United States v. Claude Booker ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4738
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CLAUDE ALEXANDER BOOKER, a/k/a Danny Booker, a/k/a Pine,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:04-
cr-00235-RWT-26)
Submitted: May 30, 2013 Decided: June 4, 2013
Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mirriam Z. Seddiq, MIRRIAM Z. SEDDIQ, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia,
for Appellant. Deborah A. Johnston, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Claude Alexander Booker appeals the district court’s
order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
twenty-four months of imprisonment and a thirty-six-month term
of supervised release. Counsel has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that
there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
whether Booker’s sentence is plainly unreasonable. Although
notified of his right to do so, Booker has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. We affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40 (4th Cir. 2006). While a
district court must consider the Chapter Seven policy
statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. B, and
the statutory requirements and factors applicable to revocation
sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006), the
district court “ultimately has broad discretion to revoke
[supervised release] and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
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Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and the applicable
§ 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at
440. And although the district court need not explain a
revocation sentence in as much detail as an original sentence,
it “still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence is found
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this court “then
decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at
439 (emphasis omitted).
Here, the district court correctly calculated Booker’s
advisory policy statement range and considered the applicable 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors. The twenty-four-month sentence
does not exceed the applicable statutory maximum of thirty-six
months’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The court was
also well within its statutory authority to sentence Booker to
an additional term of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h).
Because the district court also clearly explained the basis for
Booker’s sentence, we find no error in its imposition.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Booker, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Booker requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Booker. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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