NLRB v. Baker ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Petitioner,
    INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
    ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Local Union
    No. 26,
    No. 96-1377
    Intervenor,
    v.
    D. L. BAKER, t/a Baker Electric,
    Respondent.
    D. L. BAKER, t/a Baker Electric,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    No. 96-1548
    Respondent,
    INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
    ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Local Union
    No. 26,
    Intervenor.
    On Petition for Review and Cross Application
    for Enforcement of an Order of the
    National Labor Relations Board.
    (5-CA-24131, 5-CA-24190)
    Argued: December 6, 1996
    Decided: January 8, 1997
    Before WILKINS, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    Application for enforcement granted and petition for review denied
    by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: J. Raymond Sparrow, Jr., SHUMATE, KRAFTSON &
    SPARROW, P.C., Reston, Virginia, for Baker. Julie Brock Broido,
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for
    NLRB. Brian A. Powers, O'DONOGHUE & O'DONOGHUE, Wash-
    ington, D.C., for Intervenor. ON BRIEF: Michael E. Avakian, THE
    CENTER ON NATIONAL LABOR POLICY, INC., North Spring-
    field, Virginia, for Baker. Frederick L. Feinstein, General Counsel,
    Linda Sher, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy
    Associate General Counsel, Margaret Gaines Neigus, Supervisory
    Attorney, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington,
    D.C., for NLRB. John M. McIntire, O'DONOGHUE &
    O'DONOGHUE, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) filed a complaint
    against D. L. Baker, Inc. (the Company) on February 7, 1994, alleg-
    ing that the Company violated § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the National
    Labor Relations Act (the Act), see 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 158
    (a)(1), (a)(3)
    (West 1973), by firing an employee for pro-union activity, and that
    the Company violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating
    employees about union activity, see 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 158
    (a)(1). Later,
    the Board filed a second complaint, alleging that the Company vio-
    lated § 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the Act, see 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 158
    (a)(1),
    (a)(5) (West 1973), by refusing to comply with a§ 8(f) prehire agree-
    2
    ment, see 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 158
    (f) (West 1973). On May 19, 1994, the
    complaints were consolidated. The case was heard by an administra-
    tive law judge (ALJ) on October 3 and 4, 1994.
    The ALJ concluded that the Company had violated the Act by (1)
    firing Michael Tangy for his pro-union activity; (2) coercively ques-
    tioning other employees about their union activities; and (3) refusing
    to adhere to the current collective bargaining agreement between
    Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
    (the Union), and the Washington, D.C., Chapter of the National Elec-
    trical Contractors Association (NECA). After considering exceptions
    filed by the Company, the Board adopted the ALJ's factual findings,
    legal conclusions, and proposed order.1 Thereafter, the Company filed
    a petition for review, and the Board filed a cross-petition for enforce-
    ment of the order.
    The ALJ's findings of fact are adequate to address most of the
    Company's arguments. Therefore, we will reiterate the facts only
    when specifically relevant. And although we review de novo the
    ALJ's legal conclusions, if accepted by the Board,"we must sustain
    the [ALJ's] factual findings ``if supported by substantial evidence on
    the record considered as a whole.'" Virginia Concrete Co. v. NLRB,
    
    75 F.3d 974
    , 980 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 160
    (e) (West
    1973)). Moreover, "absent exceptional circumstances, the ALJ's cred-
    ibility findings, ``when adopted by the Board are to be accepted by the
    [reviewing] court.'" NLRB v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 
    717 F.2d 141
    , 145 (4th Cir. 1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Dubin-
    Haskell Lining Corp. v. NLRB, 
    375 F.2d 568
    , 571 (4th Cir. 1967)).
    In its petition, the Company argues first that there was insufficient
    evidence to support the Board's conclusion that Michael Tangy was
    fired for pro-union activity. The Company lodges a similar evidenti-
    ary argument against the Board's conclusion that other employees
    were coercively interrogated about their union activities. Finally, the
    Company challenges the holding that it violated§ 8(a)(1) and (a)(5)
    by not adhering to the current § 8(f) agreement between the Union
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 The Board did modify the ALJ's proposed remedy for the Company's
    violation of § 8(a)(1) and (a)(5). That issue is not before us, however,
    and we need not address it.
    3
    and NECA. Finding no merit to the Company's arguments, which we
    consider in turn, we deny the Company's petition for review and
    enforce the Board's order.
    I.
    An employer violates § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the Act by firing an
    employee because of the employee's pro-union activities. See FPC
    Holdings, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    64 F.3d 935
    , 942 (4th Cir. 1995); NLRB v.
    Hale Container Line, Inc., 
    943 F.2d 394
    , 398 (4th Cir. 1991). Here,
    the ALJ concluded, and the Board agreed, that "[b]y discriminatorily
    discharging Michael Tangy on December 1, 1993, for supporting the
    Union, the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices" under
    § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3). (J.A. at 621.)
    Applying our deferential standard of review, we uphold the ALJ's
    findings of fact, which are clearly supported by substantial evidence
    in the record. The ALJ specifically found that Tangy's testimony was
    "truthful" (J.A. at 612), and that Tangy's witness, Graham, "im-
    pressed [the ALJ] favorably as being [a] truthful witness[ ], trying to
    recall accurately what had happened" (J.A. at 612). On the other hand,
    the ALJ found that Daniel Baker, one of the principal witnesses for
    the Company, "clearly gave fabricated testimony" (J.A. at 612), and
    that "the Company fabricated the defense that it had already decided
    to discharge Tangy" because of his poor performance (J.A. at 613).
    In short, the ALJ observed the witnesses at length and made specific
    credibility determinations, and the Board "carefully examined the
    record and [found] no basis for reversing the[ALJ's] findings." (J.A.
    at 609 n.1.) Because we must accord substantial deference to the
    ALJ's credibility determinations and factual findings, as adopted by
    the Board, we accept the conclusion that the Company fired Tangy
    because of his pro-union activities and therefore violated § 8(a)(1)
    and (a)(3).
    II.
    An employer also violates § 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating
    employees about their pro-union activities. See Equitable Gas Co. v.
    NLRB, 
    966 F.2d 861
    , 866-67 (4th Cir. 1992); NLRB v. Nueva Eng.,
    Inc., 
    761 F.2d 961
    , 966 (4th Cir. 1985). Mindful of our deferential
    4
    standard of review, we note that "[t]he coercive effect of an employ-
    er's speech in a particular labor relations setting,``is a question essen-
    tially for the specialized experience of the NLRB,'" J. P. Stevens &
    Co. v. NLRB, 
    638 F.2d 676
    , 687 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Daniel Con-
    str. Co. v. NLRB, 
    341 F.2d 805
    , 811 (4th Cir. 1965)). The ALJ found
    that the Company "coercively interrogat[ed] employees and inform-
    [ed] employees that it discharged Tangy because of his union-related
    activity . . . ." (J.A. at 621.) The Company does not deny that it ques-
    tioned employees about their union activity, but argues only that the
    questioning was not coercive. The Company's lengthy argument,
    however, does not change the fact that the ALJ heard the witnesses,
    weighed the evidence, made credibility determinations, and con-
    cluded that these statements were coercive. As noted above, the ALJ's
    factual determination is entitled to deference on appeal. We therefore
    find substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's conclu-
    sion, adopted by the Board, that the Company coercively interrogated
    its employees about their union activity, thereby violating § 8(a)(1) of
    the Act.
    III.
    Finally, the Company challenges the Board's holding that it vio-
    lated § 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) by failing to adhere to the current § 8(f)
    agreement between NECA and the Union. Section 8(f) allows
    employers or multiemployer associations in the construction industry
    to enter into collective bargaining agreements, commonly called "pre-
    hire agreements," with unions that have not formally established
    majority status. See 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 158
    (f). Moreover, an individual
    construction employer can voluntarily enter a "me-too" agreement, in
    which the individual employer authorizes a multiemployer bargaining
    association to represent it in § 8(f) negotiations. In such an arrange-
    ment, the individual employer agrees to be bound to the § 8(f) agree-
    ment reached between the multiemployer bargaining association and
    the union. Here, the ALJ concluded, and the Board agreed, that the
    Company had violated the current § 8(f) agreement between NECA
    and the Union, to which it was bound by virtue of two "me-too" docu-
    ments the Company signed in 1976.2 Although the Company chal-
    _________________________________________________________________
    2 The two "me-too" documents were the "Letter of Assent-A" (J.A. at
    402) and the "Benefit Fund Agreement" (J.A. at 403).
    5
    lenges this conclusion on several grounds, we reject each of the
    Company's arguments.
    The Company first argues that it repudiated the 1976"me-too" doc-
    uments by sixteen years of "notorious" nonunion operations. We
    disagree.3 In Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 
    461 U.S. 260
    , 270 n.11 (1983),
    the Supreme Court recognized that certain "specific acts would affect
    the repudiation of a prehire agreement." See also Clark v. Ryan, 
    818 F.2d 1102
    , 1107 (4th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that, until an § 8(f)
    agreement is repudiated, it must be followed). Under McNeff and
    Clark, however, acts sufficient to repudiate the prehire agreement
    require at least that the Union have some form of notice of the incon-
    sistent conduct. Here, the ALJ specifically found that the Company
    "succeeded in operating nonunion without discovery by the Union
    until September 1993" (J.A. at 621), and that"[t]here was no reason
    for [the Union] to suspect that Baker was reneging on his promises
    and operating nonunion" (J.A. at 620). These factual findings are
    supported by substantial evidence and are not contradicted by any
    evidence offered by the Company. Therefore, we must reject the
    Company's argument that its conduct prior to September 1993 was
    sufficiently "notorious" to repudiate the contract.
    The Company also argues that it is not bound to the current § 8(f)
    agreement between NECA and the Union because, in 1976, it agreed
    only to be bound to the "current approved labor agreement." Because
    the § 8(f) agreement existing in 1976 has been replaced by a series of
    four successor agreements, culminating in the current § 8(f) agree-
    ment, the Company argues that its consent in the"me-too" documents
    it signed in 1976 does not bind it to the current§ 8(f) agreement.
    The ALJ found, however, that the Company was bound to the cur-
    rent § 8(f) agreement by virtue of renewal clauses contained in both
    _________________________________________________________________
    3 The ALJ apparently assumed that John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282
    N.L.R.B. Dec. 1375 (1987), enforced sub nom. International Ass'n of
    Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB , 
    843 F.2d 770
    (3d Cir. 1988), controlled the issue. (J.A. at 616, 621.) Because the
    Fourth Circuit has not adopted Deklewa, we analyze the Company's
    argument under Clark v. Ryan, 
    818 F.2d 1102
     (4th Cir. 1987). The result,
    however, does not change under the rationale of either decision.
    6
    "me-too" documents,4 as well as in each § 8(f) agreement. Although
    we normally afford the ALJ and the Board considerable deference, we
    owe no deference to the interpretation of contractual provisions,
    which we review de novo. See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 
    501 U.S. 190
    , 203 (1991) ("We would risk the development of conflicting
    principles were we to defer to the Board in its interpretation of the
    contract . . . ."). We agree, however, with the Board's conclusion that
    the Company is bound to the current § 8(f) agreement. Other courts
    have reached the same result. See Local 257, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Work-
    ers v. Grimm, 
    786 F.2d 342
    , 345-46 (8th Cir. 1986) (binding an
    employer to successor § 8(f) agreements by virtue of "me-too" docu-
    ments identical to those in the instant case); NLRB v. Black, 
    709 F.2d 939
    , 940-41 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that a "me-too"
    document signed in 1978 bound the employer to a§ 8(f) agreement
    effective from 1979-81); Nelson Elec. v. NLRB , 
    638 F.2d 965
    , 967-68
    (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (finding that an employer was bound to
    a "new collective bargaining agreement" that became effective after
    the employer signed a "me-too" document identical to the one at issue
    here). We therefore agree with the ALJ and the Board that the Com-
    pany's delegation of bargaining authority to NECA continued until
    revoked, and that prior to this action the Company did not revoke
    NECA's authority. Accordingly, we accept the Board's conclusion
    that the Company was bound to the current § 8(f) agreement between
    NECA and the Union.5
    _________________________________________________________________
    4 Specifically, the Letter of Assent-A authorized NECA to act as the
    Company's "collective bargaining representative for all matters con-
    tained in or pertaining to the" § 8(f) agreement between NECA and the
    Union. (J.A. at 402.) This authorization was to"remain in effect until ter-
    minated by [the Company] giving written notice. . . ." (J.A. at 402.) The
    Benefit Fund Agreement contained similar language. (J.A. at 403.)
    5 The Company also argues that because Holly Baker, Baker's ex-wife,
    signed the 1976 "me-too" documents in the name of Baker's sole propri-
    etorship, the Company itself is not bound to the current § 8(f) agreement.
    Holly Baker signed the "me-too" documents, however, as "President" of
    the employer, and the Company never explains how she could have been
    the president of a sole proprietorship. Moreover, the Company has never
    demonstrated that Daniel Baker was, in fact, operating two separate legal
    entities. We therefore reject this argument on the Board's reasoning.
    (J.A. at 609.)
    7
    IV.
    In conclusion, we agree with the Board's holding that the Company
    violated § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) by firing Tangy for his pro-union activi-
    ties, and that the Company violated § 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogat-
    ing employees. Moreover, we accept the Board's holding that the
    Company violated § 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) by refusing to adhere to the
    current § 8(f) agreement between the Union and NECA. Because the
    Company never effectively repudiated the § 8(f) agreement, it may be
    held liable for breaching its terms. We therefore deny the Company's
    petition for review and grant the Board's cross-petition for enforce-
    ment.
    PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT GRANTED;
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED
    8