United States v. Christopher Staples , 444 F. App'x 706 ( 2011 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-4074
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER ANTONIO STAPLES,     a/k/a       Christopher      Antonio
    Ross,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.       Thomas David
    Schroeder, District Judge. (1:09-cr-00260-TDS-1)
    Submitted:   August 25, 2011                  Decided:     August 29, 2011
    Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., GRAY, JOHNSON & LAWSON, LLP, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellant.      Ripley Rand, United States
    Attorney, Paul A. Weinman, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Christopher Antonio Staples pled guilty to possession
    of a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2006).              On appeal, Staples contends that
    the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.                         He
    also argues that sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act
    (“ACCA”), 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(2006), violated his constitutional
    rights   under      the   Due    Process       Clause,    the    Equal     Protection
    Clause, and the Eighth Amendment.              We affirm.
    When considering a district court’s ruling on a motion
    to suppress evidence, this Court reviews the district court’s
    factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de
    novo.    United States v. Rusher, 
    966 F.2d 868
    , 873 (4th Cir.
    1992).   When a suppression motion has been denied, this Court
    construes    the    evidence     in   the      light     most    favorable    to   the
    government. United States v. Seidman, 
    156 F.3d 542
    , 547 (4th
    Cir. 1998).      “Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent
    occupant’s    arrest      only   if     the    arrestee     is    within     reaching
    distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search
    or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of
    the offense of arrest.”          Arizona v. Gant, 
    556 U.S. 332
    , __, 
    129 S. Ct. 1710
    , 1723 (2009).
    While     driving     his     girlfriend’s          car,   Staples     was
    stopped because the license plate had expired.                   The officer
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    learned that Staples’s driver’s license was revoked, and told
    Staples that he could not drive away.                 The officer then asked if
    he could search the car.               Staples replied that the car was his
    girlfriend’s, and the officer should wait until she arrived.
    When the officer approached the passenger window, he noticed the
    passenger attempting to conceal what appeared to be marijuana.
    The passenger was arrested for possession of marijuana, and the
    subsequent search revealed a handgun in the glove compartment.
    We conclude that the district correctly found that the search
    was   a   valid    search    incident       to    arrest     because    the        officer
    reasonably believed the vehicle contained evidence relating to
    the passenger’s possession of marijuana.
    Circuit precedent forecloses Staples’s constitutional
    arguments      challenging       his    sentence     under    the     ACCA.        United
    States    v.    Presley,    
    52 F.3d 64
    ,     67-68   (4th   Cir.    1995).         We
    therefore      reject   Staples’s        claim.     See    Scotts     Co.     v.    United
    Indus. Corp., 
    315 F.3d 264
    , 272 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that
    a panel of this court cannot explicitly or implicitly overrule
    circuit precedent established by a prior panel; only the United
    States Supreme Court or the en banc court may do so).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.      We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal     contentions      are   adequately        presented     in   the     materials
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    before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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