Oldham v. Chater, Commissioner ( 1997 )


Menu:
  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    KATHRYN J. OLDHAM,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 95-2985
    SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF
    SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
    Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge.
    (CA-94-649-CV-2)
    Submitted: February 13, 1997
    Decided: February 27, 1997
    Before WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and
    BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Tomi W. Bryan, Lisa W. Bullard, TOMI BRYAN & ASSOCIATES,
    Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr.,
    United States Attorney, Gill P. Beck, Assistant United States Attor-
    ney, Arthur J. Fried, General Counsel, Randolph W. Gaines, Acting
    Principal Deputy General Counsel, A. George Lowe, Acting Asso-
    ciate General Counsel, Richard Fox, Office of the General Counsel,
    SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland,
    for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Kathryn Oldham appeals the decision of the district court adopting
    the recommendation of the magistrate judge, granting summary judg-
    ment to the Commissioner of Social Security, and upholding the
    denial of Oldham's application for disability insurance benefits and
    Supplemental Security Income. The Commissioner's decision deny-
    ing benefits is based upon the finding that Oldham could perform her
    past relevant work, and thus was not disabled under the Social Secur-
    ity Act. Because we find that the Commissioner's decision is sup-
    ported by substantial evidence, and that the correct law was applied,
    we affirm.
    Oldham filed her application for social security disability benefits
    claiming disability since August 14, 1992, from the loss of her right
    kidney, and mental disability from longstanding depression and a per-
    sonality disorder. A hearing was held before an administrative law
    judge (ALJ) on March 16, 1993. After a thorough review of the hear-
    ing testimony by Oldham and her witness, a vocational expert called
    by the ALJ, and the relevant medical evidence, the ALJ determined
    that Oldham could perform her past relevant work, and that Oldham's
    impairments were not disabling for purposes of the Social Security
    Act.
    Oldham's basic claim on appeal is that the ALJ's decision is not
    supported by substantial evidence. She specifically claims that her
    condition deteriorated significantly after she last worked in 1990. In
    addition, Oldham claims that the ALJ: (1) should have found her dis-
    2
    abled pursuant to the provisions of Social Security Ruling (SSR) 85-
    15; (2) made unsupported findings in a Psychiatric Review Technique
    Form; (3) improperly relied on Cauthen v. Finch , 
    426 F.2d 891
     (4th
    Cir. 1970); and (4) failed to determine the credibility of witness Hank
    Boschen.
    The language of 
    42 U.S.C.A. § 405
    (g) (West Supp. 1996), requires
    that this Court uphold the Commissioner's decision that a claimant is
    not disabled so long as the correct law was applied and the decision
    is supported by substantial evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 
    907 F.2d 1453
    ,
    1456 (4th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evi-
    dence as "``such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
    as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 
    402 U.S. 389
    , 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence "consists of more than a
    mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a prepon-
    derance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict
    were the case before a jury, then there is ``substantial evidence.'" Hays
    v. Sullivan, 
    907 F.2d at 1456
     (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 
    368 F.2d 640
    , 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). This Court will not reweigh the evidence
    or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Hays, 
    907 F.2d at 1456
    .
    After considering Oldham's claims on appeal and a review of the
    record, we find that the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence in this
    case, including Oldham's subjective complaints, and made appropri-
    ate credibility and factual findings in accordance with relevant regula-
    tory criteria and Fourth Circuit case law. In reaching this conclusion,
    we specifically find that the ALJ properly followed the provisions of
    SSR 85-15, that his findings in the Psychiatric Review Technique
    Form at issue were supported by substantial evidence, that his reli-
    ance on Cauthen v. Finch was proper, and that he properly consid-
    ered all relevant evidence, including the testimony of witness Hank
    Boschen.
    While there was some evidence supporting Oldham's claim of dis-
    ability, because the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards,
    and the decision is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the
    district court's order upholding the Commissioner's denial of Old-
    ham's application for social security disability benefits. We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
    3
    quately presented in the materials before the Court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4