Paul Clark, Sr. v. Monique Almy ( 2021 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-2181
PAUL C. CLARK, SR.,
Creditor − Appellant,
and
REBECCA DELORME; PAUL CLARK, JR.,
Creditors,
v.
MONIQUE D. ALMY, Plan Officer,
Appellee,
and
COUNCIL OF UNIT OWNERS OF THE 100 HARBORVIEW DRIVE
CONDOMINIUM,
Debtor – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Stephanie A. Gallagher, District Judge. (1:19-cv-01437-SAG)
Submitted: September 24, 2021 Decided: December 9, 2021
Before WILKINSON, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed and remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brennan C. McCarthy, BRENNAN MCCARTHY & ASSOCIATES, Annapolis,
Maryland, for Appellant. Randall L. Hagen, CROWELL & MORING LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellee Plan Officer for the Council of Unit Owners of the 100 Harborview
Drive Condominium. Paul Sweeney, James R. Schraf, Lisa Yonka Stevens, YUMKAS
VIDMAR SWEENEY & MULRENIN, LLC, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellee Council
of Unit Owners of the 100 Harborview Drive Condominium.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal of a bankruptcy court’s order. The order clarifies the court’s final
damages order resolving the creditors’—the Clark family’s—prepetition claims against the
debtor, the Council of Unit Owners of the 100 Harborview Drive Condominium
(“Harborview”). After the bankruptcy court issued its final order, Harborview’s plan
officer sought to clarify whether the order resolved the Clarks’ liability for unpaid
assessments on their unit. The bankruptcy court held that its prior orders didn’t alter the
Clarks’ preexisting liability for unpaid assessments. The district court affirmed the
clarification order, and Mr. Clark appealed.
But because the bankruptcy court’s clarification order wasn’t a final order, the
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, as do we. We therefore dismiss this appeal
and remand to the district court to vacate its order.
I.
In March of 2016, Harborview filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Its approved
reorganization plan required resolving prepetition litigation with the Clarks, who lived in
one of the condominium units. The Clarks had sued Harborview for alleged violations of
the Fair Housing Act and for property damage to their unit. The bankruptcy court held a
trial and entered a preliminary damages award, which included monthly ongoing damages
until Harborview substantially remediated the Clarks’ unit. Later, the bankruptcy court
found that Harborview had substantially remediated the unit and issued a final damages
order.
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Not long thereafter, Harborview’s plan officer, Monique D. Almy, moved to have
the court clarify that its prior orders didn’t bar Harborview from collecting unpaid
assessments on the Clarks’ unit. The Clarks opposed the motion, arguing res judicata
would bar any effort by Harborview to collect assessments.
The bankruptcy court granted the motion for clarification, noting that the motion
asked the court “to interpret the scope and legal implications of its own orders.” J.A. 500
n.1. The court held that the claims it resolved in its previous orders didn’t involve any of
Harborview’s rights or remedies against the Clarks for unpaid assessments. But the
bankruptcy court also considered the Clarks’ res judicata argument and held that the
doctrine wouldn’t bar Harborview from enforcing its rights.
Mr. Clark appealed the clarification order to the district court. Almy, joined by
Harborview, moved to dismiss the appeal. They argued that because the order didn’t
adjudicate the Clarks’ liability for assessments, the appeal wasn’t ripe, so there was no
Article III case or controversy. Although the district court granted the motion to dismiss
in part, it reached the merits of the res judicata issue and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
clarification order. Mr. Clark appealed.
II.
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) grants district courts jurisdiction to hear appeals from
bankruptcy judges’ “final judgments, orders, and decrees.” A final order “is normally
limited to an order that resolves the entire case.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry,
LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020). But the meaning of “final order” is broader in bankruptcy.
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Orders in bankruptcy proceedings are “immediately appealable if they finally dispose of
discrete disputes within the larger bankruptcy case.” Id. at 587 (cleaned up). In other
words, “the usual judicial unit for analyzing finality in ordinary civil litigation is the case,
but in bankruptcy, it is often the proceeding.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, however, the bankruptcy court’s clarification order disposed of nothing.
Harborview never asked the bankruptcy court to resolve, nor did the court purport to
resolve, the Clarks’ liability for the unpaid assessments. Nor did the clarification order
modify any of the court’s earlier orders, so it’s not appealable for that reason, either. Cf.
Major v. Orthopedic Equip. Co., 561 F.2d 1112, 1115 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that the
court lacked jurisdiction where the order on appeal was “simply an interpretation” of an
earlier injunctive order and didn’t “continue[] or modif[y] the injunction”). Rather, the
bankruptcy court made clear that it meant only to “interpret the scope and legal
implications of its own orders.” J.A. 500 n.1.
Because the clarification order didn’t “finally dispose” of any “discrete dispute”
within the larger Chapter 11 proceeding, it’s not a final judgment, order, or decree. So the
district court should have dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the same reason,
we lack jurisdiction here. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1); see Mort Ranta v. Gorman, 721 F.3d 241,
245 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Both the district court order and the bankruptcy court order must be
final for our jurisdiction to be proper under § 158(d)(1).”).
One final note. According to Mr. Clark, litigation over the family’s substantive
liability for the unpaid assessments has begun in Maryland state court. Arguments over
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whether Harborview’s claim for assessments is barred by res judicata or any other ground
belong in that court.
III.
For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal and remand to the district court with
instructions to vacate its order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
DISMISSED AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS
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