United States v. Cecilio-Matias , 208 F. App'x 199 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4096
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    ABELARDO FELIX CECILIO-MATIAS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 06-4115
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    ABELARDO FELIX CECILIO-MATIAS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham.   Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
    Senior District Judge. (1:04-cr-00155-FWB; 1:04-cr-00365-FWB)
    Submitted:   October 25, 2006             Decided:   December 5, 2006
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    James Edward Quander, Jr., QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem,
    North Carolina, for Appellant. Arnold L. Husser, Angela Hewlett
    Miller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    In these consolidated appeals, Abelardo Felix Cecilio-
    Matias appeals the district court’s judgments sentencing him to
    forty-three months in prison and two years of supervised release
    for illegally reentering the United States after having previously
    been deported subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction, in
    violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), (b) (2000), and revoking his
    supervised release for a previous illegal reentry conviction and
    sentencing him to a consecutive eleven-month prison term. Cecilio-
    Matias’s   attorney   has   filed    a   brief   pursuant   to   Anders   v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), asserting, in his opinion, there
    are no meritorious grounds for appeal and concluding Cecilio-
    Matias’s sentence is “reasonable by law.” Cecilio-Matias has filed
    a pro se supplemental brief raising the issue of whether the
    district court erred in computing his criminal history score by
    assessing criminal history points for his 1992 drug conviction when
    he was only sixteen years old.       We affirm.
    We will affirm a sentence imposed by the district court
    as long as it is within the statutorily prescribed range and is
    reasonable. United States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
     (4th Cir. 2005).
    A sentence may be unreasonable for both substantive and procedural
    reasons.   United States v. Moreland, 
    437 F.3d 424
    , 434 (4th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2054
     (2006).       A sentence within a properly
    calculated advisory guideline range is presumptively reasonable.
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    United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
    
    126 S. Ct. 2309
     (2006).    This presumption can only be rebutted by
    showing the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the
    factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2000). United States v. Montes-
    Pineda, 
    445 F.3d 375
    , 379 (4th Cir. 2006), pet. for cert. filed, __
    U.S.L.W. __ (July 21, 2006) (No. 06-5439).         In considering whether
    the sentence is unreasonable, we review the district court’s
    factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
    United States v. Hampton, 
    441 F.3d 284
    , 287 (4th Cir. 2006).
    We will affirm the sentence imposed after revocation of
    supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory range
    and not plainly unreasonable.       United States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    , 439 (4th Cir. 2006).    In making this determination, we first
    consider whether the sentence is unreasonable, and if so, whether
    it is “plainly” so.   
    Id. at 438-39
    .       While the district court must
    consider   the   Chapter   Seven   policy    statements   and   statutory
    requirements and factors applicable to revocation sentences under
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3553
    (a), 3583 (2000), the court ultimately has broad
    discretion to revoke the previous sentence and impose a term of
    imprisonment up to the statutory maximum upon finding a violation
    of a condition of supervised release.        
    Id.
    We have reviewed the record and conclude Cecilio-Matias’s
    sentences are reasonable. First, the district court did not assess
    any criminal history points for Cecilio-Matias’s 1992 conviction
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    when computing his criminal history score.              Moreover, the court
    correctly determined his advisory guideline range for the reentry
    conviction was thirty-seven to forty-six months and his sentencing
    range on the supervised release violation was eight to fourteen
    months.   The court considered the pertinent factors and reasonably
    determined a sentence within each of these ranges was appropriate.
    Specifically, the court found as positive the fact that Cecilio-
    Matias’s drug conviction occurred when he was only sixteen years
    old and he had worked without committing any further drug offenses
    since that time.       On the negative side, although Cecilio-Matias
    received a break with a below-guidelines sentence for his previous
    reentry   conviction    and   had    been    deported      twice   already,   he
    continued to return to the country illegally and had numerous
    traffic offenses.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal.   We therefore affirm the district court’s judgments.               This
    court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his
    right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    further review.    If the client requests that a petition be filed,
    but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
    counsel   may   move   in   this    court    for   leave    to   withdraw   from
    representation.     Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on the client.
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    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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