United States v. Pope , 232 F. App'x 287 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4473
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANTOINE JEFFREY POPE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (1:05-cr-
00532-AMD)
Submitted: November 30, 2006 Decided: July 5, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Flynn M. Owens, LAW OFFICES OF RUBIN & OWENS, P.A., Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Stephen M. Schenning, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following the denial of his motion to suppress a firearm
discovered during the course of a traffic stop, Antoine Jeffrey
Pope pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
He now appeals his conviction, arguing that the district court
erred when it denied the suppression motion. We affirm.
I
At a hearing on the suppression motion, Sergeant David
Long, a patrol supervisor with the Hagerstown City Police
Department, testified that he was on duty in the early morning of
August 31, 2005. He was advised that a residential burglary was in
progress approximately one mile from where he was on patrol. The
perpetrator was identified as a black male wearing dark clothing.
When Long was advised of the burglary, the victim was on the phone
with the 911 operator. Long testified that as he drove towards the
scene of the burglary he encountered no vehicles until he spotted
a sports utility vehicle (SUV) traveling with its headlights turned
off. After Long saw the car, the headlights were illuminated and
turned off several times. Long observed that the driver of the SUV
was a black male wearing dark clothing. Long initiated a traffic
stop.
Pope, the driver, produced a driver’s license but was
unable to produce the rental agreement for the car. Long observed
that both Pope and his passenger appeared quite nervous. Two
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backup officers arrived within thirty seconds of the traffic stop.
When one of the backup officers began to speak to the passenger,
the passenger appeared to reach for something. The backup officer
opened the passenger door, grabbed the passenger’s arm, and asked
him to exit the vehicle. When he did, a gun fell to the ground.
The other backup officer then asked Pope if he had any weapons.
Pope replied that he was sitting on a handgun. Officers took
custody of that gun, which Pope subsequently moved to suppress.
The district court denied the motion. The court found
that, given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer
would have conducted the traffic stop based on a reasonable
suspicion that the SUV was related to the burglary that had
occurred nearby only minutes earlier.
II
On appeal, Pope argues that the district court erred when
it found that Long had a reasonable, articulable basis to effect
the traffic stop of Pope’s SUV. When evaluating the denial of a
motion to suppress, we review legal conclusions de novo and factual
findings for clear error. Evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below. United States v. Seidman,
156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
The Fourth Amendment requires that a brief, investigatory
stop of an individual be supported by reasonable, articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
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1, 30 (1968). The reasonable suspicion standard “is a less
demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing
considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
In deciding whether an officer had the requisite
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory traffic stop,
courts apply an objective test rather than examining the subjective
beliefs of the investigating officer. Id. “Reasonable suspicion
standard is a commonsensical proposition. Courts are not remiss in
crediting the practical experience of officers who observe on a
daily basis what transpires on the street.” United States v.
Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court has
recognized that individual factors consistent with innocent travel
can, when taken together, give rise to reasonable suspicion.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
We conclude that an officer in Sgt. Long’s position would
have had an objectively reasonable suspicion that the SUV that Pope
was driving was connected with the recent burglary—i.e., that
criminal activity was afoot. The burglary had occurred only
minutes earlier; indeed, when Long received the call, the victim
was still on the telephone with the 911 operator. The offense
occurred within one mile of Long’s location in a residential area
where there was virtually no traffic in the early morning hours.
The only car that Long saw on the road was the SUV, and that
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vehicle was being operated in a suspicious manner—first without
headlights, and then with its headlights being turned on and off.
Finally, Pope, like the burglar, was a black man wearing dark
clothing. We conclude that these factors, taken together, give
rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a traffic stop
under Terry.
III
We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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