Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Smith ( 2001 )


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  •                        UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY,            
    Petitioner,
    v.
    TEDDY R. SMITH; DIRECTOR,                    No. 00-2478
    OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
    PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES
    DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
    Respondents.
    
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Benefits Review Board.
    (99-0440-BLA)
    Argued: June 7, 2001
    Decided: July 27, 2001
    Before WILKINS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
    Andre M. DAVIS, United States District Judge for the
    District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Timothy Ward Gresham, PENN, STUART &
    ESKRIDGE, Abingdon, Virginia, for Petitioner. Lawrence Lee
    Moise, III, Abingdon, Virginia, for Respondents.
    2                  CLINCHFIELD COAL CO. v. SMITH
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Clinchfield Coal Company appeals the decision of the Benefits
    Review Board (BRB) affirming an award of Black Lung benefits to
    Clinchfield’s former employee, Teddy Smith. Because we agree with
    Clinchfield that the ALJ failed to provide valid reasons for rejecting
    the contrary medical opinions of a physician on the issues of disabil-
    ity causation and the existence of pneumoconiosis, we reverse and
    remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    I.
    Smith, who is sixty-seven years old, last worked in the coal indus-
    try in April 1994. He worked at Clinchfield for approximately twenty-
    three years, between 1968 and April 1994. Prior to working for
    Clinchfield, Smith had worked for several other coal companies from
    1955 to 1968. Smith’s last job in the mining industry, as utility man
    on a long wall section, required significant physical exertion.
    On May 21, 1995, after Smith filed a claim for benefits, Dr. S. K.
    Paranthaman examined him for the Department of Labor. Dr.
    Paranthaman found Smith’s chest x-ray negative for coal worker’s
    pneumoconiosis (CWP) and diagnosed chronic bronchitis and revers-
    ible airway obstruction. He attributed the chronic bronchitis to
    Smith’s twenty years of cigarette smoking and stated that "[i]f 38
    years of coal mine employment as documented,1 it could have aggra-
    vated the condition substantially. Reversible airway obstruction is
    unrelated to coal dust exposure." (J.A. at 9.) Dr. Paranthaman noted
    that Smith had smoked a half pack of cigarettes per day for twenty
    years until 1992.
    1
    The ALJ found thirty-six years of coal mine employment. The parties
    agree that the two year disparity is immaterial.
    CLINCHFIELD COAL CO. v. SMITH                    3
    In August 1996, Dr. J. Dale Sargent examined Smith on behalf of
    Clinchfield and found no CWP on Smith’s chest x-ray. Dr. Sargent
    diagnosed mild obstructive lung disease but concluded, based upon its
    reversibility and the lack of any accompanying restriction, that
    Smith’s long history of smoking rather than coal dust exposure was
    the cause of his respiratory impairment.
    In March 1997, Dr. Emory Robinette examined Smith and diag-
    nosed
    1. Coal workers’ pneumoconiosis with a profusion abnor-
    mality of 1/0, predominant Q/T opacities with evidence
    of discoid atelectasis.
    2. Moderate obstructive lung disease without response to
    bronchodilator therapy.
    3. Probable chronic bronchitis.
    (J.A. at 110.) Dr. Robinette also opined that Smith was disabled by
    his respiratory impairment and that "his prior coal mining employ-
    ment at least partially contributed to his pulmonary disability." (J.A.
    at 111.)
    Dr. Gregory J. Fino reviewed all of the medical evidence that was
    submitted in the case but did not examine Smith. Dr. Fino found the
    evidence insufficient to prove CWP or any other pulmonary condition
    related to his occupation. Dr. Fino opined that Smith had a pulmonary
    impairment that was related to cigarette smoking rather than exposure
    to coal dust, that Smith was not disabled to the extent that his job
    required heavy labor less than fifty percent of the time, and that even
    if Smith had simple CWP, his pulmonary impairment was inconsis-
    tent with a coal mine dust-related pulmonary condition. Both Dr. Fino
    and Dr. Sargent also reviewed Dr. Robinette’s earlier medical report,
    and each stated their disagreement with his conclusions.
    After a hearing, the ALJ found that the x-ray evidence did not
    prove CWP. The ALJ also found, however, that the reports of Drs.
    Paranthaman and Robinette proved legal pneumoconiosis,2 and he
    2
    Legal pneumoconiosis is broader than CWP. See Hobbs v. Clinchfield
    Coal Co., 
    45 F.3d 819
    , 821 (4th Cir. 1995). Section 718.201 of Title 20
    4                   CLINCHFIELD COAL CO. v. SMITH
    rejected Dr. Sargent’s and Dr. Fino’s contrary opinions. The ALJ also
    found that Smith had proved a disabling respiratory impairment pur-
    suant to 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 718.204
    (c)(1) and (c)(4) and, relying solely on
    the opinions of Drs. Robinette and Paranthaman, he found that
    Smith’s legal pneumoconiosis contributed to his disabling respiratory
    impairment.
    Clinchfield appealed to the BRB, which affirmed in part, vacated
    in part, and remanded for further consideration. The BRB vacated the
    ALJ’s finding rejecting the opinions of Drs. Sargent and Fino as to
    the existence of pneumoconiosis, affirmed the ALJ’s finding that
    Smith had a totally disabling respiratory impairment, and vacated the
    finding that pneumoconiosis contributed to Smith’s disability.
    On remand, the ALJ reconsidered the reports of Dr. Fino and Dr.
    Sargent, but again rejected their opinions as to the existence of pneu-
    moconiosis, disregarding Dr. Fino’s opinion because he did not exam-
    ine Smith. The ALJ, in finding that pneumoconiosis caused or
    contributed to Smith’s disability, gave little weight to Dr. Sargent’s
    and Dr. Fino’s opinions on disability causation because neither doctor
    diagnosed pneumoconiosis. Clinchfield appealed again, and the BRB
    of the Code of Federal Regulations, which sets forth the legal definition
    of pneumoconiosis, provides,
    pneumoconiosis means a chronic dust disease of the lung and its
    sequalae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, aris-
    ing out of coal mine employment. This definition includes, but
    is not limited to, coal workers’ pneumoconiosis . . . .
    
    20 C.F.R. § 718.201
     (2000) (emphasis in original). As we stated in
    Hobbs,
    Although all of the disorders explicitly mentioned in § 718.201
    are medically similar, what is important is that a medical diagno-
    sis finding no coal workers’ pneumoconiosis is not equivalent to
    a legal finding of no pneumoconiosis. Clearly, the legal defini-
    tion of pneumoconiosis contained in § 718.201 is significantly
    broader than the medical definition of coal workers’ pneumoco-
    niosis.
    Hobbs, 
    45 F.3d at 821
    .
    CLINCHFIELD COAL CO. v. SMITH                      5
    affirmed the award and concluded that the ALJ properly discounted
    Dr. Sargent’s and Dr. Fino’s opinions on the issues of pneumoconio-
    sis and disability causation.
    On appeal to this Court, Clinchfield argues that the BRB erred in
    affirming the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Fino’s medical report on the issue
    of pneumoconiosis and that the BRB erred in affirming the ALJ’s
    rejection of Dr. Fino’s medical report on the issue of disability causa-
    tion. We address each issue in turn.3
    II.
    Clinchfield first argues that the BRB erred in affirming the ALJ’s
    rejection of Dr. Fino’s opinion on the issue of pneumoconiosis solely
    because Dr. Fino did not examine Smith. "We review an order of the
    BRB by undertaking an independent review of the record to deter-
    mine whether the ALJ’s findings of fact were supported by substantial
    evidence." Island Creek Coal Co. v. Compton, 
    211 F.3d 203
    , 207 (4th
    Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). "Sub-
    stantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it is such relevant evi-
    dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion." 
    Id. at 207-08
     (internal quotation marks omitted). "In
    determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual
    determinations, we must first address whether all of the relevant evi-
    dence has been analyzed and whether the ALJ has sufficiently
    explained his rationale in crediting certain evidence." Milburn Col-
    liery Co. v. Hicks, 
    138 F.3d 524
    , 528 (4th Cir. 1998). "We review the
    legal conclusions of the BRB and the ALJ de novo." Island Creek
    Coal, 
    211 F.3d at 208
    .
    To obtain federal black lung benefits, Smith was required to prove
    by a preponderance of the evidence that: "(1) he has pneumoconiosis;
    (2) the pneumoconiosis arose out of his coal mine employment; (3)
    3
    Clinchfield also argues that the BRB erred in failing to require the
    ALJ to consider the equivocal nature of Dr. Paranthaman’s diagnosis;
    failing to consider Dr. Paranthaman’s reliance on an improper smoking
    history; and that the ALJ erred in relying on Dr. Robinette’s medical
    report as a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis. We have carefully reviewed the
    record and find no reversible error as to these contentions.
    6                      CLINCHFIELD COAL CO. v. SMITH
    he has a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary condition; and (4)
    pneumoconiosis is a contributing cause to his total respiratory disabil-
    ity." 
    Id. at 207
     (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
    20 C.F.R. § 718.201
    -.204 (2000). After remand, the ALJ found that
    Although Dr. Fino’s opinion is reasoned, he did not examine
    [Smith] and the only opinion of record that supports his con-
    clusions is that of Dr. Sargent. Again, I cannot accord his
    opinion more weight than two examining physician’s opin-
    ions. Therefore, weighing all of the evidence, . . . I find that
    [Smith] has established the existence of pneumoconiosis by
    a preponderance of the evidence.
    (J.A. at 231 (emphasis added)). Assuming that the ALJ was correct
    in disregarding Dr. Sargent’s opinion,4 there was nevertheless a con-
    flict between Drs. Robinette and Paranthaman, on one side, and Dr.
    Fino, on the other, as to whether pneumoconiosis existed. In disre-
    garding Dr. Fino’s "reasoned" opinion, the ALJ relied solely on the
    fact that Dr. Fino "did not examine [Smith]." (J.A. at 231.) However,
    we have previously stated that "[a]n ALJ may not discredit a physi-
    cian’s opinion solely because the physician did not examine the
    claimant." Island Creek Coal, 
    211 F.3d at 212
    . The ALJ, therefore,
    improperly rejected Fino’s opinion on the basis that he was not an
    examining physician, and the BRB erred in affirming. Accordingly,
    we remand with instructions that the ALJ consider such factors as
    "the qualifications of the respective physicians, the explanation of
    their medical opinions, the documentation underlying their medical
    judgments, and the sophistication and bases of their diagnoses." Ster-
    ling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 
    131 F.3d 438
    , 441 (4th Cir. 1997).
    III.
    Clinchfield next argues that the BRB erred in affirming the ALJ’s
    decision to give little weight to Dr. Fino’s medical report on disability
    causation because Dr. Fino did not diagnose pneumoconiosis. We
    agree.
    4
    Clinchfield does not challenge the BRB’s affirmance of the ALJ’s
    rejection of Dr. Sargent’s opinions.
    CLINCHFIELD COAL CO. v. SMITH                     7
    After the BRB remanded the case and directed the ALJ to recon-
    sider evidence of disability causation, the ALJ found that Smith had
    established the existence of pneumoconiosis and, therefore, that nei-
    ther Dr. Fino’s nor Dr. Sargent’s opinions were entitled to much, if
    any, weight because neither physician diagnosed pneumoconiosis.
    The ALJ stated, "since neither Dr. Fino nor Dr. Sargent diagnosed
    pneumoconiosis, their opinions can be given little weight on the issue
    of whether the claimant’s total disability was caused by pneumoconi-
    osis." (J.A. at 231.)
    In Grigg v. Director, 
    28 F.3d 416
     (4th Cir. 1994), we held that an
    ALJ should give little weight to a physician’s opinion finding disabil-
    ity unrelated to pneumoconiosis where the physician did not diagnose
    pneumoconiosis. 
    Id. at 419-20
    ; see also Curry v. Beatrice Pocahontas
    Coal Co., 
    67 F.3d 517
    , 524 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the dis-
    ability causation opinions of physicians who did not diagnose pneu-
    moconiosis were insufficient because they "flatly contradict the ALJ’s
    finding of clinical pneumoconiosis based on the same type of evi-
    dence"). We later clarified, however, that "an ALJ may credit a physi-
    cian’s opinion on the issue of causation, even though the physician
    had not diagnosed pneumoconiosis, provided that the opinion is not
    premised on an erroneous finding contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion."
    Island Creek Coal, 
    211 F.3d at 213
     (internal quotation marks and
    alterations omitted); see also Dehue Coal Co. v. Ballard, 
    65 F.3d 1189
    , 1194-95 (4th Cir. 1995); Hobbs v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 
    45 F.3d 819
    , 821 (4th Cir. 1995). In Island Creek Coal, addressing very
    similar facts, we concluded that the reasons offered by the ALJ —
    that Dr. Fino did not examine the claimant and that Dr. Fino did not
    diagnose pneumoconiosis — were insufficient to discredit Dr. Fino’s
    opinion on disability causation. 
    211 F.3d at 214
    . We stated that "al-
    though Dr. Fino did not diagnose pneumoconiosis, he opined that
    even if [the claimant] had [CWP], he would still conclude that it was
    cigarette smoking, and not coal dust exposure, that caused [the claim-
    ant’s] disability," and thus, "Dr. Fino’s opinion on causation was not
    premised on an erroneous finding contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion"
    that the claimant had pneumoconiosis. 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks
    and alterations omitted). Here, as in Island Creek Coal, Dr. Fino
    assumed for purposes of his opinion that Smith had pneumoconiosis
    and, therefore, his opinion on disability causation "was not premised
    on an erroneous finding contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion" that Smith
    8                   CLINCHFIELD COAL CO. v. SMITH
    had pneumoconiosis. 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and alterations omit-
    ted).5 For the same reasons as in Island Creek, we accordingly con-
    clude that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Fino’s opinion without
    further explanation and solely on the basis that Dr. Fino did not diag-
    nose Smith with pneumoconiosis.
    IV.
    In conclusion, the BRB erred in affirming the ALJ’s rejection of
    Dr. Fino’s opinions as to the existence of pneumoconiosis and disabil-
    ity causation solely because Dr. Fino did not examine Smith and did
    not diagnose pneumoconiosis. We therefore vacate and remand for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    5
    Dr. Fino’s report stated that "even if this man did have simple coal
    workers’ pneumoconiosis, he does not have the type of pulmonary
    impairment that would be consistent with a coal mine dust-related pul-
    monary condition." (J.A. at 134-35.) In addition, although Dr. Fino did
    not diagnose pneumoconiosis, he did diagnose a "moderate respiratory
    impairment," albeit one that was attributed to cigarette smoking rather
    than coal mine dust inhalation. (Id. at 135.) Thus, this is not a case in
    which Dr. Fino erroneously assumed that Smith did not have respiratory
    disease solely because Dr. Fino did not diagnose pneumoconiosis. See
    Dehue Coal Co. v. Ballard, 
    65 F.3d 1189
    , 1193 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating
    that "a medical opinion that acknowledges the miner’s respiratory or pul-
    monary impairment, but nevertheless concludes that an ailment other
    than pneumoconiosis caused the miner’s total disability, is relevant
    because it directly rebuts the miner’s evidence that pneumoconiosis con-
    tributed to his disability").