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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT MARTHA A. TARTAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 99-2007 WILLIAM J. HENDERSON, Postmaster General, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (CA-99-539-AMD) Submitted: February 22, 2000 Decided: April 17, 2000 Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges. _________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. _________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL James J. Nolan, Jr., W. Michel Pierson, PIERSON, PIERSON & NOLAN, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Nadira Clarke, Assistant United States Attor- ney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. _________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). _________________________________________________________________ OPINION PER CURIAM: Martha A. Tartal appeals the district court's order granting sum- mary judgment to William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, and dis- missing Tartal's employment discrimination complaint alleging a hostile work environment based on her sex. The district court held that Tartal did not contact an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimina- tory events that created the hostile work environment. See
29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(1999). Finding no reversible error, we affirm. The record shows that Tartal believed she had an actionable dis- crimination complaint as early as April 1996. Furthermore, the only events that occurred within the forty-five-day period prior to meeting with the EEO counselor are insufficient to establish a continuing vio- lation. Tartal does not contest the dismissal on the merits of these claims. See Beall v. Abbott Lab.,
130 F.3d 614, 621 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that the continuing violation theory is available "only where an actual violation has occurred within that requisite time period" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nor can Tartal successfully assert equitable estoppel as a bar to Henderson's assertion of untimeliness. Tartal acknowledged that she knew she could initiate formal proceed- ings and that in September 1996, the Postal Police suggested that she file an EEO complaint. She did not heed this advice. We find that she was not diligent in preserving her legal rights. See Irwin v. Depart- ment of Veterans Affairs,
498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). Tartal also asserted that the district court erred by proceeding with summary judgment without allowing her additional time to secure the deposition of Gwen Gales, one of Tartal's supervisors. The record is ambiguous as to whether Tartal made a proper showing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).* In addition, although Tartal noted at the summary _________________________________________________________________ *Although Tartal submitted a declaration arguably requesting an opportunity to conduct discovery, the declaration did not specifically 2 judgment hearing that Gales' deposition would be essential to oppose the motion, Tartal did not specifically object at the hearing, nor did she formally move for a continuance. Therefore, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in conducting the proceeding with- out the additional discovery. See Nguyen v. CNA Corp.,
44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process. AFFIRMED _________________________________________________________________ mention Gales nor did it articulate any reasons why discovery was neces- sary. It simply asserts that "I do not believe that it would be fair to con- sider the defendant's motion until I have had the opportunity to conduct pretrial discovery." (J.A. at 15.) 3
Document Info
Docket Number: 99-2007
Filed Date: 4/17/2000
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 10/30/2014