United States v. Bruner ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                      No. 95-5020
    HELEN SNIPES BRUNER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
    James C. Fox, Chief District Judge.
    (CR-94-93)
    Submitted: February 7, 1996
    Decided: February 29, 1996
    Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
    PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Dean R. Davis, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Janice
    McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Harold F. Askins, Special
    Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-
    lee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Helen Snipes Bruner was convicted by a jury of conspiring, while
    being an unlawful user of controlled substances, to receive or possess
    an explosive which had been shipped or transported in interstate com-
    merce, 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
     (West 1966 & Supp. 1995), 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 842
    (i) (West 1976 & Supp. 1995). She appeals her conviction on
    the ground of insufficient evidence. She also appeals her 24-month
    sentence, contending that the district court clearly erred in refusing
    her a 4-level adjustment for having a minimal role in the offense.
    United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,
    § 3B1.2(a) (Nov. 1994). We affirm the conviction and the sentence.
    At the time of the offense, Helen Bruner (Helen) was separated
    from her husband, James Bruner (James), and lived with her parents
    in Dudley, North Carolina. However, she saw her husband nearly
    every day. James Bruner lived in his mother's mobile home in Golds-
    boro, North Carolina. The evidence at trial established that in May
    1994, James discovered that one of his neighbors in the trailer park
    was an ammunition specialist in the Air Force. James asked the neigh-
    bor, Rob Brown, to help him get some explosives or a pipe bomb.
    Brown notified his superiors of James's request and an investigation
    ensued which was conducted by the Air Force Office of Special
    Investigations (OSI) in conjunction with the Bureau of Alcohol,
    Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).
    On May 19, 1994, Brown and an OSI undercover officer posing as
    an Air Force friend of Brown's went to James's trailer and, in a two-
    hour recorded conversation, discussed selling James a pipe bomb.
    James said he wanted a pipe bomb capable of blowing up a car or a
    house. He planned either to sell the bomb or to use it himself to blow
    up a crack dealer to whom he owed money. Helen was present for the
    entire conversation, and took part in the discussion. She and James
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    also smoked crack during the meeting and offered crack to Brown and
    the undercover agent. A price was agreed upon, and a pipe bomb was
    subsequently put together by an ATF explosives expert and brought
    to Goldsboro from Atlanta, Georgia.
    On May 23, 1994, Helen drove her husband to a parking lot where
    delivery of the pipe bomb was to take place under surveillance.
    Helen's son, Alvin Grant, parked nearby to act as a lookout. James
    did not have the purchase money with him. While he discussed with
    Brown and the undercover agent how he could show the bomb to his
    intended customer who had the money, Helen drove off to find Alvin.
    She returned several times to warn her husband that Alvin had seen
    surveillance officers in the area and that he was being set up. She and
    James were arrested shortly afterward.
    James Bruner pled guilty to conspiracy and possession of an explo-
    sive and testified against his wife at her trial. Helen Bruner testified
    in her own defense that she had nothing to do with the purchase of
    the bomb. She said she tried to leave the trailer during the May 19
    meeting with Rob Brown and the undercover officer, but that James
    had prevented her from leaving. She said her husband had testified
    falsely in an attempt to frame her because he hated her, and that she
    had feared he would blow up her parents' house with the bomb. She
    said she drove her husband to the Roses' parking lot on May 23 with-
    out knowing why he wanted to go there, and tried to get him to leave
    when she realized he was going to buy a bomb. She said her son
    Alvin was in the area because they intended to have dinner together.
    She denied smoking crack at the May 19 meeting.
    A conviction must be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to
    support a finding of guilt. Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80
    (1942). The issue is whether, taking the view most favorable to the
    government, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant
    guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Tresvant, 
    677 F.2d 1018
    , 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). Circumstantial as well as direct evidence
    is considered, and the government is given the benefit of all reason-
    able inferences from the facts proven to the facts sought to be estab-
    lished. 
    Id.
     The jury's estimation of the credibility of witnesses is not
    reviewable on appeal. United States v. Saunders , 
    886 F.2d 56
    , 60 (4th
    Cir. 1989).
    3
    Helen Bruner first challenges her conviction by arguing that the
    government failed to prove that the pipe bomb was shipped or trans-
    ported in interstate commerce. Although she moved for a judgment
    of acquittal on general grounds, Helen did not make this argument in
    the district court. Therefore, we will review it under a plain error stan-
    dard. United States v. Olano, 
    61 U.S.L.W. 4421
     (U.S. Apr. 26, 1993)
    (No. 91-1306); United States v. Bornstein, 
    977 F.2d 112
    , 115 (4th Cir.
    1992). The definition of "explosive," as the term in used in 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 842
    (i), includes but is not limited to black powder, initiat-
    ing explosives, detonators, safety fuses, detonating cord, igniter cord,
    and igniters. 
    18 U.S.C. § 841
    (d) (1988). The agent who constructed
    the pipe bomb testified that he used black powder and similar materi-
    als which were on hand in the Atlanta ATF office to construct the
    pipe bomb. To complete the bomb, he also used a second type of
    explosive reloading powder which he purchased in South Carolina on
    his way to Goldsboro. This evidence was sufficient to show that the
    bomb itself, and its components, had traveled in interstate commerce.
    Next, Helen contends that the evidence did not show that she per-
    sonally intended harm to any person or property. However, the testi-
    mony of the government's witnesses, if believed by the jury,
    established that Helen took part in James's negotiations to acquire the
    bomb with full awareness of his intention to use it to blow up a house,
    a car, or a person, or to sell it to someone else who would use it simi-
    larly. In any case, the government had only to prove that Helen and
    James were unlawful users of controlled substances and that Helen
    agreed with James to receive or possess an explosive. The evidence
    was sufficient to establish both elements.
    Finally, the district court did not clearly err in determining that
    Helen was more than a minimal participant. A minimal participant is
    one who is among the least culpable in the conduct of a group; she
    lacks knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the
    enterprise in which she is involved and of the activities of the others
    involved. USSG § 3B1.2, comment. (n.1). The definition does not fit
    this defendant. Therefore, the district court's factual finding was not
    clearly erroneous.
    The conviction and the sentence are therefore affirmed. We dis-
    pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    4
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5