United States v. Alexander ( 1996 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 95-5918
ANTHONY COREY ALEXANDER, a/k/a
Troy Williams, a/k/a Troy Smith,
a/k/a Troy B. Jackson,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.
David C. Norton, District Judge.
(CR-94-589)
Submitted: October 17, 1996
Decided: October 25, 1996
Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Douglas H. Westbrook, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Margaret B. Seymour, United States Attorney, Robert H. Bickerton,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Corey Alexander appeals his conviction entered pursuant
to a plea made in accordance with North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 (1990). The district court convicted Alexander of one count of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute
cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 846 (1994), five
substantive drug counts in violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1) (1994),
one count of conspiracy to engage in money laundering in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (1994), and two substantive counts of money
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), 1957(a) (1994).
Alexander alleges that the district court erred in refusing to decrease
his offense level based upon acceptance of responsibility under USSG
§ 3E1.1 (Nov. 1994). We affirm.
We review the district court's determination regarding acceptance
of responsibility for clear error. United States v. Curtis, 934 F.2d 553,
557 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Harris, 882 F.2d 902, 905
(4th Cir. 1989)). The district court judge has great discretion in apply-
ing this adjustment. See United States v. White , 875 F.2d 427, 431
(4th Cir. 1989). In determining whether the defendant is qualified for
the reduction, the district court should consider whether the defendant
truthfully admits the conduct comprising the offenses of conviction.
USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(a)); see United States v. Martinez, 901
F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1990).
Alexander was charged with transporting quantities of cocaine
from Florida to South Carolina, involvement with others in the distri-
bution of crack and cocaine powder in the Charleston area, and the
pick-up and delivery of approximately $70,000 of funds that were the
proceeds of drug transactions which he transported to a co-defendant.
While Alexander admitted to selling five to six kilograms of cocaine
powder, knowing that it would be sold in South Carolina, and that he
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picked up and delivered $70,000 in cash to a co-defendant, he did not
admit to most of the conduct comprising the offenses of conviction.
Alexander alleges that the district court erred to the extent that its
denial of acceptance of responsibility was based upon a finding that
an Alford plea precludes a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
At sentencing, the district court did not hold that the Alford plea pre-
cluded Alexander from receiving the reduction, and properly consid-
ered other evidence regarding the reduction. Other circuits have
addressed this issue and held that a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility is not automatically barred by the Alford nature of the
plea, but that the plea is a relevant factor to consider. See United
States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176, 181 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Burns, 925 F.2d 18, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Tucker,
925 F.2d 990, 991 (6th Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction because the district court did
not clearly err in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility
under USSG § 3E1.1. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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