DeBlasio v. Johnson ( 2000 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
KEITH WILLIAM DEBLASIO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
DONALD WELLS; S. BATTS; D.
WILSON; D. MCBRIDE; JOHN HARRIS;
ERIC HOBBS; NASH,
Plaintiffs, No. 99-7723
v.
GENE M. JOHNSON, Deputy Director,
Virginia Department of Corrections;
RON ANGELONE, Director, Virginia
Department of Corrections,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge.
(CA-99-1818-AM)
Submitted: July 27, 2000
Decided: September 13, 2000
Before WIDENER and MURNAGHAN,* Circuit Judges, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
*Murnaghan was assigned to the panel in this case but died prior to the
time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a quorum of the
panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Keith William DeBlasio, Appellant Pro Se. Rick Randall Linker,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Rich-
mond, Virginia, for Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's order denying their motions for
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, for class cer-
tification, and for appointment of counsel. We affirm in part, and dis-
miss in part.
To the extent that Plaintiffs appeal the denial of a temporary
restraining order, such a denial is not immediately appealable and
must be dismissed as interlocutory. See Virginia v. Tenneco, Inc., 538
F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (4th Cir. 1976). To the extent that they appeal the
denial of preliminary injunctive relief, we have reviewed the record
and the district court's order and find no abuse of discretion. We
therefore affirm. See South Carolina Dep't of Wildlife & Marine
Resources v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1989) (providing stan-
dard).
As to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, we find that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in denying this motion, and
accordingly, we affirm. See Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1380 (4th
Cir. 1995) (providing standard).
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Finally, as to the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for appointment of
counsel, this court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders,
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). A denial of a motion for
appointment of counsel is neither a final order nor an appealable
interlocutory or collateral order. See Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962,
967 (4th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, it must be dismissed as interlocu-
tory.
We therefore affirm in part, and dismiss in part. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART
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