United States v. Privette , 358 F. App'x 398 ( 2009 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-4115
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    HENRY RAYFORD PRIVETTE, JR., a/k/a H.R. Privette, a/k/a Ray
    Picard,   d/b/a  Carolina   Furniture,   Incorporated, d/b/a
    carolinafurniture.com, d/b/a Henry Ray Furniture Export,
    Incorporated, d/b/a Carolina Furniture Factory Direct from
    High    Point,  NC,   Incorporated,    d/b/a   Miller  Burns
    International Home Furnishings, Ltd.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.   Terrence W. Boyle,
    District Judge. (7:07-cr-00133-BO-1)
    Submitted:    December 7, 2009              Decided:   December 22, 2009
    Before WILKINSON and      NIEMEYER,   Circuit   Judges,   and   HAMILTON,
    Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
    Hayes,   Jennifer   P.   May-Parker,  Assistant   United  States
    Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    Henry Rayford Privette, Jr., appeals his convictions
    for wire fraud, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 1343
     (West Supp.
    2009).     Privette     argues   that    the     district    court   abused   its
    discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) by allowing the government
    to present evidence of Privette’s prior state charges.                   For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    This court typically reviews evidentiary rulings for
    abuse of discretion.          United States v. Perkins, 
    470 F.3d 150
    ,
    155 (4th Cir. 2006).          An abuse of discretion occurs only when
    “the trial court acted arbitrarily or irrationally in admitting
    evidence.”      United States v. Williams, 
    445 F.3d 724
    , 732 (4th
    Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Although   not     admissible      to   prove    the    defendant’s
    character, evidence of other crimes may be admitted to prove
    “motive,     opportunity,      intent,       preparation,    plan,   knowledge,
    identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”                   Fed. R. Evid.
    404(b).    Rule 404(b) is an inclusionary rule, allowing evidence
    of other crimes or acts to be admitted, except that which tends
    to prove only criminal disposition.              See United States v. Queen,
    
    132 F.3d 991
    , 994-95 (4th Cir. 1997).                For such evidence to be
    admissible, it must be “(1) relevant to an issue other than the
    general character of the defendant; (2) necessary to prove an
    element    of   the   charged    offense;      and   (3)    reliable.”    United
    3
    States    v.      Hodge,      
    354 F.3d 305
    ,     312     (4th     Cir.      2004).
    Additionally, the probative value of the evidence must not be
    substantially         outweighed    by      its       prejudicial        effect.      
    Id.
    (citing Fed. R. Evid. 403).                 Where the trial judge gives a
    limiting instruction on the use of 404(b) evidence, the chance
    that    the    jury   will     improperly      use    the     evidence    is    reduced.
    Queen, 
    132 F.3d at 997
    .
    An element of wire fraud is the intent to defraud.                      
    18 U.S.C.A. § 1343
    .        The evidence that Privette had previously pled
    nolo    contendere      to    similar    state       charges,    involving       similar
    facts, was relevant to his state of mind when making promises to
    the victims.       The district court did not abuse its discretion by
    concluding the challenged evidence was relevant and necessary to
    prove intent, reliable, and more probative than prejudicial.
    Accordingly, because the evidence of Privette’s prior
    state convictions was properly admitted, we affirm the district
    court’s judgment.            We dispense with oral argument because the
    facts    and    legal   contentions      are      adequately      presented      in   the
    materials      before    the    court    and     argument       would    not    aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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