United States v. Christopher Watkins ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4759
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL WATKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (4:00-cr-00043-HCM-1)
Submitted: December 21, 2011 Decided: January 5, 2012
Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Timothy Anderson, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, Virginia Beach,
Virginia, for Appellant. Brian James Samuels, Assistant United
States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Michael Watkins appeals the district
court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing
him to six months in prison. Watkins’s attorney has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting, in his opinion, there are no meritorious grounds for
appeal but raising the issue of whether Watkins was unlawfully
arrested and denied a probable cause hearing for a supervised
release violation. Watkins was notified of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. We affirm.
We review a district court’s judgment revoking
supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
Cir. 1992). To revoke supervised release, a district court need
only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a
preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006).
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release if it is within the prescribed statutory range and not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether the sentence
is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. In
this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than
reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United States
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v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if we find
the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable must we
decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven
policy statements and the statutory factors applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),
the court need not robotically tick through every subsection,
and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum. Id. at 656-57. Moreover, while a district
court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
district court did not err or abuse its discretion in revoking
Watkins’s supervised release, and his sentence is reasonable.
Watkins did not dispute the factual allegations in the petition
on supervised release, and the district court was required to
revoke his supervised release. See U.S.C. § 3583(g) (2006).
The district court correctly determined his advisory Guidelines
sentence was twelve months, see U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006); USSG
§ 7B1.4(b), and reasonably determined a sentence of six months
in prison with no further supervised release was appropriate.
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Moreover, the district court correctly rejected Watkins’s pro se
arguments that his arrest was illegal and he was entitled to a
probable cause hearing after he waived a preliminary hearing.
Watkins contended that only a U.S. Marshal could execute his
arrest warrant, but it was directed to “[a]ny authorized law
enforcement officer” and its execution complied with federal
law. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(c). At his revocation hearing,
Watkins argued that he was entitled to a probable cause hearing,
but he waived a preliminary hearing under Fed. R. Crim. P.
32.1(b)(1); and he did not dispute the factual allegations in
the petition on supervised release at his revocation hearing
conducted pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing,
of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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