United States v. Lamont Turrentine ( 2021 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4425
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAMONT TURRENTINE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00245-BO-1)
Submitted: October 28, 2021 Decided: December 20, 2021
Before AGEE, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael W. Patrick, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL W. PATRICK, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Lamont Lee Turrentine of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924. The district court sentenced him to 120
months’ imprisonment. Turrentine appeals, arguing that he was not afforded an
opportunity to allocute. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Under Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a district
court must “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or
present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Because Turrentine failed to object at
sentencing regarding the denial of his right to allocute, our review is for plain error. United
States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 424 (4th Cir. 2012). To establish plain error, Turrentine
must show that “(1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial
rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“Rule 32 only requires the district court to address the defendant personally and
permit him to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence before sentence is
imposed; apart from that requirement, the rule does not create a right of allocution at any
specific point in the sentencing proceeding.” Engle, 676 F.3d at 425. Moreover, when
inviting a defendant to allocute, the district court is not required to explicitly track the
language of Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). See United States v. Stuver, 845 F.2d 73, 74-75 (4th Cir.
1988) (holding that Rule 32(a)(1)(C), the predecessor of Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii), was not
violated because, although district court did not quote the language of the Rule, “[t]he court
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specifically addressed the defendant by name at the beginning of the interchange,” the
defendant responded to the court’s questions, and the defendant’s responses evidenced that
he understood he was permitted “to speak in mitigation of his punishment”).
Here, the district court began the sentencing hearing by asking, “Do you want to say
anything, Mr. Turrentine?” Turrentine responded, “Yes, sir” and proceeded to make
several arguments, including that his attorney was ineffective, the firearm recovered by
police was not his, he did not shoot at police officers, there was insufficient evidence to
convict him, and the Government’s account of his offense conduct was not logically
consistent. Turrentine concluded by stating, “That’s all I have to say.” After the district
court heard arguments from both parties with respect to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, it
sentenced Turrentine to 120 months’ imprisonment. We find that the district court
adequately complied with Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). The district court’s invitation to speak
specifically addressed Turrentine, he responded to the district court’s statements and
questions, and his arguments were clear and direct attempts to mitigate the district court’s
upcoming sentence. See Stuver, 845 F.2d at 74-75. Therefore, we find no error.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s criminal judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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