Knight v. Runyon ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    RUTH KNIGHT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    MARVIN RUNYON, Postmaster
    General of the United States,
    Defendant-Appellee,                                                      No. 96-2115
    and
    TERRY BARRY, Postmaster, Fairfield
    Branch, Hilton Head Island, South
    Carolina,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort.
    Robert S. Carr, Magistrate Judge.
    (CA-93-2681)
    Submitted: December 9, 1997
    Decided: December 31, 1997
    Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Jack D. Simrill, Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, for Appellant. J.
    Rene Josey, United States Attorney, Joseph P. Griffith, Jr., Assistant
    United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina; R. Andrew Ger-
    man, Managing Counsel, David G. Karro, Christopher Pearson,
    UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Washington, D.C., for
    Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Ruth Knight appeals from a magistrate judge's order, 1 after a bench
    trial, granting her injunctive relief for her employer's unlawful dis-
    crimination but denying her back pay or other monetary relief. She
    also appeals from the magistrate judge's order denying her motion to
    reconsider or for a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Knight, formerly a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service
    ("Post Office"), alleged that she was illegally discriminated against on
    numerous grounds in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
    See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).2 The district
    court granted the Post Office summary judgment except for Knight's
    allegations that it altered her mail route (which thereby reduced her
    salary) in retaliation for her prior discrimination complaints. Because
    the Post Office admitted its reassignment was in fact retaliatory, the
    parties proceeded to trial on the sole issue of what was the appropriate
    relief for the employer's admittedly wrongful action.
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 The parties consented to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 636
    (c) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
    2 The parties do not dispute that the acts at issue occurred prior to the
    effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and therefore Knight is
    limited to equitable remedies. See Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
    Co., 
    60 F.3d 1126
    , 1132 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (compensatory and punitive
    damages not authorized prior to enactment of 1991 Act).
    2
    After a two day bench trial, the magistrate judge made the follow-
    ing factual findings. Knight was employed with the Post Office from
    August 1985 to February 13, 1991, at which point she left work for
    psychological reasons and never returned. On March 9, 1991, the Post
    Office, in retaliation for Knight's previous discrimination complaints,
    altered her route so that had she returned to work her salary would
    have been decreased by approximately $9000 per year. Knight
    applied for and received compensation benefits arising out of her psy-
    chological injury of February 13, 1991.3 Although the Post Office's
    discriminatory route readjustment may have contributed in some way
    to Knight's psychological problems, the primary cause of her inability
    to work was caused by tragic personal circumstances. Finally, the
    court found that Knight's testimony regarding her personal circum-
    stances was "less than truthful." (Joint appendix ("J.A.") at 752).
    Based upon these factual findings, the magistrate judge concluded
    that because Knight was already unavailable for work at the time of
    the route adjustment, the discriminatory act was not"causally linked
    to [Knight's] . . . psychological condition and consequent unavaila-
    bility to work." (J.A. at 753). Therefore, because the employer's ille-
    gal act was unrelated to Knight's inability to work, the magistrate
    judge ordered no back pay or other damages. The magistrate judge
    did, however, order the Post Office to refrain from engaging in any
    practice in violation of Title VII, including retaliation should Knight
    ever return to work. On appeal, Knight alleges the magistrate judge
    erred in his factual finding that Knight was already unavailable for
    work at the time of the retaliatory reassignment and by failing to
    award back pay or other monetary relief.
    A district court's award of back pay is left to the discretion of the
    trial judge. See Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp. , 
    48 F.3d 1343
    , 1358-
    59 (4th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has explained that back pay
    under Title VII is awarded "to make persons whole for injuries suf-
    fered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Albemarle
    Paper Co. v. Moody, 
    422 U.S. 405
    , 418 (1975). When an injury is of
    _________________________________________________________________
    3 Knight receives a percentage of her salary under the Federal Employ-
    ees Compensation Act ("FECA"). See generally 
    5 U.S.C.A. §§ 8101
    -
    8151 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (FECA compensates employees totally
    disabled by work-related injuries).
    3
    an economic nature, "[t]he injured party is to be placed, as near as
    may be, in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not
    been committed." 
    Id. at 418-19
     (citation and internal quotations omit-
    ted).
    Thus, we do not find that the magistrate judge abused his discretion
    in finding that Knight was already unavailable for work prior to the
    Post Office's discriminatory conduct--and therefore had no effect on
    her ability to work. There was ample evidence in the record to support
    the magistrate judge's findings. See Martin, 
    48 F.3d at 1358
    . Finally,
    because the Post Office's discriminatory act did not cause a loss in
    pay, the magistrate judge correctly denied such relief on that basis.
    See Albemarle Paper Co., 
    422 U.S. at 418
    . Accordingly, we affirm
    the magistrate judge's order only granting injunctive relief and affirm
    the order denying Knight's motion for reconsideration or for a new
    trial. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal con-
    tentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4