United States v. Medley , 231 F. App'x 299 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4662
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    PAULA MEDLEY, a/k/a Paula Duncan, a/k/a Paula
    Medley Duncan, a/k/a Paula Russell,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt.    Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.
    (8:05-cr-00032-DKC)
    Submitted: May 18, 2007                         Decided:   July 6, 2007
    Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit
    Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Denise C. Barrett, Assistant
    Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod
    J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Gina L. Simms, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Paula Medley pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement,
    to one count of bank fraud, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1344
    (2000).   The district court determined at sentencing that Medley’s
    offense involved at least $70,000 in actual loss, but not more than
    $120,000, and pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG)
    § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E) (2005), increased the base offense level of seven,
    see USSG § 2B1.1(a)(1), by eight levels to fifteen.           Because of an
    intervening arrest between the time of the guilty plea and the
    sentencing hearing, Medley did not receive an adjustment for
    acceptance of responsibility.         Medley’s prior criminal conduct
    yielded a criminal history category of IV. The total offense level
    of fifteen and criminal history category of IV resulted in a
    sentencing range of thirty to thirty-seven months.
    The   district   court   sentenced   Medley   to   thirty-seven
    months in prison, and ordered restitution in the total amount of
    $142,780.15.     On appeal, Medley raises two issues relating to the
    district court’s calculation of loss. For the reasons that follow,
    we affirm.
    The district court’s finding at sentencing as to the
    amount of loss suffered by a victim is a finding of fact reviewed
    for clear error.    United States v. Daughtrey, 
    874 F.2d 213
    , 217-18
    (4th Cir. 1989).     The government has the burden to establish the
    “amount of loss” by a preponderance of the evidence. United States
    - 2 -
    v. Harris, 
    882 F.2d, 902
    , 907 (4th Cir. 1989).               Under USSG § 2B1.1,
    comment., n.3(A)(I) (2005), “actual loss” is defined as “the
    reasonably   foreseeable     pecuniary      harm     that    resulted    from   the
    offense.”    “[R]easonably foreseeable pecuniary harm” is defined as
    pecuniary harm that the defendant knew or, under the circumstances,
    reasonably   should   have   known,       was   a   potential    result    of   the
    offense.”    USSG § 2B1.1, comment., n.3(A)(iv).               “Actual loss” may
    be reduced by “the amount the victim has recovered at the time of
    sentencing from disposition of the collateral.”                   USSG § 2B1.1,
    comment., n.3(E)(ii).    Finally, a sentencing court “need only make
    a   reasonable    estimate   of     the    loss,”      given     the    “available
    information.”    USSG § 2B1.1, comment., n.3(C).
    Medley first argues that “amount recovered” under USSG
    § 2B1.1, comment., n.3(E)(ii) could mean the gross sale price of
    the collateral, or the net sale price taking into account some, but
    not all, of the settlement charges the victim payed to effect the
    sale.    Specifically,     Medley    asserts        that    property    management
    charges and the real estate commission paid by the mortgage company
    should not have been considered in calculating the amount of loss.
    Medley’s argument is without merit.                Medley was loaned
    $426,000. In order to mitigate the loss, the mortgage company sold
    the collateral.    We find the court did not clearly err by finding
    it was reasonably foreseeable that the mortgage company would incur
    - 3 -
    property management fees and a real estate commission in order to
    sell the collateral.
    Second, Medley argues the Government failed to prove the
    fees paid to the realtor and management company were reasonable and
    necessary.   We find that Medley’s arguments are conclusory and
    without merit, as the district court’s findings were based on
    adequate and reliable evidence submitted by the Government.
    For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the district
    court's judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
    and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
    before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-4662

Citation Numbers: 231 F. App'x 299

Judges: Williams, Wilkinson, Motz

Filed Date: 7/6/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024