McNeill v. Currie , 84 F. App'x 276 ( 2003 )


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  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    JAMES C. MCNEILL,                      
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    GEORGE E. CURRIE; TONY C. JONES;
    MICHAEL A. MUNNS; JAMES BOYD
    BENNETT; VIRGINIA LANCASTER;
    RICHARD T. JONES; CHARLES E. HILL;
    MICHAEL ROACH; JAMES P. ORWIN;
    MARVIN THOMAS; JAMES A. REID;
    WILLIAM BROWN; DENNIS W.
    VANBUREN; THOMAS D. AKER;
    THURMAN HINES; DAVID A. CARROLL,                   No. 03-6940
    Sargeant; LAVERN MCRAE; RICHARD
    CROMARTIE; WILLIAM W. WESLEY;
    ERIC R. GRANDY; PAMELA C.
    WOODALL; RENEE SMITH; MARGARET
    COOPER; JAMES CHAPPELL; LEROY
    HARRIS; KIMBERLY REID; ROY
    PATTERSON; JERRI HARRIS; CHARISSA
    DAWSON; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER
    CLARKE; MICHAEL MCDONALD
    MURPHY, M.D.; PHILIP HOPKINS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
    Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge.
    (CA-03-223-5-H)
    Submitted: October 15, 2003
    Decided: December 22, 2003
    2                         MCNEILL v. CURRIE
    Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
    curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    James C. McNeill, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    James C. McNeill, a North Carolina inmate, appeals the district
    court’s order denying relief on his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (2000) complaint
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B) (2000). McNeill alleged a number of
    constitutional violations by prison officials at Polk Youth Institution,
    including violations of due process and the prohibition against cruel
    and unusual punishment in connection with certain disciplinary hear-
    ings, interference with legal mail, retaliation for filing grievances and
    complaints, denial of medical care, and sexual harassment. We affirm
    in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
    McNeill claims that he was denied certain due process protections
    with respect to various prison disciplinary hearings. In order to show
    the deprivation of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
    Clause, an inmate must show either: (1) the conditions exceed the
    sentence imposed in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to pro-
    tection by the Due Process Clause or (2) the confinement creates an
    atypical or significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of
    MCNEILL v. CURRIE                            3
    prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 483-84 (1995). A claim
    having no arguable basis in law or fact may be dismissed as frivolous.
    Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 328 (1989). We review de novo
    a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2) (2000). De’Lonta v. Angelone, 
    330 F.3d 630
    , 633 (4th Cir. 2003).
    We conclude that McNeill was not entitled to due process protec-
    tions with respect to his disciplinary hearings on December 22, 2000,
    July 10, 2001, September 18, 2001, November 8, 2001, and Decem-
    ber 12, 2001, because the disciplinary actions taken and McNeill’s
    placement in administrative segregation did not create an atypical or
    significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
    See Beverati v. Smith, 
    120 F.3d 500
    , 503-04 (4th Cir. 1997). We
    therefore affirm the portion of the district court’s order dismissing
    McNeill’s due process claims with respect to these five proceedings.
    However, with respect to the proceedings held on August 1, 2002, and
    December 31, 2002, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of
    McNeill’s due process claims because we conclude that these claims
    have an arguable basis in law and fact. On remand, the district court
    should compare the conditions in segregation to which McNeill is
    exposed, including his loss of out-of-cell exercise, with the ordinary
    incidents of prison life, to determine whether McNeill possessed a lib-
    erty interest requiring due process protections during these two disci-
    plinary hearings.
    We also vacate the district court’s dismissal of McNeill’s depriva-
    tion of exercise claim and remand for consideration of this claim. In
    order to make out an Eighth Amendment claim relating to conditions
    of confinement, a plaintiff must establish both (1) "a serious depriva-
    tion of a basic human need" and (2) "deliberate indifference to prison
    conditions on the part of prison officials." Strickler v. Waters, 
    989 F.2d 1375
    , 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). A plaintiff must also "produce evi-
    dence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting
    from the challenged conditions." 
    Id. at 1381
    . We have held that it may
    generally be considered that "complete deprivation of exercise for an
    extended period of time violates Eighth Amendment prohibitions
    against cruel and unusual punishment." Mitchell v. Rice, 
    954 F.2d 187
    , 191 (4th Cir. 1992).
    McNeill’s allegation, which must be accepted as true at this stage
    of the proceedings, is that he was deprived of out-of-cell exercise for
    4                         MCNEILL v. CURRIE
    approximately seven months while housed in segregation. McNeill
    also alleged that he needs exercise to rehabilitate his various injuries
    and that the lack of exercise has caused him serious physical and
    emotional distress. Whether such facts, if proven, amounted to an
    Eighth Amendment violation should be considered in the first
    instance by the district court.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of McNeill’s
    due process claims relating to his disciplinary hearings on December
    22, 2000, July 10, 2001, September 18, 2001, November 8, 2001, and
    December 12, 2001, and affirm the dismissal of those claims not
    raised in McNeill’s informal brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). However, we
    vacate the district court’s dismissal of McNeill’s due process claims
    relating to the disciplinary proceedings on August 1, 2002, and
    December 31, 2002, vacate the dismissal of McNeill’s deprivation of
    exercise claim, and remand to the district court for further proceed-
    ings consistent with this opinion.*
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
    tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED
    IN PART, AND REMANDED
    *By this disposition, we indicate no view as to the ultimate merits of
    McNeill’s claims.