United States v. Harvey , 38 F. App'x 147 ( 2002 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                            No. 01-4311
    DALE HARVEY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
    James C. Fox, Senior District Judge.
    (CR-01-4)
    Submitted: December 17, 2001
    Decided: March 29, 2002
    Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
    per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Anne M.
    Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, David J. Cortes, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    2                      UNITED STATES v. HARVEY
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Dale Harvey pled guilty to one count of credit card fraud, in viola-
    tion of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 1029
    (a)(2) (West 2000); he appeals his sen-
    tence. Harvey’s offense involved use of Social Security numbers and
    other personal information he used to obtain credit cards and establish
    credit accounts in the names of several individuals, and use of those
    cards and accounts to obtain cash advances and purchase computers,
    consumer electronics, and other items without paying the credit
    charges. Harvey then sold those items and retained the proceeds.
    Starting in March 2000, Harvey enlisted the aid of his companion,
    Elissa Beeler, in executing the fraud.
    In preparing the presentence investigation report, the probation
    officer determined that Harvey’s crimes caused actual and intended
    losses totaling $74,904.55, and recommended a six level enhancement
    of Harvey’s offense level. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
    § 2F1.1(b)(1)(G) (2000). The probation officer also recommended an
    additional four level enhancement based upon a finding that Harvey
    was a leader in a criminal enterprise that involved five or more partic-
    ipants. See USSG § 3B1.1. Finally, the presentence report noted that
    Harvey had a negative net worth and therefore no ability to pay a fine,
    but that restitution was required in the amount of $39,881.79.
    The district court adopted the findings and recommendations in the
    presentence report and sentenced Harvey to forty-six months impris-
    onment to be followed by a three year term of supervised release. The
    district court ordered restitution of $39,881.79, due and payable
    immediately, and held Harvey and Beeler jointly and severally liable
    for the restitution.
    Harvey first challenges the district court’s imposition of a four-
    level enhancement, pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(a). We review the dis-
    UNITED STATES v. HARVEY                          3
    trict court’s determination for clear error. See United States v. Per-
    kins, 
    108 F.3d 512
    , 518 (4th Cir. 1997). Section 3B1.1(a) of the
    Sentencing Guidelines provides for a four-level enhancement, based
    upon a defendant’s aggravating role in the offense, "[i]f the defendant
    was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or
    more participants or was otherwise extensive." Harvey’s presentence
    report, which was adopted by the district court, proposed a four-level
    enhancement on the basis that Harvey was an organizer or leader of
    a criminal activity that involved at least five participants. The govern-
    ment, although conceding that it could not establish that Harvey’s
    criminal activity involved five or more participants, asserted that a
    four-level enhancement was nevertheless proper because Harvey’s
    criminal activity was "otherwise extensive."
    Harvey challenges the enhancement on multiple grounds. First, he
    argues that the district court failed to make the requisite factual find-
    ings to support its imposition of the enhancement, and failed to
    resolve disputed facts concerning the enhancement. Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 32 requires that, at sentencing, "[f]or each matter
    controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation
    or a determination that no finding is necessary because the contro-
    verted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sen-
    tencing." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1). We have held that, in lieu of
    specific findings by the district court, "the district court may expressly
    adopt the recommended findings in the presentence report." United
    States v. Morgan, 
    942 F.2d 243
    , 245 (4th Cir. 1991). However, if "the
    district court elects to take this approach in meeting its responsibilities
    under Rule 32, it must make clear on the record that it has made an
    independent finding and that its finding coincides with the recom-
    mended finding in the presentence report." 
    Id.
    Our review of the record reveals that the district court failed to
    make adequate findings and resolve disputed factual issues to support
    enhancement under § 3B1.1. First, in his objections to the presentence
    report, and again at sentencing, Harvey asserted that information he
    provided to authorities in post-arrest interviews should not have been
    used to calculate his sentence. See USSG § 1B1.8 (2000). The Gov-
    ernment argued that Harvey’s statements were not protected. The dis-
    trict court did not resolve this disputed factual issue, or address
    whether this issue had any impact on sentencing. In addition, Harvey
    4                      UNITED STATES v. HARVEY
    submitted information to the district court that indicated Beeler tried
    to minimize her own culpability for the fraud when she was inter-
    viewed by investigators. The district court was required to, at a mini-
    mum, rule on whether Harvey’s statements were protected under
    § 1B1.8, and on the credibility of the information Harvey submitted
    and its impact, if any, on the propriety of the § 3B1.1 enhancement.
    The district court also failed to resolve the discrepancy in the basis
    for the imposition of the enhancement under § 3B1.1. As noted above,
    the presentence report recommended enhancement on the basis that
    the criminal activity involved five or more persons. At sentencing, the
    Government disavowed that basis, arguing instead that the activity
    was otherwise extensive. While the district court’s adoption of the
    presentence report can be interpreted as an implicit finding that Har-
    vey’s criminal activity involved five or more persons, the record is
    not "clear regarding which disputed issues were resolved by the adop-
    tion." Morgan, 
    942 F.2d at 245-46
    . Harvey also argues that the evi-
    dence was insufficient to support the four level enhancement imposed
    by the district court. We find, however, that the present record is
    insufficient to permit effective appellate review of this issue.
    Harvey next contends that the district court erred in using the
    intended loss from his criminal activity, rather than the actual losses,
    in determining his offense level. Harvey did not raise this issue in the
    district court. Therefore, we review for plain error. See United States
    v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732 (1993); United States v. Walker, 
    112 F.3d 163
    , 166 (4th Cir. 1997). In determining a sentence, "if an intended
    loss that the defendant was attempting to inflict can be determined,
    this figure will be used if it is greater than the actual loss." USSG
    § 2F1.1, comment. (n.8). See United States v. Williams, 
    81 F.3d 1321
    ,
    1328 (4th Cir. 1996). Harvey contends that he would not have placed
    subsequent fraudulent computer orders if his earlier, unsuccessful
    orders had been successful because his criminal activities were used
    to fund his and Beeler’s daily living expenses. This contention is pure
    conjecture. Moreover, his assertion is belied by the record of fraudu-
    lent orders placed well before he and Beeler began working together.
    The district court did not err in including intended losses in its sen-
    tencing calculations.
    Harvey next contends that the district court erred in ordering that
    $39,881.79 in restitution be paid in full immediately, without consid-
    UNITED STATES v. HARVEY                          5
    ering Harvey’s financial condition in determining a payment sched-
    ule. Harvey did not raise this issue in the district court, and we limit
    our review to plain error. See United States v. Ubakanma, 
    215 F.3d 421
    , 427 (4th Cir. 2000). The district court ordered Harvey to pay res-
    titution in the amounts detailed in the presentence report, and imposed
    joint and several liability with his co-defendant Beeler. Payment was
    ordered due in full immediately. The court then found that Harvey did
    not have the ability to pay a fine in addition to restitution, and
    declined to impose a fine. Harvey does not argue that restitution was
    inappropriate, nor contest the amount of restitution required, but
    argues that the district court’s order of restitution does not comply
    with the requirements of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3664
    (f) (West 2000), and our
    holding in United States v. Dawkins, 
    202 F.3d 711
     (4th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    529 U.S. 1121
     (2000). In Dawkins, we vacated and remanded
    a sentence that included a restitution order, in part because the district
    court failed to make the factual findings required by § 3664(f)(2) in
    ordering restitution. Dawkins, 
    202 F.3d at 716-17
    . In this case, as in
    Dawkins, the presentence report described Harvey’s negative net
    worth and projected income, but the report is silent as to any schedule
    for restitution payments. Because the presentence report does not
    address a schedule of payments, and the district court did not state
    any findings that relate Harvey’s financial condition to the restitution
    schedule ordered, we find plain error. Dawkins, 
    202 F.3d at 717
    ; Uba-
    kanma, 
    215 F.3d at 428-29
    . On remand, the district court shall make
    the appropriate findings in accordance with § 3664(f).
    In his final assertion of error, Harvey contends that the district
    court erred by failing to specify that the restitution due each victim
    of his crimes is limited to the amount of actual loss incurred by that
    victim. Harvey and his co-defendant, Beeler, were ordered jointly and
    severally liable for restitution; Harvey is liable for $39,881.79, and
    Beeler is liable for $25,564.06. Harvey did not raise this issue before
    the district court, and we review for plain error. Ubakanma, 
    215 F.3d at 429
    . In this case, if Harvey and Beeler each paid the full amount
    of restitution ordered, the victims would receive $25,564.06 more
    than the actual losses sustained as a result of the criminal conduct.
    Because restitution is limited to an amount that will restore the victim
    to the position occupied prior to the crime, the district court’s failure,
    in imposing joint and several liability, to explicitly limit the total
    recovery of each victim, is error. However, because there is no statute
    6                       UNITED STATES v. HARVEY
    or controlling Fourth Circuit law requiring that a restitution order
    imposing joint and several liability explicitly state the limit of the vic-
    tims’ recovery, the district court’s error does not amount to plain
    error. Nevertheless, because remand for resentencing is necessary in
    any event, the district court should correct this error when resentenc-
    ing Harvey by including a limitation on each victim’s recovery in its
    written judgment.
    Accordingly, we affirm Harvey’s conviction, but vacate his sen-
    tence and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
    tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED
    AND REMANDED IN PART