United States v. Cleveland Easterling , 481 F. App'x 812 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5027
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CLEVELAND DEWAYNE EASTERLING,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:02-cr-00383-JAB-1)
Submitted: April 27, 2012 Decided: June 5, 2012
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Todd A. Smith, LAW OFFICE OF TODD ALLEN SMITH, Graham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Stephen T. Inman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cleveland Dewayne Easterling appeals the district
court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing
him to twenty-four months in prison. On appeal, he contends
that the district court erred by refusing to hear evidence
regarding whether his underlying conviction was still valid in
light of United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011)
(en banc). We affirm.
We review a district court’s judgment revoking
supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
Cir. 1992). Challenges to a district court’s authority or
jurisdiction are matters of law reviewed de novo. United
States v. Winfield, 665 F.3d 107, 109 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 2011).
Procedural sentencing claims and other specific claims of
sentencing error raised for the first time on appeal are
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d
170, 184 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 292 (2011);
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010).
To revoke supervised release, a district court need
only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a
preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006).
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
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release if it is within the prescribed statutory range and not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether the sentence
is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. In
this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than
reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if
we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable
must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven
policy statements and the statutory factors applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),
the court need not robotically tick through every subsection,
and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum. Id. at 656-57. Moreover, while a district
court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
district court did not err or abuse its discretion in revoking
Easterling’s supervised release, and his sentence is reasonable.
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The district court did not err in concluding that Easterling’s
underlying conviction could not be attacked at the supervised
release revocation hearing. See United States v. Warren, 335
F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2003). Easterling conceded the supervised
release violation, and the district court reasonably concluded a
twenty-four month prison sentence was appropriate.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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