Webb v. Deboo ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-7193
WILLIAM EUGENE WEBB,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
KUMA J. DEBOO,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (2:09-cv-00107-REM-JES)
Submitted: March 31, 2011 Decided: April 15, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William Eugene Webb, Appellant Pro Se. Alan McGonigal, Assistant
United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Eugene Webb appeals from the district court’s
order adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate
judge and dismissing Webb’s Bivens * complaint challenging his
prison’s conditions for failure to state a claim. Specifically,
the district court concluded that Webb had failed to produce any
evidence that he had “sustained any serious or significant
physical or emotional injury as a result of [the alleged]
conditions” as required by Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375
(4th Cir. 1993). We vacate and remand for further proceedings.
We review de novo a district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See Flood v. New Hanover County, 125
F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1997). In considering a motion to
dismiss, we accept the complainant’s well-pleaded allegations as
true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130,
1134 (4th Cir. 1993). A pro se litigant’s pleadings should be
liberally construed to avoid inequity, and a complaint should
not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff could not recover under any set of facts which could
*
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
2
be proven. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978).
We have held that, in the context of a
conditions-of-confinement claim, a prisoner must either “produce
evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional
injury resulting from the challenged conditions,” or
“demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting
from the prisoner's unwilling exposure to the challenged
conditions.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995).
Jail employees may not ignore a dangerous condition of
confinement on the ground that the complaining inmate shows no
serious current symptoms. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
33-36 (1993) (holding that the determination of a “substantial
risk” requires inquiry into the seriousness of the potential
harm, the likelihood that such injury to health will actually
occur, and whether the risk violates contemporary standards of
decency). Here, the district court did not consider whether
Webb’s complaint stated an Eighth Amendment claim that prison
conditions exposed him to a substantial risk of harm. The court
noted only that Webb had not alleged a significant personal
injury and, therefore, failed to state a claim. Thus, the
district court applied the incorrect legal standard.
Webb’s complaint alleged that severe overcrowding was
causing unsanitary conditions, the spread of disease, an
3
increased risk of violence, and lack of access to medical care,
among other effects. Courts have recognized that allegations
similar to Webb’s state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Gates v.
Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 338 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding evidence that
cells were crusted with fecal matter, chipping paint, urine, and
old food was sufficient to show a substantial risk of serious
harm); Shannon v. Graves, 257 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding that blankets contaminated with sewage constituted
substantial risk to human health); McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d
1287, 1291-92 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that three days in
feces-covered cell states claim); DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525,
533 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that continuing failure by prison
officials to institute system to prevent the spread of
tuberculosis violated the Eighth Amendment); Tillery v. Owens,
907 F.2d 418, 428 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence of
increased stress, anxiety, and depression, as well as the
opportunity for predatory activities and the spread of disease
due to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions was sufficient to
show Eighth Amendment violation). We conclude that, liberally
construed, Webb’s complaint properly states a claim that his
prison’s overcrowding and lack of sanitation are exposing him to
a substantial risk of serious harm. Thus, Webb’s complaint
satisfies the “objective” component of an Eighth Amendment
claim, and the district court erred in finding otherwise. See
4
Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
objective and subjective components of Eighth Amendment claim).
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order
ruling that Webb’s failure to allege a personal injury barred
his claim and remand for further consideration of his complaint.
We deny Webb’s motion to file an amicus curiae brief. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
5