Kimberly Bagnal v. Foremost Insurance Group ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1414
KIMBERLY K. BAGNAL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
FOREMOST INSURANCE GROUP,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief District
Judge. (2:09-cv-01474-DCN)
Submitted: November 22, 2011 Decided: January 6, 2012
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
O. Grady Query, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. J.R.
Murphy, Ashley B. Stratton, MURPHY & GRANTLAND, P.A., Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kimberly K. Bagnal appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Foremost Insurance Group
(“Foremost”) on her declaratory judgment action seeking
reformation of the motorcycle insurance policy that Donald Adams
maintained with Foremost. Bagnal contends that the evidence
before the district court was insufficient to justify its
determination that Foremost complied with the requirements of
South Carolina law, S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-160 (2002), when
offering underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage to Adams. We
affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, “viewing the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the
moving party sufficiently supports its motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate “that there are
genuine issues of material fact.” Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.
“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does
a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving
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party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d
645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-160, insurance
carriers are required to offer UIM coverage up to the limits of
an insured’s liability coverage. See generally Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Powell, 292 F.3d 201, 203-04 (4th Cir. 2002). To
comply with this statutory obligation, the insurer must make a
“meaningful offer” of UIM coverage. See, e.g., Atkins v. Horace
Mann Ins. Co., 658 S.E.2d 106, 109 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008). If an
insurance company fails to do so, the policy may be reformed to
include such coverage up to the limits of the liability
insurance carried by an insured. See id.An insurer must meet the following requirements to
make a “meaningful offer” of UIM coverage:
(1) the insurer’s notification process must be
commercially reasonable, whether oral or in writing;
(2) the insurer must specify the limits of optional
coverage and not merely offer additional coverage in
general terms; (3) the insurer must intelligibly
advise the insured of the nature of the optional
coverage; and (4) the insured must be told that
optional coverages are available for an additional
premium.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wannamaker, 354 S.E.2d 555,
556 (S.C. 1987).
A review of the record indicates that the district
court correctly determined that Foremost complied with these
requirements when offering UIM coverage to Adams. First,
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Foremost mailed its offer of UIM coverage to Adams, thus
employing a commercially reasonable process of notification.
See Atkins, 658 S.E.2d at 109. The form that Foremost mailed to
Adams offered him UIM coverage in all of the amounts that the
South Carolina Department of Insurance had authorized Foremost
to sell at the time, thus satisfying the second requirement of
Wannamaker. See Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Leachman, 608
S.E.2d 569, 573 (S.C. 2005). Additionally, this form satisfied
the third and fourth requirements of Wannamaker by clearly
explaining the nature of the coverage being offered and listing
the additional premiums associated with each level of coverage.
Wannamaker, 354 S.E.2d at 556.
We find no merit in Bagnal’s contention that the
district court was required to consider the documents before it
in isolation from each other when examining the propriety of
Foremost’s offer of UIM coverage. Moreover, there is no
evidence to support Bagnal’s speculation that Adams may not have
received a complete copy of the forms that Foremost sent to him,
or that Adams’ wife may have executed the forms in question
without the proper authority.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Foremost. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately
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presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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