Deaton v. City of Richmond ( 1997 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL DEATON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-1212
THE CITY OF RICHMOND,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.
(CA-95-561-3)
Submitted: December 17, 1996
Decided: January 7, 1997
Before WIDENER, HALL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Daniel Deaton, Appellant Pro Se. Beverly Agee Burton, Assistant
City Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed the record and
the district court's opinion and find no reversible error as to the issues
addressed by the district court. Additionally, we find the claims not
specifically addressed by the district court to be without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the reasoning of the district
court. Deaton v. City of Richmond, No. CA-95-561-3 (E.D. Va. Jan.
18, 1996).
To the extent Appellant claims that Appellee violated his due pro-
cess rights by using his polygraph results in the determination of his
disciplinary action in violation of state law, this court finds his claim
meritless. Even if Appellee impermissibly considered the results, vio-
lations of state law cannot provide the basis for a federal due process
claim. See Weller v. Department of Social Servs. , 901 F.2d 387, 392
(4th Cir. 1990); Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 161-63 (4th Cir. 1988).
We also find meritless Appellant's averment that Appellee violated
his due process rights by withholding money from him without suffi-
cient evidence and without a proper hearing. First, this court con-
cludes that Appellee withheld the money based on sufficient
evidence. Because the Appellee acted in a judicial capacity and
resolved factual issues which the parties had an adequate opportunity
to litigate, this court must give deference to the Appellee's factfind-
ings. See Layne v. Campbell County Dep't of Social Servs., 939 F.2d
217, 219 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478
U.S. 788, 799 (1986)). Based on a de novo review of the facts Appel-
lant submits were presented at his post-termination hearing, this court
concludes that substantial evidence supported the Appellee's decision
that the money did not belong to the Appellant. Hence, we will not
disturb Appellee's factfindings.
To the extent that the Appellant contends that the Appellee violated
his due process rights by withholding the money without a proper
hearing, his claim is without merit. Because the Appellee complied
with the state grievance procedures and provided the Appellant with
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adequate notice and an opportunity to respond in a post-termination
hearing, Appellant received all the process which he was constitution-
ally due. See Holland v. Rimmer, 25 F.3d 1251, 1259 (4th Cir. 1994).
Therefore, because the Personnel Board based its decision on suffi-
cient evidence and the post-termination hearing complied with due
process, we affirm the denial of summary judgment for Appellant and
grant of summary judgment for the Appellee on this claim.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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