United States v. Rodriguez , 152 F. App'x 278 ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4243
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANGEL LUIS RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a Jose M. Gomez,
a/k/a Angel Ayala, a/k/a Hector Reyes,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(CR-03-92)
Submitted: September 14, 2005 Decided: October 11, 2005
Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Linda George, Hackensack, New Jersey, for Appellant. Jonathan S.
Gasser, Acting United States Attorney, Alston C. Badger, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Angel Luis Rodriguez appeals his guilty plea conviction
and life sentence imposed for conspiracy to distribute ecstasy,
cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000),
possession with intent to distribute ecstasy, and more than 500
grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000), and one
additional count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000).
Rodriguez first contends that the district court erred by
denying his motion to compel specific performance of the
Government’s promise to move for a U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 5K1.1 departure. The denial of a motion to compel is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Wells v. Liddy, 186
F.3d 505, 518 n.12 (4th Cir. 1999). A district court may, upon the
government’s motion, reduce the sentence of a defendant who has
provided substantial assistance in aiding another prosecution. See
Rule 35(b); United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 5K1.1.
Courts review plea agreements as contracts. United States v.
Martin, 25 F.3d 211, 216-17 (4th Cir. 1994). The party asserting
a breach of a plea agreement has the burden of proving its breach.
United States v. Dixon, 998 F.2d 228, 230 (4th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1076 (4th Cir. 1991). After
careful review of the record, we conclude that by threatening
several witnesses, Rodriguez violated his plea agreement in several
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respects and such material breaches relieved the Government of any
obligation to move for a downward departure. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513(b) (2000); see also United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113,
(4th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
Rodriguez next asserts that his sentence was based upon
facts found by a judge, in violation of United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the
federal sentencing guidelines’ mandatory scheme, which provides for
sentencing enhancements based on facts found by the court, violated
the Sixth Amendment. After Booker, courts must calculate the
appropriate guideline range, consider the range in conjunction with
other relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2000), and impose a sentence. If a court imposes a sentence
outside the guideline range, the district court must state its
reasons for doing so. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547
(4th Cir. 2005).
Because Rodriguez did not raise this claim in the
district court, his sentence is reviewed for plain error. Hughes,
401 F.3d at 547 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-
32 (1993)). To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish
that error occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected his
substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 731-32; Hughes, 401 F.3d at
547-48. If a defendant establishes these requirements, the court’s
“discretion is appropriately exercised only when failure to do so
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would result in a miscarriage of justice, such as when the
defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Hughes, 401 F.3d at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Although Rodriguez’s offense level was enhanced by facts
that he did not admit to, the enhanced offense level did not affect
the length of his sentence. In the absence of a downward departure
based upon substantial assistance, the district court was without
the authority to impose any sentence other than mandatory life in
prison.* United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir.
2005) (holding that “Booker did nothing to alter the rule that
judges cannot depart below a statutorily provided minimum
sentence.”). Accordingly, Rodriguez suffered no Sixth Amendment
violation. We therefore affirm Rodriguez’s convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
Rodriguez had four prior drug trafficking convictions.
Accordingly, under 18 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000) (dictating
mandatory life sentence if the defendant has two or more prior
felony drug convictions), Rodriguez was subject to a mandatory life
sentence even if his offense level had not been enhanced by judge-
found facts. In light of this circumstance, we need not address
Rodriguez’s claim that he was entitled to a sentence reduction
based on acceptance of responsibility.
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