Russell v. Chater, Commissioner ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    JOHN C. RUSSELL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 96-1822
    SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONEROF
    SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon.
    James C. Turk, District Judge.
    (CA-92-95-A)
    Submitted: April 8, 1997
    Decided: April 25, 1997
    Before MURNAGHAN and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges,
    and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Ginger J. Largen, J. D. Morefield, MOREFIELD, KENDRICK,
    HESS & LARGEN, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant. James A.
    Winn, Acting Chief Counsel, Region III, Masayo Howell, Assistant
    Regional Counsel, Office of General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY
    ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Robert P. Crouch,
    Jr., United States Attorney, Julie C. Dudley, Assistant United
    States
    Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    John C. Russell filed a claim with the Social Security Administra-
    tion in March 1991 for Supplemental Security Income, alleging dis-
    ability commencing September 11, 1990, due to neck and back pain
    and problems with his left arm. After denial and reconsideration,
    Rus-
    sell requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
    The ALJ decided that Russell was not disabled under the Social
    Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Russell's request for
    review. The ALJ's decision then became the Commissioner's final
    decision. Russell filed an action seeking review of the final
    decision
    in district court. The district court remanded Russell's claim for
    fur-
    ther development and review and utilization of a vocational expert.
    An ALJ held a supplemental hearing at which a vocational expert
    appeared and testified. The ALJ found that for the benefits period
    in
    question, Russell had the residual functional capacity to perform
    light
    work with certain non-exertional restrictions. The Appeals Council
    denied Russell's subsequent request for review, and the ALJ's deci-
    sion became the final decision of the Commissioner.
    Russell filed a complaint in the district court challenging the
    final
    decision of the Commissioner after remand from the district court.
    The parties each filed motions for summary judgment. A magistrate
    judge recommended granting the Commissioner's motion for sum-
    mary judgment and denying Russell's summary judgment motion.
    The district court agreed with the recommendation and entered the
    order. This appeal followed.
    We review the Commissioner's final decision to determine whether
    it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law
    was applied. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g) (1994); Hays v. Sullivan, 
    907 F.2d 1453
    , 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Russell claims that substantial
    evi-
    dence does not support the ALJ's finding that Russell could perform
    2
    light work with some restrictions. However, the ALJ gave specific
    reasons for his determination and we will not disturb it. See Ham-
    mond v. Heckler, 
    765 F.2d 424
    , 426 (4th Cir. 1985). The ALJ made
    a thorough evaluation of the evidence, and we conclude that the
    Com-
    missioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was
    based on the correct legal standards. The ALJ properly evaluated
    Rus-
    sell's complaints of pain. See Hyatt v. Sullivan , 
    899 F.2d 329
    ,
    337
    (4th Cir. 1990). The ALJ also properly applied the treating
    physician
    rule when evaluating Russell's mental impairments in accordance
    with 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (d)(2) (1995).
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
    quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3