United States v. Joseph Devon Barrett ( 2000 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4523
JOSEPH DEVON BARRETT, a/k/a Junior,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern.
James C. Fox, District Judge.
(CR-96-35)
Submitted: February 29, 2000
Decided: March 21, 2000
Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges,
and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Edwin C. Walker, Acting Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Devon Barrett appeals the district court's order revoking his
term of supervised release and imposing a new period of imprison-
ment. Barrett was serving a five year term of supervised release sub-
sequent to completing a thirty-six month sentence for armed bank
robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1994). After Barrett admitted two
violations of the conditions of his supervised release in the form of
cocaine use, the district court sentenced Barrett to twelve months in
prison. In this appeal, Barrett contends that the district court erred by
considering his potential for rehabilitation in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3582(g) (West 1985), in revoking his supervised release and impos-
ing the twelve month sentence. Finding no abuse of discretion on the
part of the district court, we affirm.
This court reviews the district court's order imposing a term of
imprisonment for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Davis,
53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1995). An abuse of the district court's
discretion occurs when the court fails or refuses to exercise its discre-
tion or when the court's exercise of discretion is flawed by an errone-
ous legal or factual premise. See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239
(4th Cir. 1993). Barrett contends that the district court's exercise of
its discretion was flawed by an erroneous legal premise. He argues
that a defendant's potential for rehabilitation is not among the factors
that a court appropriately may consider in imposing a term of impris-
onment upon the revocation of a term of supervised release.
It is true that, for the purposes of initial sentencing, a court may not
consider rehabilitative goals in deciding whether to impose a sentence
of imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(a); 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(k)
(West 1993); United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 879 (6th Cir.
1995).
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Nevertheless, the statute governing the imposition and revocation
of supervised release expressly permits consideration of a defendant's
need for rehabilitation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583 (West 1985 & Supp.
1999). Section 3583(e) directs the court to consider the factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1999), which
include the defendant's need for "educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a)(2)(D). Thus, the express language of§ 3583 allows the dis-
trict court to consider Barrett's need for drug treatment in revoking
his supervised release and determining the length of imprisonment.
See United States v. Thornell, 128 F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir. 1997);
Jackson, 70 F.3d at 880; United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091,
1097 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson , 15 F.3d 278, 282-83
(2d Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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