United States v. Servance ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4111
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TYRONE MELVIN SERVANCE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
(S. Ct. No. 04-9648)
Submitted: July 18, 2007 Decided: August 2, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Clarke F. Ahlers, CLARKE F. AHLERS, P.C., Columbia, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Martin J.
Clarke, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tyrone Melvin Servance, Jr. was charged with one count of
conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture containing
a detectable amount of cocaine hydrochloride and 50 grams or more
of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000), one
count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
a mixture containing cocaine hydrochloride and 50 grams or more of
crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one count of
possessing a handgun during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000) (“Count
Three”), and one count of being a convicted felon in possession of
a handgun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(g)(1) (2000) (“Count
Four”). He pled guilty to Count Four and proceeded to trial on the
remaining three counts. The jury found him guilty of all three
counts. At sentencing, Servance did not object to the findings in
the presentence investigation report. He was sentenced to 238
months’ imprisonment on the drug charges to run concurrent with a
120 month sentence on Count Four. He was also sentenced to a
consecutive 60 month sentence on Count Three. On appeal, this
court affirmed. See United States v. Servance, 394 F.3d 222 (4th
Cir. 2005). On the same day the Servance opinion was issued, the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
On May 23, 2005, the Supreme Court vacated this court’s judgment
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Booker.
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See Servance v. United States, 544 U.S. 1047 (2005). While we
affirm the convictions, we vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.
Servance did not previously object to his sentence on
Sixth Amendment grounds. Therefore, review of his sentence for any
Booker error is for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b),
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). Under the
plain error test, a defendant must show that (1) error occurred;
(2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial
rights. Id. Even when these conditions are satisfied, this court
may exercise its discretion to notice the error only if the error
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
If an appellant meets these requirements, our “discretion is
appropriately exercised only when failure to do so would result in
a miscarriage of justice, such as when the defendant is actually
innocent or the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” See United States v.
Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 555 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
This court has addressed two types of Booker error: a
violation of the Sixth Amendment and a failure to treat the
sentencing guidelines as advisory. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 552. A
Sixth Amendment error occurs when the district court imposes a
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sentence greater than the maximum permitted based on facts found by
a jury or admitted by the defendant. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
Here, the base offense level of 36 that was used was higher than
the base offense level of 32 that would have applied had the
probation officer only considered the jury finding implicit in the
drug counts. The two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice
also violates the Sixth Amendment under Booker because it was not
found by a jury or admitted by Servance. Therefore, based on facts
found by the jury alone, Servance’s offense level would have been
32, his criminal history category would have been I, and his
guideline range would have been 121-151 months rather than the
range of 235-293 months that the district court used in sentencing
Servance.
This court has held that a Booker plain error need not be
noticed and corrected if the error was harmless because it did not
actually affect the outcome of the proceedings. United States v.
Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2006) (declining to correct
error where evidence of drug quantity was overwhelming and
uncontroverted). In this case, as the Government notes, the
evidence supporting the drug quantity was not overwhelming and
uncontroverted. The record before us does not indicate what
sentence the court would have imposed on Servance had it exercised
discretion under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) and
treated the guidelines as merely advisory. Although it is possible
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that Servance will receive the same sentence on remand, “[t]his
possibility is not enough to dissuade us from noticing the error.”
Hughes, 401 F.3d at 556.
Although the guidelines are no longer mandatory, Booker
makes clear that a sentencing court must still “consult [the]
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” 543 U.S.
at 264. On remand, the sentence must be “within the statutorily
prescribed range and . . . reasonable.” Hughes, 401 F.3d at 547.
Specifically, district courts must (1) properly calculate the
sentence range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines; (2)
determine whether a sentence within that range and within statutory
limits serves the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and, if not,
select a sentence that does serve those factors; (3) implement
mandatory statutory limitations; and (4) articulate the reasons for
selecting the particular sentence, especially explaining why a
sentence outside of the Sentencing Guideline range better serves
the relevant sentencing purposes set forth in § 3553(a). United
States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 455-56 (4th Cir. 2006). A sentence
not imposed within the properly calculated range must be based on
the factors listed under § 3553(a). Id. at 456.
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions, but vacate the
sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with the rules
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announced in Booker.* We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
*
Just as we noted in Hughes, “[w]e of course offer no
criticism of the district court judge, who followed the law and
procedure in effect at the time” of Servance’s sentencing. Hughes,
401 F.3d at 545 n.4. See generally Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (stating that an error is “plain” if “the law
at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at
the time of appeal”).
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