McClenny v. C.H.&R. Enterprises ( 2000 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT B. MCCLENNY, JR.; DORIS
ATKINS MCCLENNY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 99-1452
C. H. & R. ENTERPRISES,
INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.
Norman K. Moon, District Judge.
(CA-98-105-C, BK-96-1735-WA3-7)
Submitted: January 27, 2000
Decided: February 11, 2000
Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER,
Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Robert P. Dwoskin, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellants. Robert
M. Musselman, Jonathan B. Burns, ROBERT M. MUSSELMAN &
ASSOCIATES, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Robert B. McClenny, Jr., and Doris A. McClenny appeal from the
district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's order denying
them a discharge in bankruptcy based on a finding of fraud in the fil-
ing of their schedules. After reviewing the record and the briefs sub-
mitted by the parties, we affirm the district court's order.
The same day the McClennys filed for relief in bankruptcy, they
also filed a petition on behalf of their wholly owned corporation. In
completing the bankruptcy schedules, the McClennys listed all of the
corporation's assets and liabilities on both the corporation's and their
personal schedules. The only exception to this was the corporation's
accounts receivables, which the McClennys claimed as an asset only
on their personal schedules, and then they sought to exempt this asset
under a homestead deed. After reviewing all the facts and circum-
stances, the bankruptcy court found that the McClennys knowingly
and with fraudulent intent made a false oath when they listed the cor-
poration's accounts receivables on their personal schedules and also
submitted a false claim of exemption when they claimed a homestead
exemption for the receivables. The court accordingly denied them a
discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), (B), (a)(7) (1994). After
the district court upheld this determination, the McClennys appealed
to this court.
We find no clear error in the bankruptcy court's findings of the
existence of the elements for denying a discharge under § 727(a)(4).
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948) (standard of review); Williamson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
828 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1987) (setting forth elements for denial
of discharge).
On appeal, the McClennys contend that the bankruptcy court's
decision was based on a mistaken belief that they had not amended
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their bankruptcy schedules to list the receivables as an asset of the
corporation. They contend that their amendment of the schedules
should negate the inference of fraud. We find that the district court
properly ruled that the McClennys' amendment of the schedules after
their fraud was discovered during the meeting of creditors did not
negate the fraud. See Mazer v. United States, 298 F.2d 579, 582 (7th
Cir. 1962); In re Schnabel, 61 F. Supp. 386, 395 (D. Minn. 1945); In
re Smith, 161 B.R. 989, 992 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).
The McClennys also argue that the misinformation on the sched-
ules concerned de minimis matters and should not form the basis for
a denial of a discharge. However, the amount they claimed as
accounts receivables on their personal schedules was $6549. This is
not a de minimis amount. See In re Kilson, 83 B.R. 198, 203 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1988) (finding $4000 not de minimis or inconsequential).
Finding that the district court properly found no clear error by the
bankruptcy court, we affirm the district court's order which upheld
the bankruptcy court's denial of a discharge to the McClennys. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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