Edmonson v. Potter , 118 F. App'x 726 ( 2004 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1427
DELOIS EDMONSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JACK POTTER, Postmaster General,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Williams D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-02-2803-1-WDQ)
Submitted: September 24, 2004 Decided: December 22, 2004
Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael J. Snider, Morris E. Fischer, SNIDER & FISCHER, L.L.P.,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Thomas M. DiBiagio, United
States Attorney, John W. Sippel, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Delois Edmonson appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to John E. Potter, Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service (“USPS” or “Postmaster”) and
dismissing her employment discrimination suit alleging violations
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. On appeal, Edmonson alleges
error by the district court in dismissing her claims that the USPS
failed to accommodate her carpel tunnel syndrome and subjected her
to a hostile work environment. We have reviewed the record and
find no reversible error.
This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo.
Higgins v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th
Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact, given the parties’ respective
burdens of proof at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986). In determining
whether the moving party has shown there is no genuine issue of
material fact, a court must assess the factual evidence and all
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Id. at 255; Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth
Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1996).
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Edmonson first claims error in the district court’s
dismissal of her failure to accommodate claim.1 To prevail under
the ADA, Edmonson must prove that she was a qualified individual
with a disability and that the USPS discriminated against her
because of the disability. Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 268. Absent
direct evidence of discrimination, Edmonson may make her showing
using the burden shifting approach first enunciated in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Halperin v. Abacus
Technology Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on
other grounds by Baird ex rel Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir.
1999).
To establish a prima facie case for failure to
accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must show:
(1) she was an individual with a disability within the meaning of
the ADA;2 (2) the employer had notice of her disability; (3) with
reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions
1
As a preliminary matter, the district court properly applied
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) standards to Edmonson’s
Rehabilitation Act claim because she is a federal employee. See
Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir. 2001).
2
The ADA defines a “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The Postmaster asserts that
Edmonson has failed to establish that she is disabled under the
applicable law, because she has not provided any evidence that her
carpel tunnel syndrome has substantially limited a major life
activity. We do not address this assertion given the disposition
of this appeal.
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of the position; and (4) the employer refused to make such
accommodations. Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir.
2001). To establish discrimination based on her disability under
the Rehabilitation Act, Edmonson must demonstrate that she: (1) is
an individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2)
is otherwise qualified for the job in question; and (3) suffered an
adverse employment action solely because of the disability.
Halperin, 128 F.3d at 197. “An absolute precondition to [any
discrimination] suit [is] that some adverse employment action [has]
occurred.” Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th
Cir. 1985). An adverse employment action is a discriminatory act
that “adversely affect[s] the ‘terms, conditions, or benefits’ of
[a plaintiff’s] employment.” Von Guten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858,
864 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc.,
126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)).
We find without difficulty that the record is replete
with facts demonstrating the reasonable accommodations made by the
USPS to Edmonson. From the time Edmonson presented her medical
documentation to the USPS relating to her carpel tunnel syndrome in
1986, the USPS provided her with light-duty work. She worked, and
continues to work, as a mail processing clerk in the 030 Manual
Operation at the Baltimore Processing and Distribution Center. At
no time did Edmonson sustain any loss of pay, benefits, or rank.
The USPS approved thirteen schedule changes requested by Edmonson
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over a twelve month period of time. While she asserts the refusal
to grant her two additional schedule changes demonstrates a refusal
to accommodate, she admitted that her requests for schedule change
were for personal convenience and not to accommodate her alleged
disability. In addition, her request for a twelve-month schedule
change was not completed on the proper form, and she did not first
receive authorization from her manager or union representative in
compliance with USPS policies and procedures. Assuming, arguendo,
that Edmonson demonstrated that she was disabled under the
Rehabilitation Act, we find this evidence amply supports the
Postmaster’s reasonable accommodation of her disability.
Moreover, we agree with the district court’s
determination that Edmonson failed to demonstrate that she suffered
an adverse employment action such that she established her prima
facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. The
USPS’s denials of Edmonson’s requests for temporary schedule
changes did not affect a term, condition, or benefit of her
employment. Nor did the denials cause Edmonson to be demoted or
receive less pay or benefits. She admitted also that the requests
were for her personal convenience, i.e., to accommodate her baby-
sitter and care for her brother, and not to accommodate an alleged
disability. Such requests for accommodation based on personal
convenience are not actionable under Title VII. See, e.g., Grube
v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Edmonson further asserts on appeal that she was subjected
to adverse employment action because she was transferred from the
re-wrap section, and her duties and skills thereafter became “very
limited.” She attested that she had “lack of instruction and
assignment and sat with no work to do for long periods of time
. . .”. Edmonson’s self-serving assertions, unsupported by any
other evidence, are insufficient to successfully counter summary
judgment. Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 134-35 (4th
Cir. 2002). Despite Edmonson’s assertions, she admitted that she
was not demoted, nor did she receive less pay as a result of her
transfer out of the re-wrap section. A transfer in duties or
reassignment that does not result in any decrease in salary,
benefits, or rank cannot constitute an adverse employment action
necessary to state a prima facie case of discrimination. Munday,
126 F.3d at 243; Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256-57 (4th Cir.
1999). Nor is there any evidence that the changes to her work
schedule or duties damaged her future career prospects. Brown v.
Cox Med. Ctrs., 286 F.3d 1040, 1045-46 (8th Cir. 2001).3 Her
dissatisfaction with the assignments she received without the
scheduling modification is not actionable, nor is her claim that
the reassignment caused her to lose her status with other
supervisors and workers. See, e.g., Brown, 286 F.3d at 1046;
3
The district court properly held that the adverse impact on
Edmonson’s leave was insufficient to establish an adverse
employment action. See Von Guten, 243 F.3d at 869.
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Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.
1996).4
The second cause of action on which Edmonson appeals is
the district court’s dismissal of her hostile work environment
claim. To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, Edmonson must prove that she: (1) is a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) was subject to
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her
disability; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5)
some factual basis for imputing liability to the employer. Fox v.
GMC, 247 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001). Edmonson must demonstrate
that her employer’s conduct was objectively hostile, such that a
reasonable person would so perceive it as such. Id. at 178.
Factors to be considered in analyzing the objective component
include the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct,
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating rather than
being a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance. Fox, 247 F.3d at
178. Assuming, arguendo, that Edmonson demonstrated that she was
4
Given our finding that the district court correctly
determined that Edmonson failed to meet her prima facie burden on
her accommodation claim by failing to demonstrate that she was
subjected to an adverse employment action, we decline to address
Edmonson’s further assertions on appeal relative to her
accommodation claim.
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disabled under the Rehabilitation Act, we find no evidence here
that could support a reasonable finding that any alleged harassment
Edmonson suffered by the USPS was based on her disability, or that
it was severe or pervasive such that it created an abusive work
environment. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21 (1993).
Edmonson specified the following acts in support of her
claim of a hostile work environment: (1) her light duty work and
lack of a chair fostered an atmosphere of resentment and pity for
her among her co-workers; (2) the strict leave policies of the
USPS; (3) the work place was too cold; (4) one night she was asked
to work in a mail-handler position, and then was removed from that
job; (5) sometimes her badge was missing; (6) her skills were
under-utilized; and (7) she was denied a shift change and was given
no work for long periods of time. While Edmonson attested that her
uncertainty about her work assignments made her feel “sick” on a
daily basis, and that the stress of her working conditions created
physical problems such as hair loss and joint aches, juxtaposed
against this testimony, Edmonson also described the above-
enumerated occurrences as “silly,” “stupid,” “little stuff.” We
agree with the district court’s determination that, while
Edmonson’s evidence established that she subjectively perceived her
environment as hostile, it was insufficient, when viewed
objectively, to support a hostile work environment claim. See
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Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998) (isolated
or genuinely trivial acts constituting ordinary adversities in
workplace not actionable); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77
F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 1996) (working environment must be “hostile
or deeply repugnant,” not “merely unpleasant,” to be actionable).
There is no evidence that Edmonson was unable to perform her job
duties as a result of her working environment, and she attested
that she never felt threatened. She was unable to provide evidence
to show that her disability specifically was a factor in the
occurrences of which she complained. She did not satisfy her
burden of demonstrating that she was subjected to a hostile work
environment because of her alleged disability.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
granting the Postmaster’s motion for summary judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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