United States v. McCrae , 234 F. App'x 150 ( 2007 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4988
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    BRIAN DAVID MCCRAE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Chief District
    Judge. (1:06-cr-00025-JPJ)
    Submitted:   July 13, 2007                 Decided:   July 25, 2007
    Before MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Michael A. Bragg, BRAGG LAW, PLC, Abingdon, Virginia, for
    Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Zachary T.
    Lee, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia,
    for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    A jury found Brian D. McCrae guilty of conspiracy to
    commit    robbery   of   controlled   substances   after    traveling   in
    interstate commerce, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2118
    (d) and
    (b)(1)(B)(2000),    taking   by   force   controlled   substances   after
    traveling in interstate commerce and the use of a dangerous weapon,
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    , 2118(a), (a)(1) (2000), and
    knowingly possessing with intent to distribute and distributing
    oxycodone, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(C)
    (2000).     McCrae was sentenced to three concurrent terms of 60
    months’ imprisonment.     On appeal, McCrae argues the district court
    erred by denying his motion to suppress.       We affirm.
    This Court reviews the factual findings underlying the
    denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal
    conclusions de novo.     United States v. Johnson, 
    400 F.3d 187
    , 193
    (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 134
     (2005).           The evidence is
    construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
    below.    United States v. Seidman, 
    156 F.3d 542
    , 547 (4th Cir.
    1998).    In determining whether probable cause existed for McCrae’s
    arrest, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances
    surrounding the arrest.      Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 230-32
    (1983); Taylor v. Waters, 
    81 F.3d 429
    , 434 (4th Cir. 1996).
    Probable cause for a warrantless arrest is defined as “facts and
    circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to
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    warrant   a    prudent    person,   or    one   of    reasonable        caution,    in
    believing,     in   the   circumstances     shown,     that      the    suspect    has
    committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”
    United States v. Gray, 
    137 F.3d 765
    , 769 (4th Cir. 1998) (citations
    omitted).       Determining whether the information surrounding an
    arrest    is    sufficient    to    establish         probable     cause     is     an
    individualized and fact-specific inquiry.                   Wong Sun v. United
    States, 
    371 U.S. 471
    , 479 (1963).               Additionally, officers are
    permitted to draw on their experience and specialized training to
    make inferences from and deductions about cumulative evidence.
    United States v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 273 (2002).                          “[E]ven
    ‘seemingly     innocent    activity’     when   placed      in    the    context    of
    surrounding     circumstances,”     can    give      rise   to   probable       cause.
    United    States    v.    Humphries,      
    372 F.3d 653
    ,      657    (4th     Cir.
    2004)(citation omitted).
    McCrae does not challenge the constitutionality of the
    officer’s pat-down search of his front pants pockets.                        Such a
    challenge would be unavailing in any event because McCrae was
    present during the arrest of his co-conspirator, Sean Osborne, who
    was a suspect in the robbery of a pharmacy, and was observed to
    have a large bulge in his left front pants pocket.                 McCrae argues,
    however, that the police exceeded the permissible scope of the
    search by manipulating the object inside of his pants to discern
    that it felt like pills.       He contends that the search should have
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    ceased as soon as it became evident the bulge was not created by a
    weapon.
    McCrae acknowledges that at the time the search was
    performed,   police     knew    a     drug    store    had    been    robbed     by   an
    individual meeting the description of Osborne; McCrae had returned
    home with Osborne; Osborne had told his girlfriend that he had done
    something    illegal;    Osborne’s          girlfriend       had    discovered    pill
    bottles; and McCrae had a bulge in his front pants pocket.                       McCrae
    ignores, however, the testimony of the officer who conducted the
    pat-down    search   that      when    he    felt     the    lump    he   immediately
    recognized it to be a pocketful of pills.                     After reviewing the
    totality of the circumstances, we find the police did not exceed
    the scope of a permissible pat-down search, and that the evidence
    lawfully found in the course of the search providing probable cause
    to arrest McCrae. Accordingly, we find the district court properly
    denied McCrae’s motion to suppress.
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
    judgment.    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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