United States v. Lucas , 257 F. App'x 638 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4005
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ROY KEITH LUCAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(3:05-cr-00760-MBS)
Submitted: November 14, 2007 Decided: December 6, 2007
Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Rogers, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Stanley
D. Ragsdale, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roy Keith Lucas pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and 851
(West 2000 & Supp. 2007), and carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 924(c)(1) and 2 (West Supp. 2007). He received mandatory
minimum sentences on both counts, for a total sentence of 300
months. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure in accepting Lucas’s guilty plea and whether the
sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable. Lucas was
advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he
has not done so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Lucas’s counsel questions the adequacy of the court’s
Rule 11 colloquy but does not identify any specific error. Because
Lucas did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty
plea, any appellate challenge to the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed
for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2002). To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must
establish that an error occurred, that it was plain, and that it
affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
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725, 731-32 (1993); United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547-48
(4th Cir. 2005). In the guilty plea context, to prove that an
error is substantial, the defendant must show that he would not
have pled guilty but for that error. Martinez, 277 F.3d at 532.
Our review of the record reveals that the district court
substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 11. Though
the district court did not advise Lucas that he could not withdraw
his plea if the sentence was longer than he expected, as required
by Rule 11(c)(3)(B), we conclude this omission did not affect
Lucas’s substantial rights.
Likewise, Lucas’s counsel challenges the reasonableness
of his sentence but points to no errors. This court will affirm a
sentence if it “is within the statutorily prescribed range and is
reasonable.” United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006). “[A] sentence within
the proper advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”
United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006); see
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007) (upholding
application of rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to
within-guidelines sentences). Because the district court sentenced
Lucas to the statutory mandatory minimum sentences on each count of
conviction, which were statutorily required to be served
consecutively, after considering and examining the sentencing
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guidelines and the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we
find Lucas’s sentence was reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Lucas’s convictions and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Lucas, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If he requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Lucas. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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