United States v. Richardson ( 2000 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                    No. 99-4803
    SHIRMON RICHARDSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg.
    Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge.
    (CR-98-830)
    Submitted: August 22, 2000
    Decided: September 5, 2000
    Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Christopher F. Cowan, COWAN, NORTH & LAFRATTA, L.L.P.,
    Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. J. Rene Josey, United States
    Attorney, Nancy C. Wicker, Assistant United States Attorney, Colum-
    bia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Shirmon Richardson was convicted of possession with intent to
    distribute crack cocaine, possession with intent to distribute powder
    cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, all in vio-
    lation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 841
    (a)(1) (West 1999). Richardson appeals
    his convictions, arguing that the district court erred when it denied his
    motion to suppress and that the evidence was insufficient to establish
    the element of possession. We affirm.
    I
    Calhoun County Deputy Sheriff Forrest Crider testified that on the
    night of November 19, 1997, he and Reserve Officer Jim Parker
    observed a pickup truck weaving in the road. Crider initiated a traffic
    stop. Richardson, the owner, driver, and sole occupant of the truck,
    informed Crider that he did not have a valid driver's license. Crider
    noticed beer in the truck and saw a cooler. Richardson gave Crider
    consent to search the cooler. Inside the cooler was a bottle containing
    moonshine whiskey. Richardson was arrested for driving without a
    license and possession of untaxed liquor.
    Richardson was transported to the Orangeburg County Law
    Enforcement Complex. His truck was towed to an impound lot. Crider
    was informed that two packages of cocaine had been found in Rich-
    ardson's hat. Crider returned to the Calhoun County Sheriff's Depart-
    ment, where he met Deputy Sheriff Lin Shirer, who was assigned to
    a four-county narcotics task force. Shirer, Crider, and Parker then
    went to the impound lot where an inventory search of the truck was
    conducted. Under the hood of the truck, Shirer discovered marijuana,
    crack, and powder cocaine.
    II
    Richardson moved to suppress the drugs found during the search
    of his truck. The district court denied the motion, finding that the
    search was a valid inventory search and that, alternatively, the officers
    2
    had probable cause to search the truck. Richardson now challenges
    that ruling. We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo
    and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Rusher,
    
    966 F.2d 868
    , 873 (4th Cir. 1992).
    Both Shirer and Crider testified at the suppression hearing that it
    was Sheriff's Department policy to conduct a "bumper-to-bumper"
    inventory search of impounded vehicles. This policy exists to protect
    the impound lot, the owner of the vehicle, and the Sheriff's Depart-
    ment. Such searches routinely include opening and looking under the
    hood of the vehicle.
    "An inventory search is a well-defined exception to the warrant
    requirement of the Fourth Amendment . . . designed to effect three
    purposes: protection of the owner's property, protection of the police
    against claims of lost or stolen property, and protection of the police
    from potential danger." United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 
    107 F.3d 769
    ,
    772-73 (10th Cir. 1997). If an inventory search is conducted accord-
    ing to standard departmental policies and not as a ruse for an imper-
    missible search, the search does not violate the Fourth Amendment,
    and evidence seized during the search is admissible at trial. See Flor-
    ida v. Wells, 
    495 U.S. 1
    , 3-5 (1990); United States v. Brown, 
    787 F.2d 929
    , 932 (4th Cir. 1986).
    Here, there is no dispute that Richardson's truck was properly
    impounded. The district court credited the testimony of Crider and
    Shirer that they conducted the search of Richardson's truck in accor-
    dance with established departmental procedures. Richardson asserts
    that the inventory search was a pretext for an otherwise unconstitu-
    tional investigatory search. As support for his argument, Richardson
    states that no inventory list was produced. Further because the Sher-
    iff's Department had received anonymous tips that Richardson trans-
    ported drugs under the hood of the truck, there was an increased
    likelihood that the search was conducted in an effort to locate illegal
    drugs. An officer's expectation of uncovering evidence of crime will
    not vitiate an otherwise proper inventory search. See United States v.
    Gallo, 
    927 F.2d 815
    , 819-20 (5th Cir. 1991). Further, because Crider
    and Shirer initiated the inventory search of the truck in accordance
    with an established Sheriff's Department policy, the failure to com-
    3
    plete an inventory list does not render suspect either the motive for
    conducting the search or the reasonableness thereof.*
    III
    Richardson also contends that the evidence was insufficient to con-
    vict him because there was no showing that he possessed the drugs.
    Possession may be actual or constructive. See United States v. Blue,
    
    957 F.2d 106
    , 107 (4th Cir. 1992). "A person has constructive posses-
    sion over contraband when he has ownership, dominion, or control
    over the contraband itself or over the premises or vehicle in which it
    was concealed." United States v. Armstrong , 
    187 F.3d 392
    , 396 (4th
    Cir. 1999). Here, Richardson was the registered owner, driver, and
    sole occupant of a truck in which crack, powder cocaine, and mari-
    juana were secreted. This is sufficient to establish possession beyond
    a reasonable doubt. See Glasser v. United States , 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80
    (1942).
    IV
    We accordingly affirm Richardson's convictions. We dispense with
    oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
    aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    _________________________________________________________________
    *Because the drugs were discovered during a valid inventory search,
    we need not address Richardson's contention that the officers lacked
    probable cause to search the truck.
    4