United States v. Comparan , 249 F. App'x 307 ( 2007 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4992
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    SALVADOR COMPARAN, JR.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
    District Judge. (1:06-cr-00075-WLO)
    Submitted:   August 27, 2007                 Decided:   October 2, 2007
    Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    J. Kyle Smith, LAW OFFICE OF J. KYLE SMITH, P.L.L.C., Newton, North
    Carolina, for Appellant. David Paul Folmar, Jr., Assistant United
    States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, Salvador Comparan, Jr.,
    pled   guilty    to     possessing   with    intent    to    distribute     663.63
    kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
    (a)(1),
    (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).            He was sentenced to seventy-
    eight months of imprisonment, to be followed by four years of
    supervised release.        On appeal, Comparan’s counsel filed a brief
    pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967), raising
    five issues but stating that there were no meritorious issues for
    appeal. The Government declined to file a brief; Comparan, advised
    of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, has done so,
    alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Counsel     for   Comparan     first    seeks   to    challenge   the
    district court’s denial of a motion to suppress.                        In view of
    Comparan’s      valid    guilty   plea,   he   has    waived      all   antecedent
    nonjurisdictional defects, Tollett v. Henderson, 
    411 U.S. 258
    , 267
    (1973); United States v. Willis, 
    992 F.2d 489
    , 490 (4th Cir. 1993),
    including his Fourth Amendment claim. Counsel next claims that the
    district court erred in considering the Government’s response to
    Comparan’s objections to the presentence report.                   This claim is
    patently without merit, particularly in light of trial counsel’s
    concession that Comparan was not prejudiced by any delay on the
    part of the Government.
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    Third,   counsel   for   Comparan       challenges   the   district
    court’s application of a guidelines enhancement.                      Under U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2005), a defendant’s
    base offense level is increased two levels “[i]f a dangerous weapon
    (including a firearm) was possessed.”               USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1).     “The
    adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it
    is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
    offense.”    USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.3.           “In order to prove that a
    weapon was present, the Government need show only that the weapon
    was possessed during the relevant illegal drug activity.”                 United
    States v. McAllister, 
    272 F.3d 228
    , 234 (4th Cir. 2001).                     The
    district court’s determination that a firearm or other weapon was
    present and justifies the enhancement is a factual question that is
    reviewed for clear error.        United States v. Apple, 
    915 F.2d 899
    ,
    914 (4th Cir. 1990).     Our review of the record leads us to conclude
    that   the   district   court   did    not    err    in   enhancing   Comparan’s
    sentence under this provision.
    Counsel also challenges whether the district court acted
    unreasonably in denying Comparan a four-point reduction based on
    his minimal role in the offense.              A defendant has the burden of
    showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a minimal or
    minor role in the offense.        United States v. Akinkoye, 
    185 F.3d 192
    , 202 (4th Cir. 1999).        A defendant may receive a four-level
    reduction for being a minimal participant if he is “plainly among
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    the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.”
    USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. n.4.      This level of culpability is shown by “the
    defendant’s lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and
    structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others . . .
    .”   Id.    A two-level reduction may be made when a defendant is a
    minor participant, that is, one “who is less culpable than most
    other participants, but whose role could not be described as
    minimal.”    USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. n.5.
    In deciding whether the defendant played a minor or
    minimal    role,   the   “critical   inquiry   is   not   just    whether    the
    defendant has done fewer ‘bad acts’ than his co-defendants, but
    whether    the   defendant’s   conduct   is    material   or     essential    to
    committing the offense.” United States v. Pratt, 
    239 F.3d 640
    , 646
    (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).                Role
    adjustments are determined on the basis of the defendant’s relevant
    conduct.    United States v. Fells, 
    920 F.2d 1179
    , 1183-84 (4th Cir.
    1990).     The district court in this case denied the minimal role
    reduction, finding “no evidence to support a minimal or minor role
    in connection with the crime,” and this finding is not clearly
    erroneous.
    Finally, counsel questions whether the district court
    acted unreasonably in denying an additional one-level downward
    adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1(b).
    However, this adjustment may only be made upon formal motion by the
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    Government at the time of sentencing.          USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6.        In
    this case, there was no such motion.          Therefore, as the district
    court   noted,   Comparan    was    not   eligible    for   the   third   point
    reduction, and this claim entitles him to no relief.                      United
    States v. Chase, 
    466 F.3d 310
    , 315 (4th Cir. 2006).
    In his pro se supplemental brief, Comparan asserts that
    appellate counsel was ineffective for filing an Anders brief. This
    claim is not cognizable on direct appeal.             To allow for adequate
    development of the record, a defendant must bring such claims in a
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     (2000) motion unless the record conclusively
    establishes ineffective assistance of counsel.              United States v.
    Richardson, 
    195 F.3d 192
    , 198 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v.
    King, 
    119 F.3d 290
    , 295 (4th Cir. 1997).          Here, the record does not
    conclusively     establish   that    Comparan’s      appellate    counsel   was
    ineffective.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
    this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.                   We
    therefore affirm Comparan’s conviction and sentence.               This court
    requires that counsel inform Comparan, in writing, of the right to
    petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
    If Comparan requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
    that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
    this court for leave to withdraw from representation.               Counsel’s
    motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Comparan.                We
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    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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