United States v. Rodney Barnes ( 2000 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4594
RODNEY BARNES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon.
James P. Jones, District Judge.
(CR-98-70)
Submitted: February 29, 2000
Decided: April 19, 2000
Before WILKINS and KING, Circuit Judges,
and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Erwin Lynn Dougherty, HUDSON & DOUGHERTY, Bristol, Ten-
nessee, for Appellant. Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney,
Anthony P. Giorno, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Vir-
ginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Rodney Barnes pled guilty to one count of possession
with intent to distribute marijuana and one count of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994).
Barnes preserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress, and he timely appealed. For the reasons that fol-
low, we affirm Barnes' conviction.
We review de novo legal conclusions underlying the denial of a
motion to suppress, and factual findings for clear error. See United
States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). With respect to
allegations of prejudicial misconduct by the government, we also
review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.
See United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 1995).
Barnes first claimed that Deputy Pike, the arresting officer, did not
have probable cause to conduct the traffic stop that led to Barnes'
arrest. The district court, after considering the credibility of both
Barnes and Pike, accepted Pike's testimony that he stopped Barnes
because the van he was driving had a cracked windshield, the win-
dows appeared to be too darkly tinted, and Barnes was following
another vehicle too closely. We have no basis for concluding that the
district court's credibility determination was clearly erroneous. More-
over, Pike's subjective reasons for stopping Barnes are irrelevant. See
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); United States v.
Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993). While testifying at the
suppression hearing, Barnes admitted his windshield was cracked.
Since this constitutes a violation of Va. Code Ann.§ 46.2-1005, the
vehicle stop was objectively supported. Barnes is therefore entitled to
no relief upon this claim.
As to Barnes' second, third and fourth claims, Barnes essentially
argues that the district court erred in crediting the Government's wit-
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nesses rather than his. The district court's findings regarding the cred-
ibility of the respective witnesses are entitled to deference in this
Court, and therefore Barnes' conviction shall not be reversed on this
ground. See United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir.
1989); United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. , 191 F.3d 516, 531 (4th
Cir. 1999).
Barnes' fifth claim is a catalogue of the purported inconsistencies
in Pike's testimony in an attempt to bolster Barnes' first four claims.
The decision to credit the officers' version of events, and not Barnes'
version, is not reviewable in this court. See Saunders, 886 F.2d at 60.
Accordingly, we affirm Barnes' conviction. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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