Johnson v. K-Mart Corporation ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    PAULA EDNA JOHNSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 96-2408
    K-MART CORPORATION; HAL LEWIS;
    MARK KUHLMAN,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg.
    James H. Michael, Jr., Senior District Judge.
    (CA-95-75-H)
    Submitted: October 31, 1997
    Decided: December 2, 1997
    Before HALL, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Thomas D. Logie, Front Royal, Virginia, for Appellant. R. Craig
    Wood, H. Dill Battle, III, MCGUIRE, WOODS, BATTLE &
    BOOTHE, L.L.P., Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Paula Edna Johnson brought suit against K-Mart and two of its
    employees alleging that the Defendants discriminated against her in
    violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1994), based
    upon her religious beliefs and practices. The district court granted
    summary judgment to the Defendants and dismissed the action. John-
    son appeals, alleging that the district court erred when it found as a
    matter of law that she was not constructively discharged. Finding no
    error, we affirm.
    Johnson was a personnel and training manager at K-Mart. This liti-
    gation arose in April 1994 when K-Mart initiated a new policy to
    eliminate "sweetheart schedules," schedules which require no week-
    end working hours, in its stores. The new policy required Johnson to
    work one Sunday per month. Because working on Sunday interfered
    with her religious beliefs, Johnson resigned from her position on
    November 5, 1994. During her exit interview, Johnson told her
    employers that K-Mart's implementation of the new policy was forc-
    ing her to choose between attending church on Sunday and her
    employment with K-Mart.
    Defendants Lewis and Kuhlman, two K-Mart managers, offered
    Johnson an accommodation: she could work either before or after
    church on the one Sunday a month that she would be scheduled to
    work. Johnson refused the offer and instead proposed that they give
    her a job in the pharmacy which was closed on Sundays thereby
    negating the scheduling problem. K-Mart declined her offer because
    of the cost it would incur to train Johnson for the position and in pay-
    ing Johnson full-time wages and benefits when it desired to fill the
    position with two part-time employees.
    To establish a prima facie religious accommodation claim under
    Title VII, the plaintiff must: (1) have a bona fide religious belief
    which conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) inform the
    employer of the belief; and (3) be disciplined for failing to comply
    with the conflicting requirement. See Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of
    Richmond, 
    101 F.3d 1012
    , 1019 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65
    
    2 U.S.L.W. 3815
     (U.S. Oct. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1874). If the plaintiff
    presents a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
    that it was unable to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's religious
    needs without undue hardship. 
    Id.
    Johnson conceded that the only adverse action taken against her
    relates to her resignation from K-Mart. She does not claim that the
    Defendants actually fired her; she alleges that she was constructively
    discharged. An employee is entitled to relief under Title VII if an
    employer "deliberately" makes the "working conditions" of the
    employee "intolerable" in an effort to induce the employee to quit.
    See Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 
    48 F.3d 1343
    , 1353-54 (4th Cir.
    1995). In order to establish such a claim of constructive discharge, the
    plaintiff must prove deliberateness of the employer's actions and
    intolerability of the working conditions. 
    Id. at 1354
    . The plaintiff
    must also prove that the actions complained of were intended by the
    employer as an effort to force the employee to quit. 
    Id.
     Intent may be
    shown by evidence that an employee's resignation was the reasonably
    foreseeable consequence of the employer's conduct and may be
    inferred from the employer's failure to act when he knows of intolera-
    ble conditions. See Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co., 
    60 F.3d 1126
    , 1132-33 (4th Cir. 1995).
    Even assuming that working conditions for Johnson were intolera-
    ble because her religious belief prohibited her from working on Sun-
    day, Johnson cannot show that K-Mart deliberately adopted the
    requirement that she work one Sunday per month to induce her to quit
    her job. By Johnson's account, all employees were subject to the
    same requirement. In addition, the Defendants attempted to accom-
    modate Johnson's religious belief by offering her an opportunity to
    attend services on Sunday before or after she worked. While we
    refrain from ruling upon whether this is a reasonable accommodation
    under Title VII, it is evidence that the Defendants attempted to keep
    Johnson employed. Johnson has not produced any evidence from
    which a reasonable factfinder could infer that the Defendants enacted
    the scheduling policy intending that it would force Johnson to quit.
    Because Johnson cannot prove constructive discharge and therefore
    cannot establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, we
    find that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
    to the Defendants. Because Johnson cannot establish a prima facie
    3
    case, it is unnecessary to decide if K-Mart reasonably accommodated
    Johnson's Sabbatarian belief.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
    tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-2408

Filed Date: 12/2/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014