United States v. Gaston , 286 F. App'x 4 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4892
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES WILLIAM GASTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00087-RJC)
Submitted: July 31, 2008 Decided: August 4, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David G. Belser, BELSER & PARKE, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States
Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James William Gaston was convicted, following a jury
trial, of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine
and cocaine base, three counts of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. Based on his prior convictions for either violent or drug
trafficking felonies, as noticed by the 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2000)
information filed by the government, Gaston was found to be an
armed career criminal. The district court imposed a life sentence
as mandated by 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 851 (2000). Gaston
appeals his sentence, arguing that his constitutional rights were
violated because his sentence was increased based on a prior
conviction not alleged in the indictment, found by the jury, or
stipulated to by him. We affirm.
Gaston concedes that the Supreme Court ruled, in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), that the
penalty provision of a statute enhancing a sentence based on
recidivism is not an element of the crime and prior convictions
need not be alleged in the indictment and found by the jury.
However, he contends that Almendarez-Torres was called into
question by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny and should no longer be
considered binding precedent. Although Apprendi expressed some
uncertainty regarding the future vitality of Almendarez-Torres, we
- 2 -
subsequently concluded that Almendarez-Torres was not overruled by
Apprendi, and remains the law. United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d
216, 220 (4th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d
349, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming continuing validity of
Almendarez-Torres after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220(2005)). We therefore conclude that Gaston’s claim is without
merit. Moreover, as this court noted in Cheek, even if we were to
agree with Gaston’s forecast that the Supreme Court will overrule
Almendarez-Torres, “we are not free to overrule or ignore the
Supreme Court’s precedents.” Cheek, 415 F.3d at 352-53 (citing
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (“[I]t is [the
Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its
precedents.”)).
Accordingly, we affirm Gaston’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 3 -