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 2012-01

United States v. Errick Redmond ( 2012 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4523
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERRICK REDMOND,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.   Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:07-cr-00271-FDW-1)
Submitted:   August 15, 2011                 Decided:   January 9, 2012
Before KING, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC., Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.      Anne M. Tompkins,
United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States
Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Errick       Redmond   appeals   from     an     amended    judgment
convicting him of two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (2006). *        The trial evidence showed that Redmond
directed that funds from a construction loan be loaned to an
associate with the expectation that he would receive a large
return.     Redmond contends the evidence was insufficient to show
that he knew that the funds from the construction loan were not
to be used for such purposes without the consent of the lending
company.    Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government, as we must, see Glasser v. United States,
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942), we conclude the evidence was sufficient to
support the convictions and affirm.
This court reviews a district court’s denial of a Rule
29 motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo.                United States v.
Smith,
    451 F.3d 209
    , 216 (4th Cir. 2006).                    A jury’s verdict
“must be sustained if there is substantial evidence . . . to
support it.”
    Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80
    .             Substantial evidence is
“evidence    that    a    reasonable   finder   of    fact   could     accept   as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”            United States v. Alerre, 430
*
The amended judgment was entered after this court granted
the parties’ joint motion to remand for resentencing.
    2 F.3d 681
    ,     693       (4th   Cir.    2005)      (internal       quotation     marks
omitted).       This court considers both circumstantial and direct
evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences from such evidence
in the Government’s favor.                United States v. Harvey,
    532 F.3d 326
    , 333 (4th Cir. 2008).                 In evaluating sufficiency of the
evidence, this court does not reweigh the evidence or reassess
the    factfinder’s        determination        of   witness      credibility,     United
States v. Brooks,
    524 F.3d 549
    , 563 (4th Cir. 2008), and “can
reverse    a    conviction        on   insufficiency        grounds    only    when   the
prosecution’s failure is clear,” United States v. Moye,
    454 F.3d 390
    , 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 has “two essential
elements:       (1) the existence of a scheme to defraud and (2) the
use of . . . wire communication in furtherance of the scheme.”
United States v. Curry,
    461 F.3d 452
    , 457 (4th Cir. 2006).                            The
scheme to defraud “can be in the form of an assertion of a
material       falsehood      with     the      intent    to      deceive     or   active
concealment      of    a    material     fact    with    the   intent    to    deceive.”
United States v. Pasquantino,
    336 F.3d 321
    , 333 (4th Cir. 2003)
(en banc).        To establish a scheme to defraud, the Government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Redmond acted with the
specific    intent      to    defraud,     which     “may    be    inferred    from   the
totality of the circumstances and need not be proven by direct
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evidence.”        United States v. Ham,
    998 F.2d 1247
    , 1254 (4th Cir.
1993).      The    specific      intent   may    be   proven    by   circumstantial
evidence and by inferences drawn from the facts and situations.
United States v. Bales,
    813 F.2d 1289
    , 1294 (4th Cir. 1987).
We conclude there was sufficient evidence from which
the jury could infer that Redmond knew that he was fraudulently
receiving     funds       from    the     construction     loan.         There    was
sufficient evidence to show that Redmond was informed that the
funds from the construction loan were to be used solely to pay
the costs associated with the construction project and not for
any other purpose without the approval of the lending company.
In addition, the evidence was sufficient to show that it was
Redmond who directed on two occasions that a request be made for
an advance from the construction loan, knowing that he would
use the funds to loan to an associate without the consent of the
lending company.
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentence.
We   dispense      with   oral    argument      because   the    facts   and     legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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