United States v. Miller , 221 F. App'x 248 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4723
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TRENTON JEREL MILLER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (5:04-cr-01143-MBS)
Submitted: February 21, 2007 Decided: March 23, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert H. Citronberg, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant. Reginald I.
Lloyd, United States Attorney, C. Todd Hagins, Assistant United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
On June 10, 2004, Trenton Jerel Miller was arrested by
Orangeburg, South Carolina, authorities for disregarding a stop
sign and discharging a firearm within city limits. Miller was also
subsequently charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e)(1).
Miller filed a motion to suppress evidence challenging the stop and
search of his vehicle. The district court denied the motion to
suppress, finding that the stop was proper because Miller
unlawfully ran a stop sign and the search was proper because it was
necessary to ensure officer safety. Miller then entered a
conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm
and was sentenced to eighty-four months in prison. Miller then
appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
This court reviews the district court’s factual findings
underlying a motion to suppress for clear error and reviews its
legal determinations de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 699 (1996); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th
Cir. 1992). When a suppression motion has been denied, this court
construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.
1998).
Miller does not dispute that Officer Bradley lawfully
stopped him for running the stop sign. Rather, he claims that the
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stop was executed with unreasonable force when he was ordered out
of the vehicle at gunpoint, frisked, and subjected to a vehicle
search. We conclude the force used to effectuate the stop of
Miller’s vehicle was reasonable, considering Miller’s behavior, the
time of day, and the fact that shots had been fired in the
vicinity. See United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 277 n.2 (4th
Cir. 2004)(citing United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786,
791 (8th Cir. 1999)). We also conclude the search was proper
because the officers reasonably believed “that the suspect [was]
dangerous and . . . may gain immediate control of weapons.” See
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). One officer also
observed an object shaped like a gun beneath a towel in the
vehicle.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Miller’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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