Spain v. Mecklenburg County School Board , 54 F. App'x 129 ( 2002 )


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  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    STEVE R. SPAIN, SR.,                    
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    
    MECKLENBURG COUNTY SCHOOL
    BOARD,                                             No. 01-2282
    Defendant-Appellee.
    EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
    COMMISSION,
    Amicus Curiae.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
    Robert E. Payne, District Judge.
    (CA-00-474)
    Argued: October 29, 2002
    Decided: December 23, 2002
    Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and
    WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Carolyn P. Carpenter, CARPENTER LAW FIRM, Rich-
    mond, Virginia, for Appellant. Anne Noel Occhialino, EQUAL
    EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington,
    2            SPAIN v. MECKLENBURG CTY. SCHOOL BOARD
    D.C., for Amicus Curiae. Mary Ellen McGowan, SICILIANO,
    ELLIS, DYER & BOCCAROSSE, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.
    ON BRIEF: Nicholas M. Inzeo, Acting Deputy General Counsel,
    Philip B. Sklover, Associate General Counsel, Carolyn L. Wheeler,
    Assistant General Counsel, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTU-
    NITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Steve R. Spain, Sr. filed this suit against his former employer, the
    Mecklenburg County School Board, alleging that he was demoted
    from the position of Director of Special Education because of his gen-
    der in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because the school
    district had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his reassign-
    ment and Spain did not offer any evidence of discriminatory intent,
    we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defen-
    dants.
    I.
    Plaintiff Steve Spain was employed by the Mecklenburg County
    School Board (the "Board") in various capacities as a teacher and
    administrator from August, 1966, until his retirement in March, 2000.
    In 1995, he was given the title of Director of Special Education,
    which he held until September, 1999, when he was reassigned to the
    position of Supervisor of Special Education. Spain alleges that this
    change in his employment was a discriminatory, gender-based demo-
    tion.
    Spain began his employment with Mecklenburg County as an
    English teacher in 1966. In 1981, he moved into administration,
    SPAIN v. MECKLENBURG CTY. SCHOOL BOARD                  3
    becoming the Coordinator of Regular and Special Services of the
    Department of Special Education. His job title changed a number of
    times in the ensuing years until he was given the title of Director of
    Special Education. Spain holds an Associate of Arts degree, a Bache-
    lor of Arts degree in English, and a Masters degree in Administration
    and Supervision. However, he has no training in special education and
    no experience teaching in that area. Virginia state law requires that a
    Director of Special Education maintain a Virginia postgraduate pro-
    fessional license. Spain does not have the credentials to qualify for
    such a license, but he was granted an administrative waiver in 1992
    by the Virginia Department of Education.
    While Spain was director of the Special Education Department, the
    U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights (OCR) investi-
    gated the department for allegations of ability grouping and racial dis-
    proportionality in special education. This investigation began in 1994
    and concluded in 1998 with the OCR encouraging the department to
    increase minority student participation in college preparatory classes
    and to combat disproportionality in class assignments. On June 6,
    1997, a separate complaint was filed with the OCR regarding discrim-
    ination in the department. Specifically, the complaint alleged that
    African-American students were disproportionately assigned to spe-
    cial education curricula. After reviewing this complaint, the OCR
    concluded that there was a disproportionate assignment of African-
    American students to special education curricula and a failure to place
    African-American students in available accelerated programs in the
    county.
    In July, 1998, Rebecca Perry was appointed Superintendent of the
    Mecklenburg County School System. Shortly after her appointment,
    the school district entered into a formal Commitment to Resolve with
    the OCR to address its disproportionality issues and bring the district
    into compliance with state and federal regulations. As part of Perry’s
    mandate to address these problems and modernize the administration,
    Perry set new goals for herself and other central office personnel.
    These goals included revising outdated job descriptions and develop-
    ing clear lines of responsibility within the central office. Around this
    time, Spain alleges that Perry convened a meeting of central office
    personnel during which she discussed her plans for improvement of
    the school district. Spain contends that during this meeting, Perry
    4             SPAIN v. MECKLENBURG CTY. SCHOOL BOARD
    stated that she had a preference for female administrators because
    they are more organized than men.
    In the summer of 1999, Perry hired Larry Farmer as the Assistant
    Superintendent of Instruction to help her orchestrate the administra-
    tive reorganization. During his initial review of the special education
    department, Farmer noted an "inordinate concentration of kids in self-
    contained classrooms" and a high percentage of minority children in
    special education. In the middle of September, 1999, Farmer met with
    Perry and suggested a change in leadership for the department. He
    recommended Cecelia Coleman for the position of Director of Special
    Education because he felt that her credentials gave her the ability to
    lead the department in the right direction.
    Coleman holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Special Education
    and a Masters of Education degree in Preschool Handicapped Educa-
    tion. She also has certifications for the teaching of special education
    students. Coleman taught special education classes from 1976 until
    1994, receiving the Virginia Teacher of the Year Award in 1987.
    Since 1994, she has held a high-ranking administrative position in the
    Mecklenburg County Special Education Department.
    In late September, 1999, Farmer informed Spain that Cecelia Cole-
    man would be the new Director of Special Education and that Spain
    would be reassigned to the position of Supervisor of Special Educa-
    tion. Farmer told Spain that the reason for the reassignment was that
    "Perry preferred Coleman in the position of Special Education Direc-
    tor." Both Coleman and Spain received new job descriptions that con-
    tained some of their old tasks as well as several new tasks. Upon
    being reassigned to the position of Supervisor, Spain complained to
    Farmer and Perry about having to supervise teachers rather than
    administrative staff and about the increased workload. He asked for
    additional compensation, which was denied.
    Spain’s employment with Mecklenburg County Schools was gov-
    erned by an "Annual Contract with Professional Personnel," initially
    entered into in February, 1972, when Spain was hired as a principal.
    This contract expressly provided that the Superintendent had the
    authority to transfer any teacher or principal to a different school, pro-
    vided that no change was made to his salary. Additionally, school
    SPAIN v. MECKLENBURG CTY. SCHOOL BOARD                   5
    board policy allows for employee reassignment "for that school year
    to any school or facility within such division, provided no change or
    reassignment during a school year shall affect the salary of such
    employee for that school year." Virginia code § 22.1-297 contains a
    virtually identical provision.
    Spain does not deny Perry’s authority to reassign personnel, but
    alleges that the action taken by the Board was a demotion motivated
    by gender discrimination. On February 18, 2000, Spain submitted a
    letter to the Board stating that he intended to end his employment by
    the Board, and on February 26, he submitted another letter detailing
    the reasons for his decision. Spain officially retired from the Meck-
    lenburg County School System on March 1, 2000.
    On February 28, 2000, Spain filed a charge of discrimination with
    the EEOC. Two months later, the EEOC closed its investigation,
    declaring that it was "unable to conclude that the information
    obtained establishes violations of the statutes." Spain then filed the
    present complaint, alleging that he was demoted in violation of 
    42 U.S.C. § 2000
    (e). Spain’s amended complaint also includes a due pro-
    cess claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     and a pendent state claim for
    breach of contract. Spain seeks injunctive relief in the form of a return
    to his former position, as well as compensatory damages and attor-
    neys’ fees.
    On June 15, 2001, the district court referred the Board’s motion for
    summary judgment to a magistrate judge for a report and recommen-
    dation pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (b)(1)(A). On July 31, 2001, the
    magistrate filed a report recommending that summary judgment be
    granted. The magistrate found that Spain did not suffer an adverse
    employment action because (1) the reassignment did not represent a
    significant change in his responsibilities; (2) there was no evidence
    establishing that the position of Supervisor was necessarily inferior to
    the position of Director; (3) Spain’s duties had been expanded, not
    diminished, by the reassignment; and (4) Spain’s salary and benefits
    remained the same. The court also found that Spain’s employment
    contract, Board policy, and state law allowed his reassignment to the
    position of Supervisor. Spain objected. On September 21, 2001, the
    district court denied this objection and granted the Board’s summary
    judgment motion without issuing a separate opinion, dismissing
    6             SPAIN v. MECKLENBURG CTY. SCHOOL BOARD
    Spain’s claim with prejudice. The court also dismissed Spain’s breach
    of contract and due process claims. Spain appeals as to the Title VII
    claim.
    II.
    Under Title VII, it is "an unlawful employment practice for an
    employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual" or
    to discriminate "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
    or privileges of employment" because of an individual’s gender. 42
    U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Because it is often difficult for a plaintiff to pro-
    vide direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court has
    created a burden-shifting structure for analyzing such claims. See
    McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973).
    Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff bears the ini-
    tial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
    Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 
    530 U.S. 133
    , 142 (2000)
    (citing McDonnell Douglas). To satisfy this burden, a plaintiff is
    required to plead facts sufficient to create an inference that an adverse
    employment decision was based on impermissible considerations.
    This may be done by showing that (1) the plaintiff is a member of a
    protected class; (2) the plaintiff was otherwise qualified for the posi-
    tion; (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)
    the action took place under conditions establishing an inference of
    discrimination. 
    Id.
     Although the district court granted summary judg-
    ment on the basis that Spain suffered no adverse employment action,
    we find it unnecessary to reach this question. We will assume for the
    purposes of appeal that Spain provided sufficient facts to create a
    prima facie case.
    Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
    the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
    for the challenged action. Reeves, 
    530 U.S. at 142
    . However, this bur-
    den "is one of production, not persuasion." 
    Id.
     The responsibility of
    proving that "the protected trait . . . actually motivated the employer’s
    decision" remains with the plaintiff at all times. Hazen Paper Co. v.
    Biggins, 
    507 U.S. 604
    , 610 (1993). Thus, it is not enough for a plain-
    tiff merely to raise an inference of discrimination. Rather, a plaintiff
    bears the ultimate burden of proving that the decision was made not
    SPAIN v. MECKLENBURG CTY. SCHOOL BOARD                   7
    on any proffered grounds but instead on the basis of impermissible
    discriminatory grounds. Reeves, 
    530 U.S. at 143
    .
    The Board contends that the reason for the reassignment was clear:
    Perry and the Board wished to change the direction and leadership of
    the department to address OCR’s complaints, and Coleman was better
    qualified for the leadership position. Coleman has extensive creden-
    tials in special education, including a postgraduate professional
    license as supervisor of special education. Spain has no training in the
    area and is not qualified to hold the position of Director of Special
    Education without an administrative waiver. Additionally, Spain’s
    reassignment was part of a larger reorganization undertaken by Perry
    and Farmer designed to ultimately "set higher goals with students, and
    improv[e] student achievement."
    Because the Board has advanced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
    reason for the employment decision, the burden shifts back to Spain
    to show that "the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not
    its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Reeves, 
    530 U.S. at 143
     (internal citation omitted). The ultimate burden rests at all
    times with the plaintiff. Spain must therefore show that the Board’s
    proffered explanation "is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep’t of
    Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 
    450 U.S. 248
    , 256 (1981).
    Spain’s sole evidence of discriminatory intent is a purported com-
    ment by Perry that she prefers female administrators because they are
    better organized than men. But this general comment in no way sug-
    gests that the Board’s proffered explanation for the decision is a pre-
    text for discrimination. The reason that Farmer gave to Spain for his
    reassignment, that "Perry preferred Coleman in the position of Special
    Education Director," was likewise neutral. Spain provided no evi-
    dence at all that the reorganization itself was pretextual. In fact, dur-
    ing the reorganization Perry hired twenty-four new administrators,
    fourteen of whom were men. Thus, the Board has provided strong
    evidence that tends to rebut any inference that Perry only hired or
    strongly preferred female administrators.
    "The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case
    involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was
    the victim of intentional discrimination." Reeves, 
    530 U.S. at 153
    . To
    8            SPAIN v. MECKLENBURG CTY. SCHOOL BOARD
    overcome a motion for summary judgment in such a case, a plaintiff
    must provide direct or circumstantial evidence "of sufficient probative
    force" to show a genuine issue of material fact exists as to this ques-
    tion. Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 
    836 F.2d 845
    , 848 (4th Cir. 1988).
    Spain, however, relies on little more than bald or inapposite accusa-
    tions to satisfy his burden. Where, as here, "the record conclusively
    reveal[s] some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s
    decision" a court is correct to conclude that there is no triable issue
    of fact. Reeves, 
    530 U.S. at 148
    . Therefore, summary judgment in this
    case is appropriate and the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.