Hall's Reclamation v. APAC Carolina, Inc. ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    HALL'S RECLAMATION, INCORPORATED,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                 No. 95-2870
    APAC CAROLINA, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
    Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.
    (CA-94-87)
    Argued: October 31, 1996
    Decided: December 18, 1996
    Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Mark I. Levy, HOWREY & SIMON, Washington, D.C.,
    for Appellant. Nathan Maxwell Crystal, Columbia, South Carolina,
    for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Patricia L. O'Beirne, Timothy K. Arm-
    strong, HOWREY & SIMON, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
    James B. Van Osdell, Cynthia Graham Howe, VAN OSDELL, LES-
    TER, HOWE & RICE, P.A., Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    In this diversity action, APAC-Carolina, Inc. (APAC) appeals a
    $3.2 million jury verdict in favor of Hall's Reclamation, Inc. (Hall's)
    for fraud, breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a
    fraudulent act, and violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Prac-
    tices Act (SCUTPA), see 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20
     (Law. Co-op.
    1985). We affirm.
    I.
    Hall's, a trucking company, began providing trucking and hauling
    services for APAC, an asphalt paving contractor, in 1989. At that
    time, APAC hauled asphalt to job sites either by hiring outside truck-
    ing firms or by using its own in-house fleet of trucks. In June of 1991,
    after terminating its primary outside trucker, APAC requested that
    Hall's increase the amount of work it did for APAC. One month later,
    in July of 1991, APAC vice-president Andy Jones met with Gerald
    Hall, the owner of Hall's, to discuss the future relationship of the two
    companies. At that meeting, Jones told Hall that APAC had decided
    to get out of the trucking business and asked if Hall's would like to
    buy APAC's truck fleet. Hall declined, noting the age and disrepair
    of APAC's fleet. Later that year, on December 13, 1991, Jones
    offered Hall the following deal: if Hall's would purchase APAC's
    fleet of used trucks and dedicate its entire trucking operation to serv-
    ing APAC's needs, APAC would guarantee Hall's $4 million worth
    of business each year. This time, Hall accepted Jones' offer.
    Although the agreement was never reduced to writing, Hall's notes
    from the December 13, 1991 meeting were introduced at trial as docu-
    mentation of the agreement. In addition, the evidence revealed that
    Jones orally confirmed the contract to several individuals. On April
    21, 1992, Hall's agreement to purchase APAC's trucks was finalized.
    2
    The parties agreed that Hall's would pay $215,000 for both the pur-
    chase of the trucks and APAC's guarantee of $4 million per year in
    business.
    Hall then proceeded to obtain financing for the transaction from
    NationsBank. As part of the loan application process, a NationsBank
    loan officer spoke with Jones by telephone and confirmed that APAC
    had guaranteed Hall's at least $4 million per year in hauling work as
    Hall had stated in a letter requesting the loan. NationsBank subse-
    quently approved the loan.
    On June 20, 1992, Hall's took possession of the APAC trucks. In
    addition to purchasing and repairing the used trucks, Hall's made sev-
    eral financial and personnel commitments in anticipation of the
    expected increase in APAC business. Specifically, Hall's hired driv-
    ers, administrative personnel, and a comptroller in preparation for
    APAC's guaranteed work. Hall's also leased a shop in Florence,
    South Carolina, near APAC's Florence asphalt plant.
    APAC never fulfilled its promise to provide Hall's with $4 million
    of work per year. During the second half of 1992, Hall's received just
    $520,000 of work from APAC, a quarter of that due under the agree-
    ment. In all of 1993, Hall's received only $1,759,000 worth of APAC
    work, less than half of the amount guaranteed by APAC. The lack of
    work placed a financial strain on Hall's. In March 1994, the company
    closed its business and sold its trucks at auction to pay its creditors.
    In January 1994, Hall's filed a complaint in South Carolina state
    court, alleging that APAC had committed fraud, breached its agree-
    ment to provide Hall's with $4 million of work per year, and engaged
    in unfair trade practices. APAC removed the case to the United States
    District Court for the District of South Carolina where the case was
    tried before a jury on August 15-18, 1995. The case was submitted
    to the jury on four claims: fraud; breach of contract; breach of con-
    tract accompanied by a fraudulent act; and violation of SCUTPA. The
    jury returned a verdict for Hall's on all four claims.
    The jury awarded Hall's $2.4 million in compensatory damages on
    each of the claims for fraud, breach of contract, and breach of contract
    accompanied by a fraudulent act (which were not to be aggregated
    3
    under the court's instructions); on the unfair trade practices claim, the
    jury awarded damages of $167,000, which were trebled under
    SCUTPA, see 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140
    (a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
    The jury then heard additional evidence and received further instruc-
    tions regarding punitive damages on the claims for fraud and breach
    of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and awarded punitive
    damages of $800,000 on each of those two claims (which again were
    not to be aggregated).
    On September 21, 1995, the district court denied APAC's motions
    for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. The court also
    ruled that the damages awarded on the SCUTPA claim duplicated the
    damages awarded on the other claims. Accordingly, the district court
    entered an amended final judgment for Hall's in the amount of $3.2
    million ($2.4 million in compensatory damages on each of the claims
    for fraud, breach of contract, and breach of contract accompanied by
    a fraudulent act, and $800,000 in punitive damages on the fraud and
    fraudulent-breach claims). APAC now appeals the district court's
    denial of its motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new
    trial.
    II.
    On the fraud claim, APAC argues that the district court erred in
    denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law because Hall's
    failed to prove anything more than breach of contract at trial.*
    According to APAC, "Hall's proof of the alleged fraud consisted of
    nothing more than APAC's failure to give Hall's $4-million worth of
    business . . . ." (Appellant's Br. at 26.) We review the district court's
    denial of APAC's motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.
    See In re Wildewood Litigation, 
    52 F.3d 499
    , 502 (4th Cir. 1995);
    White v. County of Newberry, 
    985 F.2d 168
    , 172 (4th Cir. 1993). In
    doing so, we must determine whether the jury's verdict is supported
    by substantial evidence in the record. See White , 
    985 F.2d at 172
    .
    That is, we must determine whether "a jury, viewing the evidence in
    the light most favorable to [Hall's], could have properly reached the
    _________________________________________________________________
    *APAC also argues that any breach of contract claim is barred by the
    Statute of Frauds. For the reasons set forth in Part III of this opinion, we
    need not address this issue.
    4
    conclusion reached by this jury." Wildewood, 
    52 F.3d at 502
     (empha-
    sis added); see also Austin v. Torrington Co. , 
    810 F.2d 416
    , 420 (4th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    484 U.S. 977
     (1987).
    In South Carolina, fraud is proven when a party establishes by
    clear, cogent, and convincing evidence the following elements:
    (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4)
    either knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard of its
    truth or falsity; (5) intent that the representation be acted
    upon; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hear-
    er's reliance on its truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely
    thereon; [and] (9) the hearer's consequent and proximate
    injury.
    M.B. Kahn Constr. Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 
    271 S.E.2d 414
    ,
    415 (S.C. 1980); see also First State Sav. & Loan v. Phelps, 
    385 S.E.2d 821
    , 824 (S.C. 1989). While "a mere violation of a contract
    does not support a fraud claim," Duc v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 
    729 F. Supp. 1533
    , 1536 (D.S.C. 1990), entering into a contract without
    the present intention of rendering performance under the contract
    does, see Thomas & Howard Co. v. Fowler, 
    82 S.E.2d 454
    , 456 (S.C.
    1954); see also Buzhardt v. Cromer, 
    249 S.E.2d 898
    , 900 (S.C. 1978)
    (promisor liable for fraud where he had no present intention of per-
    forming the promise); Woods v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 
    431 S.E.2d 260
    , 263 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) (summarizing South Carolina
    law concerning when the failure to honor a promise amounts to fraud
    because the promisor lacked the intention to perform at the time the
    promise was made). Thus, the critical inquiry for the jury was
    whether APAC's agreement to provide Hall's with $4 million worth
    of business per year was fraudulent when made. Although breach of
    an oral agreement does not establish fraud, see Winburn v. Ins. Co.
    of North America, 
    339 S.E.2d 142
    , 146 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985), breach
    of an oral agreement coupled with other evidence is sufficient to
    establish fraudulent intent not to perform the agreement, see 
    id.
    ("Nonobservance of a promise may support an inference of a lack of
    intent to perform only when it is coupled with other evidence."); see
    also Daily Co. v. American Inst. of Marketing Systems, Inc., 
    183 S.E.2d 444
    , 445-46 (S.C. 1971).
    5
    At trial, Hall's presented evidence establishing that APAC
    breached the oral agreement to provide Hall's with $4 million of busi-
    ness per year by providing only $520,000 of work during the second
    half of 1992 and only $1,759,000 of work during all of 1993. Hall's
    also presented "other evidence," see Winburn, 
    339 S.E.2d at 146
    ,
    establishing that APAC never intended to perform the contract. Spe-
    cifically, Hall's presented evidence that APAC represented to Hall's,
    NationsBank, and several Hall's employees that APAC was getting
    out of the trucking business, that Hall's would be APAC's trucker,
    and that APAC would guarantee Hall's $4 million of business per
    year, while never intending to get out of the trucking business or pro-
    vide Hall's with $4 million of business per year. Furthermore, Hall's
    presented evidence establishing that APAC acquired trucks from its
    sister company in Texas and through the acquisition of a competitor,
    Ocean Lakes Construction Company, for the purpose of expanding its
    in-house trucking operation, while falsely representing to Hall's that
    it neither asked for nor wanted the trucks. Hall's presented evidence
    showing that these false representations were material because they
    induced Hall's to purchase the APAC fleet and persuaded Nations-
    Bank to provide financing for the acquisition. Hall's also presented
    evidence that its reliance on APAC's promise of $4 million per year
    in business was reasonable because APAC was a large company that
    had provided its outside truckers with over $4 million in business in
    previous years. In addition, Hall's presented evidence that it incurred
    expenses purchasing the APAC fleet and preparing for the increased
    business, and that it lost money and was forced to go out of business
    because of APAC's fraud. Finally, Hall's presented evidence estab-
    lishing that APAC failed to perform the contract from the contract's
    inception.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hall's, see
    Wildewood, 
    52 F.3d at 502
    , we hold that the jury's verdict on the
    fraud claim is supported by substantial evidence. A jury could prop-
    erly reach the conclusion that Hall's had proven by clear, cogent, and
    convincing evidence each element of fraud. Thus, we affirm the dis-
    trict court's denial of APAC's motion for judgment as a matter of law
    on the fraud claim.
    Alternatively, APAC argues that it is entitled to a new trial on the
    fraud claim because the district court's instructions to the jury were
    6
    flawed. According to APAC, the district court did not properly
    instruct "the jury of the need and the standards for distinguishing the"
    fraud and contract claims. (Appellant's Br. at 29.) Instead, APAC
    argues, "the court's instructions tended to gloss over the[ ] distinc-
    tions [between fraud and contract] and further amalgamated rather
    than disentangled the claims." (Appellant's Br. at 30.) We review the
    district court's denial of APAC's motion for a new trial for abuse of
    discretion. See Wildewood, 
    52 F.3d at 502
    ; Bristol Steel & Iron
    Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
    41 F.3d 182
    , 186 (4th Cir.
    1994).
    Upon reviewing the court's instructions to the jury, we find nothing
    in the instructions that "rose to the level of error, let alone prejudicial
    error." Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 
    50 F.3d 1291
    , 1296 (4th Cir.
    1995). First, APAC did not argue, and we do not find, that the jury
    instructions were not accurate. Cf. 
    id. at 1294
     ("A set of legally accu-
    rate instructions . . . is generally adequate."). Indeed, APAC acknowl-
    edges the accuracy of the jury charge, conceding that the trial court
    charged that mere breach of contract did not constitute fraud and that
    nonperformance may warrant an inference of fraud only when cou-
    pled with "other evidence," and that the trial judge gave instructions
    on the burdens of proof applicable to fraud and to breach of contract.
    Second, despite APAC's protestations, our review of the record
    reveals that the district court specifically instructed the jury on the
    distinctions between fraud and breach of contract. As to the burden
    of proof for fraud, the court clearly stated that"[i]n order to prevail
    in an action based upon fraud, the plaintiff must show [by] clear,
    cogent[,] and convincing evidence the following nine elements . . . ."
    (J.A. at 523.) Furthermore, the record reveals that the trial court care-
    fully instructed the jury on the different elements of each claim.
    Indeed, to avoid confusion among the four claims, the court submitted
    the case with separate verdict forms for each claim. Finally, we note
    that APAC has failed to bring to our attention any evidence that the
    jury was confused by the district court's charge. As a result, we hold
    that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying APAC
    a new trial. See Hardin, 
    50 F.3d at 1296
    .
    III.
    Because we affirm the district court's denial of APAC's motions
    on the fraud claim for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial,
    7
    we affirm the jury's award of $2.4 million in compensatory damages
    and $800,000 in punitive damages. See Elders v. Parker, 
    332 S.E.2d 563
     (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to puni-
    tive damages where evidence supported a finding of fraud). Because
    we affirm the jury's award to Hall's of compensatory and punitive
    damages on the ground that APAC committed fraud-- and because
    those awards mirror the damage awards under the breach of contract
    and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act claims -- we
    need not consider whether the district court erred in denying APAC's
    motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial on those
    claims. Cf. Winant v. Bostic, 
    5 F.3d 767
    , 775 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Having
    found that there was sufficient evidence to allow the fraud claim to
    go to the jury, we need not consider appellants' challenges to the
    denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law on the other
    counts."); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 
    816 F.2d 145
    , 149 (4th
    Cir. 1987) ("We need not consider whether, under these circum-
    stances, the plaintiff was entitled to an award of damages under the
    Lanham Act, for it clearly was entitled to such an award upon its
    common law claim of unfair competition and its claim under North
    Carolina's Unfair Trade Practices Act."); Anderson v. West, 
    241 S.E.2d 551
    , 553 (S.C. 1978) ("We hold that where a jury returns a
    general verdict involving two or more issues and its verdict is sup-
    ported as to at least one issue, the verdict will not be reversed.").
    Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED
    8