a
party to this action, the issue is whether Solomon, Jack’s son
and the remaining Appellant, has a reciprocal liberty interest
in being supervised and cared for by his parents.
Whether children “have cognizable, reciprocal interests in
the companionship and supervision of their parents, and in
maintaining the emotional bonds that develop within the unitary
family” is an open question in this Circuit and has not been
decided by the Supreme Court. 3 Jordan, 15 F.3d at 343 n.10
(citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989)
(plurality) (“We have never had occasion to decide whether a
child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her
parent, in maintaining her filial relationship.”); Smith v. Org.
3
In Santosky, the Supreme Court recognized that “the child
and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous
termination of their natural relationship,” 455 U.S. at 760, yet
the Court has never held that this interest amounts to a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.
40
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977)). 4 For purposes of
analysis, I assume that children have reciprocal liberty
interests in retaining nurturing relationships with their
parents. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130 (assuming for the
purpose of analysis that a child has a liberty interest in
maintaining her filial relationship). Based on this assumption,
Solomon has liberty interest in the supervision of his parents
and may assert a due process claim, even in Jack’s absence. A
review of the complaint indicates that Solomon has sufficiently
pled the existence and deprivation of a liberty interest,
satisfying the first prong to state a due process claim.
As to the second prong, Solomon must allege that the
deprivation did not comport with constitutionally due process.
Here, his claim fails.
4
The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that children
possess such liberty interests. See Smith v. City of Fontana,
818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987) overruled on other grounds
by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (“The companionship and nurturing interests of parent
and child in maintaining a tight familial bond are reciprocal,
and we see no reason to accord less constitutional value to the
child-parent relationship than we accord to the parent-child
relationship.”); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d
Cir. 1977) (“[W]e are concerned with the most essential and
basic aspect of familial privacy[--]the right of the family to
remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome
power of the state. This right to the preservation of family
integrity encompasses the reciprocal rights of both parent and
children.”).
41
It is true that regardless of the state’s practices and
procedures, “[w]hat process is due” is a question of
constitutional law, not state law. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). When a state seeks to
deprive a child of the liberty interest in being nurtured by
their parent, it must provide procedures that are fundamentally
fair. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54 (holding that “[w]hen
the State moves to destroy . . . familial bonds, it must provide
parents with fundamentally fair procedures.”).
Yet, the complaint fails to satisfy the second element
because it is clear that the state court provided Stratton with
notice and adequate hearings prior to the termination of the
familial relations. The complaint alleges numerous procedural
defects, none of which persuade otherwise, and only one is worth
addressing. Specific to the initial seizure of the children,
the complaint alleges that the Strattons: (1) never received
certain state-mandated summons or at the very least, the
required 7-day initial hearing, see N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7B-
506(a); and (2) were never given the opportunity to present
evidence to determine whether to continue custody, see id. § 7B-
506(b). These assertions bely the court records which are the
proper subject of judicial notice. See Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d
726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that in considering whether a
claim fails to state a claim, we need not “‘accept as true
42
allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial
notice or by exhibit.’” (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).
On January 30, 2001, when the Stratton children were
removed from their parents’ home, the Strattons received summons
to appear on February 2, 2001, for the appointment of counsel
and other matters relating to the removal of the children. On
February 2, the said hearing occurred to determine whether to
continue custody of the Stratton children. The Stratton parents
attended. No evidence was adduced; however, the court adopted
the facts in the petition submitted by MCDSS to obtain the
nonsecure custody warrant, which were the same facts as observed
by MCDSS on their first visit to the Strattons’ first residence
on December 19, 2000. The matter was then set for an
adjudicatory hearing on March 12, 2001.
Prior to the March 12 hearing, on February 16, the Stratton
parents and MCDSS entered into a plan that should have led to
reunification of the parents and the children. In the
agreement, the parties adopted the same facts as observed by
MCDSS on their first visit. The Stratton parents signed the
agreement. On March 12, at the adjudicatory hearing, the only
evidence presented consisted of the court reading the facts in
the mediation agreement into the record. At that hearing, the
Stratton parents affirmed those facts.
43
Their affirmation of the facts is where this case fails, as
it cannot be said that they were denied an opportunity to
present evidence where they did not take advantage of the
opportunity given to them to do so. Moreover, it appears that
at some later proceedings, though Jack and Kathy may not have
testified themselves, they adduced testimony in the form of
affidavits of other witnesses, which favored the Stratton
parents’ positions. It is clear from this record that the
Strattons were given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Therefore, the complaint fails to state a procedural due process
violation.
As to the substantive due process claim, the complaint
asserts numerous bizarre allegations but fails to state any
plausible facts that meet the “shock the conscience” standard.
As such, the complaint fails to state a substantive due process
violation.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the district
court’s dismissal of the complaint.
44