United States v. Newton , 393 F. App'x 64 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4101
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARRICK DEWAYNE NEWTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:08-cr-00332-JAB-1)
Submitted: July 30, 2010 Decided: August 19, 2010
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, William S.
Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Michael
A. DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Garrick Dewayne Newton appeals his conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Newton contends that the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
that was recovered from his person during an investigative stop.
We affirm.
I.
In the early morning hours of August 3, 2008, Michael
Castro of the Durham Police Department responded to a dispatch
regarding an armed robbery at a Waffle House on Highway 54 in
Durham. The dispatch described the robber as a black man
wearing a blue striped shirt and a tan baseball cap. Upon
arriving on the scene about three minutes later, Officer Castro
set up a perimeter while another officer canvassed the Waffle
House. In the process of establishing a perimeter, Castro saw a
man – the current defendant – fitting the suspect’s description
on the side of the road about 50 to 100 yards from the Waffle
House, walking towards the crime scene.
Officer Castro stopped his car and called to the defendant
to come over to his patrol car. The defendant, Garrick Newton,
at first looked around and hesitated, but as more police cars
approached he complied. When he reached Officer Castro, Castro
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handcuffed him and asked him if he had any weapons on his
person. The defendant said he had a gun in his waistband, which
the officer found upon frisking him.
II.
On appeal, Newton contests the denial of the motion to
suppress. He argues that the totality of the circumstances
surrounding his stop and frisk did not establish reasonable
suspicion that he was involved in any criminal activity. This
court reviews a district court’s findings of fact during a
suppression hearing for clear error, while its legal
determinations are reviewed de novo. See Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). Because the district court
denied the motion to suppress, the evidence is construed in the
light most favorable to the government. See United States v.
Black, 525 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2008).
An investigative, or Terry, stop like that undertaken by
Officer Castro “is constitutional when it is supported by a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is
engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Quarles, 330
F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Police can undertake pat-down searches of individuals
during a Terry stop if there is a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the person is involved in illegal activity and
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armed. See United States v. Raymond, 152 F.3d 309, 312 (4th
Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105,
1107-08 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding “brief but complete restriction
of liberty is valid under Terry”). Reasonable suspicion
requires more than a “hunch” but less than probable cause, and
it may be based on the collective knowledge of officers involved
in an investigation. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
123-24 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The existence of reasonable suspicion “does not depend on
any single factor, but on the totality of the circumstances.”
United States v. Singh, 363 F.3d 347, 354 (4th Cir. 2004). In
determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to
effectuate an investigatory stop, “we assess the relevant facts
known to the authorities and decide whether those facts, ‘from
the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,’
give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” Id.(quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696); see United States v.
Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1989). Even factors
which, by themselves, might suggest innocent conduct can amount
to reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct when taken together.
See United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004).
The district court correctly concluded that based on the
totality of the evidence available to the authorities and
reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, Officer
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Castro had a sufficient basis to detain Newton for questioning
in connection with the reported armed robbery. When Officer
Castro stopped Newton, he reasonably believed, based on the
police dispatch, that a man dressed like Newton had committed
armed robbery only minutes before at the Waffle House restaurant
located 50-100 yards away. Additionally, when Officer Castro
called out to Newton, the defendant paused and looked around,
complying only when more police cars began arriving on the
scene. It was reasonable for Officer Castro to conclude that
Newton was the suspect wanted in connection with the alleged
armed robbery, despite the fact that Newton was walking toward
the Waffle House. Furthermore, given that the reported offense
involved a firearm, it was reasonable for Officer Castro to
suspect that Newton might be carrying a gun. These facts, read
in the light most favorable to the government, would lead a
police officer in the same position as Castro to develop
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and search. Accordingly,
the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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