United States v. Keith Jones , 496 F. App'x 312 ( 2012 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4169
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    KEITH ANTOINE JONES,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore.     William D. Quarles, Jr., District
    Judge. (1:08-cr-00441-WDQ-1)
    Submitted:   October 26, 2012             Decided:   November 7, 2012
    Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Sicilia Chinn Englert, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt,
    Maryland, for Appellant.     Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
    Attorney,   Christopher  J.   Romano,  Assistant United States
    Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Keith Antoine Jones appeals the 188-month armed career
    criminal sentence imposed after he pled guilty to possession
    with       intent       to    distribute        100   grams      or     more      of   heroin,      in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (2006), and possession of a
    firearm       by    a        felon,   in    violation       of    
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1)
    (2006).       Jones asserts that the district court plainly erred in
    relying on the presentence report (“PSR”) to conclude that his
    2001 and 2004 drug distribution convictions involved cocaine and
    qualified          as    predicate         convictions          under       the     Armed        Career
    Criminal       Act           (“ACCA”),     
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)          (2006). ∗         The
    Government argues that Jones waived his challenge to the armed
    career       criminal           designation       and,      in        any     event,        did    not
    demonstrate         his       sentence     should     be    vacated          under     plain-error
    review.       We affirm.
    We agree with the Government that Jones has waived any
    challenge to the armed career criminal designation.                                         “[W]aiver
    is   the     intentional          relinquishment           or    abandonment           of    a    known
    ∗
    Jones does not challenge on appeal the district court’s
    reliance on his resisting arrest conviction, acknowledging that
    it was categorically a violent felony under the ACCA.        See
    United States v. Jenkins, 
    631 F.3d 680
    , 685 (4th Cir. 2011).
    Nor does Jones challenge his classification as a career
    offender, which, in the absence of the armed career criminal
    designation, resulted in a Guidelines range of 188 to 235
    months, the same range that applied to his armed career criminal
    status.
    2
    right” and extinguishes potential error under Fed. R. Crim. P.
    52(b).         United      States    v.     Olano,          
    507 U.S. 725
    ,    733     (1993)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).                           “When a claim of . . .
    error has been waived, it is not reviewable on appeal.”                                       United
    States    v.    Claridy,      
    601 F.3d 276
    ,       284     n.2     (4th      Cir.),      cert.
    denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 259
     (2010).
    Here, the plea agreement and the transcript of the
    plea hearing indicate that Jones and his counsel intended to
    challenge       the     armed       career           criminal        designation            at    the
    sentencing       hearing.            Before          the     hearing,         defense       counsel
    conceded in the sentencing memorandum that Jones qualified as an
    armed    career    criminal         based       on    Jones’        prior      convictions         for
    resisting arrest and distribution of cocaine.                                 United States v.
    West,    
    550 F.3d 952
    ,   958-59        (10th        Cir.    2008)        (holding       that
    affirmative concession in district court that prior conviction
    was   predicate       offense       for     ACCA       purposes          waived      argument      on
    appeal),       overruled     on     other       grounds       as     recognized        by     United
    States    v.    Smith,      
    652 F.3d 1244
    ,          1246    (10th      Cir.     2011);     see
    United    States      v.    Taylor,       
    659 F.3d 339
    ,    348      (4th     Cir.      2011)
    (“[T]he defendant is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-
    agent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 1817
     (2012).               Moreover, although counsel did object to
    the     armed     career      criminal          designation              at    sentencing,         he
    specifically      challenged         only       the    resisting           arrest     conviction.
    3
    United States v. Horsfall, 
    552 F.3d 1275
    , 1283 (11th Cir. 2008)
    (concluding that defendant’s withdrawal of objection to sentence
    enhancement     precluded      appellate   review    of    enhancement).        By
    failing   to    argue   at   sentencing    that   the     2001   and   2004    drug
    offenses did not qualify as ACCA predicate convictions while
    challenging his armed career criminal status on another ground,
    we conclude that Jones waived his right to challenge his prior
    drug convictions in this appeal and, therefore, we decline to
    review his claims for error — plain or otherwise.                      See Olano,
    
    507 U.S. at 733
    ; Claridy, 
    601 F.3d at
    284 n.2.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We   dispense    with   oral    argument   because      the   facts    and    legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4