United States v. Woodson ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4721
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALANDA WOODSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:08-cr-00507-HEH-1)
Submitted: February 24, 2010 Decided: March 11, 2010
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Alan H. Yamamoto, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen
Wiley Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia; Jessica Aber Brumberg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alanda Woodson appeals his conviction and 300-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to one count of possession with intent
to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006) and
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Count 1”), and one count of possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) (“Count 2”). Woodson’s
counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious issues for
review, but questioning whether Woodson was improperly
classified as a career offender, whether the district court
erred in sentencing Woodson as a career offender because he
never received notice of such classification, and whether
Woodson received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The
Government has moved to dismiss Woodson’s appeal on the basis
that Woodson explicitly waived his right to appeal his sentence
in the plea agreement.
We review a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights de
novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.
2005). “A defendant may waive his right to appeal if that
waiver is the result of a knowing and intelligent decision to
forgo the right to appeal.” United States v. Amaya-Portillo,
423 F.3d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). To determine whether the waiver is knowing and
intelligent, we look to “the totality of the circumstances,
including the experience and conduct of the accused, as well as
the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the
terms of the plea agreement.” United States v. General, 278
F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Generally, if the district court fully questions the
defendant about the waiver during the Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”) colloquy, the waiver is valid and
enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th
Cir. 2005).
Neither Woodson nor counsel challenges the validity of
Woodson’s waiver of appellate rights. The plea agreement, which
Woodson signed, clearly and unambiguously stated that he waived
his right to appeal “the conviction and any sentence within the
statutory maximum . . . (or the manner in which that sentence
was determined) . . . on any ground whatsoever.” At the plea
hearing, the district court substantially complied with Rule 11
in performing the plea colloquy. Most importantly, the district
court specifically ensured that Woodson understood the appellate
waiver provision, posing various scenarios and asking if Woodson
understood he could not appeal in each scenario. Woodson, who
was twenty-one years old at the time and a high-school graduate,
repeatedly acknowledged that he understood the waiver.
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Accordingly, we find that the guilty plea and appellate waiver
provision therein were knowing and voluntary, and thus, valid
and enforceable.
We will enforce a valid waiver so long as “the issue
being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” Blick, 408
F.3d at 168. Woodson explicitly waived his right to appeal the
manner in which his sentence was determined, so long as it was
within the statutory maximum, which was 240 months on Count 1
with a mandatory consecutive sixty-month sentence on Count 2.
Thus, Woodson’s arguments that he was improperly classified as a
career offender and that he did not receive notice of that
classification fall within the scope of that waiver.
Accordingly, we grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss
the appeal.
The appellate waiver does not, however, foreclose
Woodson’s final claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. See Johnson, 410 F.3d at 151. Nor does it preclude
our Anders review of the integrity of the Rule 11 proceeding.
Therefore, we deny in part the Government’s motion to dismiss
the appeal.
A defendant may raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel “on direct appeal if and only if it
conclusively appears from the record that his counsel did not
provide effective assistance.” United States v. Martinez, 136
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F.3d 972, 979 (4th Cir. 1998). We find that the record does not
conclusively establish that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance. Accordingly, we decline to consider Woodson’s claim
on direct appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no unwaived and meritorious
issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Woodson, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Woodson requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Woodson. We therefore deny
counsel’s motion to withdraw and dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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