United States v. Williams , 234 F. App'x 84 ( 2007 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4004
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    KELVIN LAMONT WILLIAMS,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Columbia.     Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior
    District Judge. (CR-04-378)
    Submitted:   August 25, 2006                 Decided:   July 11, 2007
    Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam.
    Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Christopher Todd Hagins,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
    Appellant.    Joshua Snow Kendrick, JOSHUA SNOW KENDRICK, P.C.,
    Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Kelvin Lamont Williams pled guilty to possession with
    intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine, in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000), and possession of a
    firearm and ammunition after previously being convicted of a
    felony,   in   violation   of   18   U.S.C.    §   922(g)(1)   (2000).     The
    presentence report (“PSR”) classified Williams as a career offender
    and assigned him an offense level of thirty-four with a criminal
    history of VI, which produced a sentencing guideline range of 262
    to 327 months of imprisonment.        During a sentencing hearing where
    neither party objected to the PSR, the district court accepted this
    range; however, without explanation, the district court varied from
    the range and sentenced Williams to two concurrent 120-month terms
    of imprisonment.    The United States appeals this sentence, arguing
    that the sentence is unreasonable.             We vacate the sentence and
    remand for resentencing.
    Following   the      Supreme      Court’s   decision   in     United
    States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), a sentencing court is no
    longer bound by the sentencing range prescribed by the guidelines.
    United States v. Moreland, 
    437 F.3d 424
    , 432 (4th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2054
     (2006).        When sentencing a defendant post-
    Booker, a district court must still calculate the proper guideline
    range and consider that range along with other relevant factors set
    forth in the guidelines and in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 &
    - 2 -
    Supp. 2006).      See United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 456 (4th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2309
     (2006).                If the district court
    imposes a sentence outside of the guideline range, “[t]he district
    court   must    articulate      the    reasons   for   the    sentence       imposed,
    particularly      explaining     any     departure     or    variance       from       the
    guideline range” in light of the factors in § 3553(a).                      Moreland,
    437 F.3d at 432; Green, 436 F.3d at 456.                    The explanation of a
    sentence outside the guideline range “must be tied to the factors
    set forth in § 3553(a) and must be accompanied by findings of fact
    as necessary.”        Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432.              Moreover, “if the
    sentence is imposed outside the Guideline range and the district
    court   provides      an    inadequate   statement     of    reasons    .    .     .    in
    departing      from   the    Guidelines’     recommendation[,]”         then       that
    sentence “will be found unreasonable and vacated.” Green, 436 F.3d
    at 457; United States v. Hampton, 
    441 F.3d 284
    , 288-89 (4th Cir.
    2006); Moreland, 437 F.3d at 436.
    Here, the district court accepted the guideline range of
    262 to 327 months.          Before imposing sentence, the district court
    discussed the case generally with Williams and his counsel.                        This
    discussion centered on the fact that, although Williams had two
    prior convictions for controlled substance offenses that qualified
    him as a career offender, he had no other prior convictions for
    which criminal history points were assessed in the PSR.                      Williams
    also informed the court that he was thirty-four years old, had
    - 3 -
    graduated from high school, was married, had four children under
    the age of fourteen, suffered from serious medical conditions
    (including bronchitis, a heart murmur, and sleep apnea), and had
    worked for a lumber company and as a cook in a restaurant before
    his sleep apnea prevented him from working.
    During this discussion, Williams’ counsel requested a
    sentence below the advisory guideline range.        In response, counsel
    for the government reviewed Williams’ criminal history, contended
    that the grounds on which Williams relied would not justify a
    departure under the guidelines, and urged the district court to
    impose a sentence within the guideline range.                 In sentencing
    Williams   to   concurrent   terms   of   120   months   of    imprisonment
    (a downward variance of 142 months below the advisory guideline
    range), the district court offered no explanation for its decision
    to impose such a dramatic variance.             Although the government
    objected based on the sentence being outside the guideline range,
    the district court noted the objection but did not elaborate on the
    basis for the sentence.
    Under these circumstances, we vacate the sentence and
    remand this case so that the district court can resentence Williams
    in a manner consistent with our post-Booker precedent.*          We express
    no opinion on the ultimate issue of whether the 120-month sentence
    *
    We, of course, offer no criticism of the district court,
    which did not have the benefit of Green, Moreland, or Hampton at
    the time of sentencing.
    - 4 -
    is appropriate.   We dispense with oral argument because the facts
    and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
    before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    - 5 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-4004

Citation Numbers: 234 F. App'x 84

Judges: Motz, Duncan, Hamilton

Filed Date: 7/11/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024