Jones v. Young ( 1998 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
RONNIE DEAN JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICHARD A. YOUNG; INVESTIGATOR
No. 96-7787
LESTER; GEORGE E. DEEDS; ROGER S.
DAVIS; M.L. MULLINS; J. O'QUINN,
Officer; SERGEANT MINTON; RICHARD
FLEMING,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
James P. Jones, District Judge.
(CA-96-122-R)
Submitted: December 2, 1997
Decided: January 14, 1998
Before LUTTIG and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Ronnie Dean Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Vir-
ginia, for Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Ronnie Jones appeals from a district court judgment entered pursu-
ant to a jury verdict in favor of Defendant correctional officer Roger
Davis in connection with Jones's excessive force action brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Jones alleged that Davis beat him
after Jones directed racial slurs and inflammatory comments about
Davis's wife at Davis. Davis denied ever striking Jones.
We must accept the jury's verdict if it is supported by substantial
evidence. See Vodrey v. Golden, 864 F.2d 28, 30 n.4 (4th Cir. 1988).
"Substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if differ-
ent conclusions might also be supported by the evidence. See
Gibraltar Sav. v. LD Brinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1297 (5th Cir.
1988). The record, however, contains no transcript of the trial, and the
government may provide a free transcript only if the appeal presents
a "substantial question." See 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (1994). A "substantial
question" is one that is "reasonably debatable," Ortiz v. Greyhound
Corp., 192 F. Supp. 903, 905 (D. Md. 1959), or one "where the law
appears to be settled, but where the appellant is able to show that his
chances of changing the law on appeal are strong." Lee v. Habib, 424
F.2d 891, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Generally, appellants bear the burden
of demonstrating non-frivolity and substantiality. See Maloney v. D.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 396 F.2d 939, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
We find that Jones fails to demonstrate a substantial question on
appeal. He contends that the correctional officers who testified against
him at his trial were untruthful. Resolution of the conflicting versions
of events presented at trial, however, necessitated a credibility deter-
mination by the jury. The jury's credibility determinations are not
subject to review by this court. See United States v. Saunders, 886
F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
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Jones also complains that his case was weakened by the State's
failure to conduct polygraph examinations on the persons allegedly
directly involved in the beating incident, and failure to perform DNA
testing on blood from a shirt Jones says that he wore during the
alleged attack. Jones asserts that DNA testing would prove that the
blood belonged to Davis, and support his claim that Davis punched
him in the mouth, scratching his hand in the process. Jones cites no
authority which would obligate the State to provide either form of
testing. He cannot reasonably expect the State to bear the expense and
burden of proving his case for him.
Accordingly, the judgment order of the district court is affirmed.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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