United States v. Peyton ( 1998 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                             No. 97-4594
    JAMES W. PEYTON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                             No. 97-4595
    LOUIS E. PEYTON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
    James R. Spencer, District Judge.
    (CR-97-33)
    Submitted: September 15, 1998
    Decided: October 13, 1998
    Before HAMILTON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
    PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Lance D. Gardner, Fairfax, Virginia; James C. Clark, LAND,
    CLARK, CARROLL, MENDELSON & BLAIR, P.C., Alexandria,
    Virginia, for Appellants. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney,
    Charles A. Beamon, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alex-
    andria, Virginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    A jury convicted brothers Louis E. Peyton and James W. Peyton
    of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute
    1000 kilograms or more of marijuana and a detectable amount of
    cocaine.1 The district court sentenced Louis Peyton to serve 151
    months' imprisonment. The court sentenced James Peyton to serve
    seventy-eight months' imprisonment. In these consolidated appeals,
    both Appellants challenge their sentences by asserting that the district
    court erroneously determined the amount of marijuana for which they
    were held accountable. James Peyton also contends that the district
    court erred by denying him a two-level sentencing reduction for
    acceptance of responsibility. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
    During their joint trial, the Government presented numerous wit-
    nesses, primarily co-conspirators, who provided overwhelming evi-
    dence of Appellants' involvement in the acquisition and distribution
    of massive amounts of marijuana and cocaine for more than a decade.
    Following their convictions and based upon the evidence presented at
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 See 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     (1994). The jury also convicted Louis Peyton of
    four counts of filing false tax returns, in violation of 
    26 U.S.C. § 7206
    (1)
    (1994), but he does not challenge these convictions in this appeal.
    2
    trial, the probation officer recommended that Louis Peyton was
    responsible for 3375 kilograms of marijuana and 11,793.6 grams of
    cocaine. The cocaine was converted to its equivalent in marijuana,
    2358 kilograms, for a total of 5733 kilograms of marijuana. The pro-
    bation officer recommended that James Peyton was accountable for
    1020.6 kilograms of marijuana. During sentencing, Appellants
    attacked the credibility of the Government's witnesses and argued
    that the presentence report grossly over-represented the amount of
    drugs involved in the distribution conspiracy. Specifically, Louis Pey-
    ton suggested that he should not be held accountable for more than
    400 to 700 kilograms of marijuana (the same amount for which
    Stephen Hatcher, his primary co-conspirator and chief Government
    witness, was held accountable). James Peyton argued that he should
    only be held accountable for one-half the marijuana attributed to
    Louis Peyton, since he was James Peyton's sole supplier of mari-
    juana. Finding inconsistencies in some of the co-conspirators' testi-
    mony, the court rejected the amount of marijuana attributable to each
    Appellant and held Louis Peyton responsible for 640 kilograms of
    marijuana, combined with the cocaine conversion of 2358 kilograms,
    for a total of 2998 kilograms of marijuana. The court also reduced the
    amount of marijuana attributable to James Peyton to 518 kilograms
    of marijuana.
    For sentencing purposes, the district court's factual determination
    concerning the amount of drugs attributable to Appellants should be
    upheld absent clear error.2 Appellants bear the burden of showing the
    inaccuracy of those drug amounts.3 However, with unrecovered drugs,
    the district court may estimate the amount of drugs attributable to
    each Appellant for an accurate reflection of their involvement in the
    drug trafficking conspiracy.
    Here, the fact that the district court reduced the amount of mari-
    juana attributable to Appellants totally belies their allegations that the
    court accepted each witness's testimony at face value. In fact, the
    court explicitly found that portions of Hatcher's testimony were
    _________________________________________________________________
    2 See United States v. Lamarr, 
    75 F.3d 964
    , 972 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
    ___ U.S. ___, 
    65 U.S.L.W. 3309
     (U.S. Oct. 21, 1996) (No. 95-9398);
    United States v. D'Anjou, 
    16 F.3d 604
    , 614 (4th Cir. 1994).
    3 See United States v. Terry, 
    916 F.2d 157
    , 162 (4th Cir. 1990).
    3
    uncorroborated and used this as a basis for reducing Louis Peyton's
    total drug accountability from 5733 to 2998 kilograms of marijuana.
    The court's assessment of witness credibility is not subject to review.4
    Therefore, since the court's weight determination for the unrecovered
    drugs is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, we find no
    clear error.5
    Next, James Peyton challenges the district court's denial of a sen-
    tence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 6 He claims that he
    was entitled to the reduction because during sentencing, he admitted
    distributing between twenty-five to fifty pounds (or 11.34 to 22.68
    kilograms) of marijuana. Peyton objected to the recommendation in
    the presentence report to deny the sentencing reduction. The court's
    silence on Peyton's objections is tantamount to a denial of the reduc-
    tion, which we review for clear error.7
    A defendant is entitled to a two-level reduction in offense level
    under USSG § 3E1.1 if he clearly demonstrates acceptance of respon-
    sibility for his offense. Here, Peyton did not accept responsibility for
    his offense. He did not plead guilty to the charged offenses. He com-
    pletely denied all involvement in the conspiracy to distribute cocaine
    and attempted to downplay his involvement in distributing marijuana.
    Further, Peyton refused to cooperate with the probation officer during
    the preparation of his presentence report. Because Peyton's uncooper-
    ative behavior and his refusal to fully disclose his involvement in the
    drug trafficking conspiracy are inconsistent with acceptance of
    responsibility, we find that the district court did not clearly err in
    denying him the two-level reduction in offense level under USSG
    § 3E1.1.8
    _________________________________________________________________
    4 See United States v. Saunders , 
    886 F.2d 56
    , 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
    5 See United States v. Williams , 
    986 F.2d 86
    , 90 (4th Cir. 1993).
    6 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (1995).
    7 See United States v. Strandquist , 
    993 F.2d 395
    , 401 (4th Cir. 1993).
    8 See United States v. Beal, 
    960 F.2d 629
    , 632 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
    that sentencing court properly considered defendant's failure to cooper-
    ate with probation office's investigation in denying reduction for accep-
    tance of responsibility).
    4
    Accordingly, we affirm Appellants' sentences. We dispense with
    oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
    aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5