Performance Friction Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board , 118 F. App'x 721 ( 2004 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 03-1788
    PERFORMANCE FRICTION CORPORATION,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Respondent,
    versus
    UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL
    IMPLEMENT WORKERS, AFL-CIO, CLC,
    Intervenor.
    No. 03-1918
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    PERFORMANCE FRICTION CORPORATION,
    Respondent.
    No. 03-2357
    UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL
    IMPLEMENT WORKERS, AFL-CIO, CLC,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    PERFORMANCE FRICTION CORPORATION,
    Respondent,
    and
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Respondent.
    On Petitions for Review and Cross-Applications for Enforcement of
    an Order of the National Labor Relations Board. (11-CA-16040; 11-
    CA-18044)
    Argued:   September 29, 2004             Decided:   December 22, 2004
    Before WILKINSON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and Henry E. HUDSON,
    United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia,
    sitting by designation.
    No. 03-1788, Petition for Review is denied; No. 03-1918, Cross-
    Application for Enforcement is granted; No. 03-2357, Intervenor’s
    Petition for Review is denied, and Intervenor’s Application for
    Enforcement is granted by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: William Lawrence Rikard, Jr., PARKER, POE, ADAMS &
    BERNSTEIN, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Performance
    Friction Corporation.  Fred B. Jacob, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
    2
    BOARD, Appellate Court Branch, Office of the General Counsel,
    Washington, D.C., for the Board. Marcia Weil Borowski, THOMPSON,
    ROLLINS, SCHWARTZ & BOROWSKI, L.L.C., Decatur, Georgia, for the
    Union. ON BRIEF: Stacy K. Wood, PARKER, POE, ADAMS & BERNSTEIN,
    L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Performance Friction
    Corporation.    Arthur F. Rosenfeld, General Counsel, John E.
    Higgins, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate
    General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General
    Counsel, Howard E. Perlstein, Deputy Assistant General Counsel,
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellate Court Branch, Office of
    the General Counsel, Washington, D.C., for the Board.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    3
    PER CURIAM:
    Performance Friction Corporation (“the Company”) petitions for
    review of a Decision and Order entered against it by the National
    Labor Relations Board (“the Board”).   On April 22, 2003, the Board
    Ordered that the Company pay employees Jerry Kennedy (“Kennedy”)
    and Manuel Mantecon (“Mantecon”) backpay with interest.* The Board
    cross-applies for enforcement of its Order, and we have granted
    United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
    America (“the Union”) leave to intervene.   Reviewing this case for
    an abuse of discretion, we defer to the findings of the Board and
    hold that the Board properly calculated and awarded backpay with
    interest. As explained below, we deny the Petitions for Review and
    grant the Cross-Applications for enforcement.
    I.
    On June 30, 1997, we affirmed the Board’s findings that the
    Company had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor
    Relations Act (“NLRA”).   
    29 U.S.C. §§ 158
    (a)(1), (3).     We then
    remanded the case to the Board for a recalculation of backpay.
    Performance Friction II, 
    117 F.3d 763
    , 766 (1997). On November 24,
    1998, the Board’s Regional Director received evidence and heard
    argument before ordering the Company to provide backpay to both
    * The Board awarded Mantecon backpay in the amount of $5,438
    plus interest and awarded Kennedy backpay in the amount of $11,738
    plus interest.
    4
    Kennedy and Mantecon, along with four others. The Board calculated
    the amount of backpay utilizing a “comparable or representative
    employee” formula based on an average of eighteen employees who
    worked throughout the entire backpay period in comparable positions
    to Mantecon and Kennedy.
    The    Company   now     petitions     for   review   of   the   decision
    challenging the Board’s award of backpay on three fronts.               First,
    the   Company    argues      that   “Kennedy    and   Mantecon’s    mendacious
    behaviors were a fraud on and a flagrant abuse of Board processes
    and therefore completely bar any backpay.”                  Next, the Company
    argues that the Board improperly awarded backpay without requiring
    Kennedy to prove that he mitigated his damages.                    Lastly, the
    Company contends that the calculation method was improper.
    II.
    The disposition of this case turns solely on the application
    of the standard of review, which is settled law in this Circuit.
    The NLRA mandates that the Board’s factual findings “shall be
    conclusive” so long as “supported by substantial evidence on the
    record.”    
    29 U.S.C. § 160
    (e); Sam’s Club v. NLRB, 
    173 F.3d 233
    , 239
    (4th Cir. 1999).       Credibility determinations are given deference
    absent exceptional circumstances and are reviewed solely for an
    abuse of discretion.      Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    467 U.S. 883
    , 898–99
    (1984).     The Board’s interpretation of the NLRA is deferred to so
    5
    long as “reasonably defensible,” WXGI, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    243 F.3d 833
    ,
    840 (4th Cir. 2001), and the Board’s application of the law to the
    facts is reviewed solely to determine whether it is “supported by
    substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole.”                   Sam’s
    Club, 
    173 F.3d at 239
    .      Further, the Board’s ordered remedy is
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will only be disturbed in
    the extraordinary circumstance where it is “arbitrary, capricious,
    or manifestly contrary to the [NLRA].”          Coronet Foods v. NLRB, 
    158 F.3d 782
    , 788 (4th Cir. 1998)(internal quotations omitted); ABF
    Freight Sys. v. NLRB, 
    510 U.S. 317
    , 324 (1994); Aneco Inc. v. NLRB,
    
    285 F.3d 326
    , 329 (4th Cir. 2002).
    III.
    In this Court’s view, the Board’s findings are supported by
    substantial evidence on the record, and there are no exceptional
    circumstances that warrant a finding that the Board abused its
    discretion.   Consequently, we affirm the findings and conclusions
    of the Board.     First, with respect to Mantecon’s and Kennedy’s
    behavior, while “[f]alse testimony in a formal proceeding is
    intolerable,”   ABF   Freight    Sys.,    
    510 U.S. at 323
    ,    the   Board
    explicitly found that “Mantecon did not make any intentional
    misleading statements.”     J.A. 526 n.11. Here, there was neither
    exceptional     circumstances,     nor     an    abuse      of     discretion.
    Consequently, we defer to the Board’s credibility determination.
    6
    However, with respect to Kennedy, the Company argues that he
    purposely lied about his incarceration and efforts to mitigate, and
    should therefore be denied backpay.               In American Navigation Co.,
    the   Board   held    that     “discriminatees      found    to   have   willfully
    concealed from the Board their interim employment will be denied
    backpay for all quarters in which they engaged in the employment so
    concealed.”    
    268 N.L.R.B. 426
    , 427 (1983).                Therefore, the Board
    appropriately withheld payment for the quarters corresponding to
    the term of Kennedy’s incarceration.
    Second, we conclude that any omission in the Board’s Order
    with respect to Kennedy’s mitigation efforts are attributable to
    the   Company’s      failure    to   meet   its    burden    of   proof.    While
    “employees who lose their jobs as a result of an unfair labor
    practice must mitigate their damages by making a ‘reasonable effort
    to obtain interim employment,’” Aneco Inc., 
    285 F.3d at 330
     (4th
    Cir. 2002)(quoting Coronet Foods, 
    158 F.3d at 800
    )), the burden
    rests upon “the employer who committed an unfair labor practice to
    establish facts that reduce the amount due for gross backpay.”
    Minette Mills, Inc., 
    316 N.L.R.B. 1009
    , 1010 (1995).                 The Company
    offered no evidence to justify a reduction in the amount of backpay
    awarded to Kennedy.          The Company failed to meet its burden and,
    therefore, the Board did not abuse its discretion in awarding
    backpay to Kennedy.
    7
    Third,   backpay     was   calculated   utilizing   a    comparable   or
    representative employee formula based on an average of eighteen
    employees who worked throughout the entire backpay period in
    comparable    positions    to    Mantecon    and   Kennedy.    The   Board’s
    calculation method was objectively reasonable based on substantial
    evidence and is entitled to deference.        There has been no abuse of
    discretion.    See Coronet Foods, 
    158 F.3d at 800
     (quoting Bagel
    Bakers Council v. NLRB, 
    555 F.2d 304
    , 305 (2d Cir. 1977)(finding
    that the Board’s decision to “proceed by one method rather than
    another hardly makes out a case of abuse of discretion”)).
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, Performance Friction Corporation’s
    Petition for Review is denied; the Board’s Cross-Application for
    Enforcement of its Decision and Order of April 22, 2003, is
    granted; the Intervenor Union’s Petition for Review as to Mantecon
    is denied, and the Intervenor Union’s Application for Enforcement
    of the Board’s decision as to Kennedy is granted.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW IS DENIED; CROSS-APPLICATION FOR
    ENFORCEMENT IS GRANTED; INTERVENOR’S PETITION FOR REVIEW IS
    DENIED; AND INTERVENOR’S APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT IS GRANTED
    8