United States v. Deaton ( 2004 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                              No. 03-4425
    MARK Q. DEATON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.
    Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., District Judge.
    (CR-02-51)
    Submitted: December 31, 2003
    Decided: January 23, 2004
    Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    William C. Gallagher, CASSIDY, MYERS, COGAN, VOEGELIN &
    TENNANT, L.C., Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas
    E. Johnston, United States Attorney, Randolph J. Bernard, Robert H.
    McWilliams, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, Wheeling, West
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    2                      UNITED STATES v. DEATON
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Mark Deaton was convicted of stealing firearms from a federal
    firearms licensee, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (u) (2000), possession of stolen
    firearms, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (j) (2000), and being an armed career crimi-
    nal in possession of firearms, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2000). He was
    sentenced as an armed career criminal to 120 months on each count.
    The sentences run concurrently. Deaton appeals. Counsel has filed a
    brief raising two issues. Deaton moves to file an addendum to the
    brief raising additional issues. We grant the motion to file the adden-
    dum and affirm.
    I
    On April 27, 2002, someone broke through the wall of the Outdoor
    Store, a retail establishment in Wheeling, West Virginia. Nine fire-
    arms were stolen.
    Prior to the robbery, James Leonard met Deaton at a soup kitchen
    in Martins Ferry, Ohio, and invited him to stay at his home. Leonard
    drove Deaton to a place known as Cherry Hill, where Deaton
    retrieved some belongings, including a red bag containing a hammer
    and chisel, from beneath an abandoned car seat. Leonard testified that
    Deaton always had the red bag with him. Deaton bragged to Leonard
    and Maranda Burch, who also lived with Leonard, that he could get
    any jewelry he wanted. He mentioned guns to Leonard. Deaton even
    said that he intended to break into the Outdoor Store on the next
    foggy night and to gain access using a hammer and chisel.
    On April 28, Deaton contacted William Linde and informed him
    that he had guns for sale, including assault-type weapons. Linde
    reported the conversation to authorities, and police officers investigat-
    ing the matter went to the Cherry Hill location and retrieved two of
    UNITED STATES v. DEATON                        3
    the stolen weapons from beneath an abandoned car seat. Ohio authori-
    ties notified police in Wheeling that two of the stolen guns had been
    recovered and, based on their investigation, identified Deaton as a
    suspect.
    Also on April 28, Daniel Yanok noticed a shirtless man carrying
    a red bag and a firearm with fabric draped over it. Yanok testified that
    he got a clear look at the man’s face. Yanok followed the man to a
    vacant lot, where the man was pacing. Again, Yanok could clearly see
    the man. Yanok briefly left the scene. When he returned, the man was
    fumbling through a red bag. Yanok immediately reported the incident
    to the police. Wheeling police officers went to the vacant lot and
    recovered five more of the stolen guns. Deaton was detained.
    Approximately three weeks later, Yanok went to the police station,
    where he selected Deaton’s photograph from a photographic line-up.
    In October, Yanok accompanied officers to the area where he had
    seen the man carrying the gun, and officers recovered the last two
    stolen firearms.
    II
    Deaton first claims that the district court erred when it denied his
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. He attempts to
    cast doubt on the credibility of various witnesses, especially Yanok.
    Specifically, Deaton contends that Yanok’s identification of him was
    suspect because Yanok initially described him as having a goatee and
    not wearing a shirt. Deaton did not have a goatee and was wearing
    a blue shirt when police detained him.
    After a de novo review, see United States v. Gallimore, 
    247 F.3d 134
    , 136 (4th Cir. 2001), we conclude that, viewing the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the United States, substantial evidence
    supports the verdict. See Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80
    (1942); United States v. Stewart, 
    256 F.3d 231
    , 250 (4th Cir. 2001),
    cert. denied, 
    535 U.S. 977
     (2002). First, Yanok accurately described
    Deaton, with the exception of the goatee and the shirt.* Yanok testi-
    *Deaton could have retrieved a shirt from the bag he was carrying
    when Yanok saw him and put the shirt on before the police entered.
    4                     UNITED STATES v. DEATON
    fied that he had a clear view of the man with the gun who was carry-
    ing a red bag. Yanok did not hesitate when selecting Deaton’s
    photograph from a photo array. Yanok testified unequivocally that
    Deaton was the man he saw on April 28. Finally, police found seven
    of the stolen guns in the area where Yanok had seen the man. In light
    of this, Yanok’s statement that the man appeared to have a goatee and
    was not wearing a shirt is of little significance.
    Other evidence supports the conviction. The day after the robbery,
    Deaton informed Linde that he had guns for sale. Officers recovered
    two stolen guns from beneath an abandoned car seat in Cherry Hill,
    where Deaton had retrieved some of his possessions before going to
    Leonard’s home. Deaton announced his intention to commit a robbery
    and specifically mentioned the Outdoor Store. He also stated that he
    intended to break into the store using a hammer and chisel. The rob-
    ber gained entry to the Outdoor Store by knocking a hole in the wall.
    In light of this evidence, all of which points to Deaton as the rob-
    ber, Deaton’s attack on the scant evidence that might be considered
    exonerating is wholly unavailing. Substantial evidence supports the
    guilty verdict, and the district court correctly denied the Rule 29
    motion.
    III
    Deaton was sentenced as an armed career criminal. On appeal, as
    below, he contends that a 1992 breaking and entering conviction in
    Ohio was not a violent felony for purposes of armed career criminal
    status. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e) (2000); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
    Manual § 4B1.4 (2002). The conviction was for a violation of 
    Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2113
    (A), which, at the time of Deaton’s conviction,
    was a fourth degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of
    six months to over one year.
    The relevant statute provides, "No person by force, stealth, or
    deception, shall trespass in an unoccupied structure, with purpose to
    commit therein any theft offense . . . or any felony." 
    Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2113
    (A). The statute includes no conduct that would not con-
    stitute burglary under § 924(e), and we conclude that the breaking and
    entering was generic burglary. The district court properly counted the
    UNITED STATES v. DEATON                        5
    conviction as a violent felony for purposes of § 924(e). See Taylor v.
    United States, 
    495 U.S. 575
    , 602 (1990).
    IV
    In his addendum to his formal brief, Deaton contends that Count
    III of the indictment, charging a violation of § 922(g), was deficient.
    We have carefully reviewed the indictment and discern no reason to
    reverse Deaton’s § 922(g) conviction on the basis of a flawed indict-
    ment. See United States v. Bolden, 
    325 F.3d 471
    , 490 (4th Cir. 2003)
    (setting forth requirements for valid indictment); United States v.
    McDonald, 
    61 F.3d 248
    , 252 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating "[r]elief from an
    erroneous indictment after a case has been decided by a petit jury is
    rarely granted"), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Wil-
    son, 
    205 F.3d 720
     (4th Cir. 2000).
    V
    We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
    als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional pro-
    cess.
    AFFIRMED